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The allocation and management of scarce resources are of central importance in the design of
policies to improve social well-being. This dissertation consists of three essays; the first two deals
with the problem of allocating kidneys and the third one on power management in computing
devices.
Kidney exchange programs are an attractive alternative for patients who need a kidney trans-
plant and who have a willing, but medically incompatible, donor. A registry that keeps track of
such patient-donor pairs can find matches through exchanges amongst such pairs. This results in a
quicker transplant for the patients involved, and equally importantly, keeps such patients from the
long wait list of patients without an intended donor. As of March 2014, there were at least 99,000
candidates waiting for a kidney transplant in the U.S. However, in 2013 only 16,893 transplants
were conducted. This imbalance between supply and demand among other factors, has driven the
development of multiple kidney exchange programs in the U.S. and the subsequent development of
matching mechanisms to run the programs.
In the first essay we consider a matching problem arising in kidney exchanges between hospitals.
Focusing on the case of two hospitals, we construct a strategy-proof matching mechanism that is
guaranteed to return a matching that is at least 3/4 the size of a max-cardinality matching. It is
known that no better performance is possible if one focuses on mechanisms that return a maximal
matching, and so our mechanism is best possible within this natural class of mechanisms. For
path-cycle graphs we construct a mechanism that returns a matching that is at least 4/5 the size
of max-cardinality matching. This mechanism does not necessarily return a maximal matching.
Finally, we construct a mechanism that is universally truthful on path-cycle graphs and whose
performance is within 2/3 of optimal. Again, it is known that no better ratio is possible.
In most of the existing literature, mechanisms are typically evaluated by their overall perfor-
mance on a large exchange pool, based on which conclusions and recommendations are drawn. In
our second essay, we consider a dynamic framework to evaluate extensively used kidney exchange
mechanisms. We conduct a simulation-based study of a dynamically evolving exchange pool during
9 years. Our results suggest that some of the features that are critical in a mechanism in the
static setting have only a minor impact in its long-run performance when viewed in the dynamic
setting. More importantly, features that are generally underestimated in the static setting turn to
be relevant when we look at dynamically evolving exchange pool. For example, the pairs’ arrival
rates. In particular we provide insights into the effect on the waiting times and the probability
to receive an offer of controllable features such as the frequency at which matching are run, the
structures through which pairs could be matched (cycles or chains) as well as inherent features
such as the pairs ABO-PRA characteristics, the availability of altruistic donors, and wether or not
compatible pairs join the exchange etc. We evaluate the odds to receive an offer and the expected
time to receive an offer for each ABO-PRA type of pairs in the model.
Power management in computing devices aims to minimize energy consumption to perform
tasks, meanwhile keeping acceptable performance levels. A widely used power management strategy
for devices, is to transit the devices and/or components to lower power consumption states during
inactivity periods. Transitions between power states consume energy, thus, depending on such
costs, it may be advantageous to stay in high power state during some inactivity periods. In our
third essay we consider the problem of minimizing the total energy consumed by a 2-power state
device, to process jobs that are sent over time by a constrained adversary. Jobs can be preempted,
but deadlines need to be met. In this problem, an algorithm must decide when to schedule the
jobs, as well as a sequence of power states, and the discrete time thresholds at which these states
will be reached. We provide an online algorithm to minimize the energy consumption when the
cost of a transition to the low power state is small enough. In this case, the problem of minimizing
the energy consumption is equivalent to minimizing the total number of inactivity periods. We
also provide an algorithm to minimize the energy consumption when it may be advantageous to
stay in high power state during some inactivity periods. In both cases we provide upper bounds
on the competitive ratio of our algorithms, and lower bounds on the competitive ratio of all online
algorithms.
Table of Contents
List of Figures iii
List of Tables vi
1 Introduction 1
1.1 On the kidney exchange problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Online scheduling for energy minimization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2 An Optimal Randomized Mechanism for Kidney Exchange with Two Agents 11
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2 Algorithm BALANCE and its analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3 Mechanism BALANCE-AND-AUGMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.4 Matchings on Paths and Cycles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.5 On strategy-proofness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.5.1 BALANCE-ALL and BALANCE-ALL-AND-AUGMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.6 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3 A Dynamic Framework for the Design and Evaluation of Kidney Exchange Pro-
grams 46
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.2 The model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.2.1 Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.2.2 Parameters estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.2.3 Altruistic Donors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
i
3.2.4 Compatible pairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.2.5 Matching policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.3 The Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.4 Our findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.4.1 How frequently should we run the matching algorithms? . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.4.2 What are the odds to receive an offer? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.4.3 How is the sensitization level of the pool? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.4.4 Who benefits from allowing chains and longer cycles? . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4 Online scheduling for energy minimization with a constrained adversary 81
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.2 Online scheduling algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.2.1 The algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.2.2 Correctness of LAZY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
4.3 Minimizing the number of idle periods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
4.4 Energy minimization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
4.4.1 Algorithm DEFER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
4.4.2 Competitive Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
4.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
Bibliography 137
A Example mechanism BALANCE-AND-AUGMENT 142
B BALANCE-ALL and BALANCE-ALL-AND-AUGMENT: strategy-proofness and bounds 144
C Parameters estimation: technical report 150
C.1 Forecasting the UNO’s waiting list arrival in the next 10 years . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
C.2 Forecasting the UNO’s living donors arrivals in the next 10 years . . . . . . . . . . . 152
D Proposition used in Proof of Theorem 4.4.2 157
ii
List of Figures
2.3.1 (a) Compatibility graph G which has two maximal connected components (b) Match-
ing M is the output of mechanism BALANCE on G (c) Output of any strategy-proof
mechanism that applies on each maximal connected component in isolation. . . . . . 29
2.4.1 Compatibility graph G in which SHARE is not SP. SHARE fails in G because the
matching that it returns depends on the order in which augmentations are done and
so agent black has incentive to hide nodes b1,b2,b5 and b6 to match all its nodes with
probability 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.4.2 e2 is matched by M2, e1 is matched by M1 and (v1, v2) is matched by both M2 and
M3. Additionally, v2 is not matched by M1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.4.3 The component of M2∆M3 that is adjacent to e1 and does not contain edge e2 has
an even number of edges. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.4.4 The component of M2∆M3 that is adjacent to e1 and does not contain edge e2 has
a odd number of edges. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.4.5 The component of M2∆M3 adjacent to e1 that is not e2 has length 1. (a) the
component of M1∆M2 that includes e2 intersect with a component M2∆M3 with
length at least 2 (b) the component of M1∆M2 that includes e2 intersect with an
edge that is matched by both M3 and M2 (c) M3 matches no node in the graph thus
there is no two consecutive nodes in the graph that belong to the same agent, and
M1 and M2 matches are equal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
iii
2.5.1 (a) Output of mechanism BALANCE on compatibility graph G, utility of agent black
is 5 (b) Output of mechanism BALANCE-ALL on G\{v1}. The utility of agent black is
7, 5 nodes matched by BALANCE-ALL and 2 nodes matched by the agent black, the
unmatched node v2 matched with the non reported node v1 (c) Output of mechanism
BALANCE-ALL on G\{v1, v2}. The utility of agent black is 5, 3 nodes matched by
BALANCE-ALL and 2 nodes matched by agent black, the non reported nodes v1 and
v2, thus agent black under mechanism BALANCE-ALL has incentive to report node v2
which could remain unmatch to match it with non reported node v1. . . . . . . . . . 43
2.5.2 (a) Output of mechanism BALANCE on compatibility graph G, utility of agent black
is 4 (b) Output of mechanism BALANCE-ALL on compatibility graph G. The utility
of agent black is 5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.4.1 Number of pairs with an O patient and an A donor pending to receive an offer over
time in Scenario1 and in Scenario3 when matching every 30 days . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.4.2 Number of pairs with an B patient and an A donor pending to receive an offer over
time in Scenario1 and in Scenario3 when matching every 30 days . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.4.3 Number of pairs with an O patient and an B donor pending to receive an offer over
time in Scenario4 and in Scenario6 when matching every 30 days for a realization . 75
4.2.1 (a) Set of jobs Ju (b) Set of jobs Ju−1 (c) Set of jobs Ju2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.2.2 Example to illustrate the computation of ωN (t, u1, u2) when workload is allowed to
not be integral . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.2.3 Sp is a schedule such that I(Sp) = {I1, I2} and S(Sp) = {B1, B2} . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.2.4 Example that shows that when workload needs to be integer it is no longer true
that there exist a set of jobs J ′∗, J ′∗ ∈ arg maxJ ′ minS∈S(J ′) p(S), such that all job’s
deadlines are at most u2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.2.5 The problems υN (t, u1, d, ~wd) arise while solving problems υ
N (t, u1, d+ 1, ~wd+1) . . 100
4.3.1 An instance of problem energy(1,9). (a) optimal schedule (b) schedule produces by
an arbitrary online algorithm with finite competitive ratio. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4.3.2 An instance of problem energy(1,4) (a) optimal schedule (b) schedule produces by
an arbitrary online algorithm with finite competitive ratio. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
iv
4.4.1 f(t) and f ′(t) for a) smax = 10
3 b) smax = 10
6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
4.4.2 t∗(smax) computed numerically . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
4.4.3 Case 1. There is a processing block that starts before and finish strictly after uCi∗−1,
and there is a processing block that starts strictly before and finish strictly after uCi∗ 128
4.4.4 Case 2. here is a processing block that starts before and finish strictly after uCi∗−1,
and there is No processing block that starts strictly before and finish strictly after uCi∗129
4.4.5 Case 3. There is No processing block that starts before and finish strictly after uCi∗−1,
and there is No processing block that starts strictly before and finish strictly after uCi∗130
4.4.6 Case 4. There is No processing block that starts before and finish strictly after uCi∗−1,
and there is a processing block that starts strictly before and finish strictly after uCi∗ 131
A.0.1compatibility graphG. Notice that graphG is a disconnected graph with 4 components.142
A.0.2Output of mechanism BALANCE when applied on G at the end of each step of the
algorithm. (a) step 1 (b) step 2 (c) step 3 (d) step 4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
C.1.1Time plots of time series xpt (b) for b ∈ {O,A,B,AB} . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
C.2.1Time plots of time series ydt (b) for b ∈ {O,A,B,AB} . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
C.2.2Time plot, ACF and PACF of xpt (b)− x
p
t−1(b) for b ∈ {O,A,B,AB} . . . . . . . . . 155
C.2.3Time plot, ACF and PACF of ydt (b)− ydt−1(b) for b ∈ {O,A,B,AB} . . . . . . . . . 156
v
List of Tables
3.1 Forecasted percentage of Patient’s arrivals of each ABO blood type in the next 10
years. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.2 Forecasted percentage of Donor’s arrivals of each ABO blood type in 10 years time
horizon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.3 Number of deaths for every 1,000 patient-years on the waiting list, 1999 to 2008 . . . 52
3.4 cPRA probability mass function used in our model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.5 New pair registrations per month in the NKR exchange program from January 2013
to Jun 2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.6 Some matching structures used in our matching algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.7 Distribution of blood types of patients and donors in the stream of arrivals . . . . . 61
3.8 Description scenarios recreated in our experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.9 Conditional distribution of donor’s blood type in the stream of arrivals given the
patient’s blood type and its cPRA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.10 Donor’s blood type distribution when compatible pairs don’t join the pool. . . . . . 63
3.11 Cumulative density function of the waiting time of pairs with an O highly sensitized
patient and an B donor that receive an offer in Scenario1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.12 Percentage of highly sensitized O and A patients by donor that receive an offer in
Scenario1 and Scenario3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.13 Percentage of patients with an O low sensitized patient that receive an offer classified
by their’s donor’s blood type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.14 Percentage of patients with an O medium sensitized patient that receive an offer
classified by their’s donor’s blood type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
vi
3.15 Percentage of patients with an O medium sensitized patient that receive an offer
classified by their’s donor’s blood type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.16 Waiting time cumulative density function for pairs with an O highly sensitized pa-
tient and an A donor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.17 Percentage of the different ABO pair types with a highly sensitized patient pending
to receive an offer by the end of the 9th year when compatible pairs join the pool
and matchings are run every 30 days . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.18 Percentage of the different ABO pair types with a highly sensitized patient pending
to receive an offer by the end of the 9th year when compatibles don’t join the pool. . 74
3.19 Chain’s last bridge donor blood type distribution in Scenario1a . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.20 Pairs with an O highly sensitized patient and an A donor Waiting time’s cumulative
density function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.21 Pairs with an O low sensitized patient and an A donor Waiting time’s cumulative
density function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
C.1 AR(1) estimated parameters of times series xpt (p) for p ∈ {O,A,B,AB} and the
corresponding analysis of residuals (normality and independence). . . . . . . . . . . 152
C.2 Predicted number of arrivals of each ABO blood type in 10 years time horizon . . . 153
C.3 AR(1) estimated parameters of times series ydt (p) for p ∈ {O,A,B,AB} and the
corresponding analysis of residuals (normality and independence). . . . . . . . . . . 154
C.4 Predicted yearly number of living donors by ABO blood type that will be trans-
planted in 2013-2022 time horizon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
vii





1.1 On the kidney exchange problem
Kidney transplantation is the best known treatment for patients suffering from end stage renal
disease (ESRD) [40]. As of March 2014, there were at least 99,000 candidates waiting for a kidney
transplantation in the U.S. However, in 2013 only 16,893 transplants were conducted, of which
11,161 were carried-out with a deceased donor and 5,732 with a living donor1. This imbalance
between supply and demand, together with the prevailing need to improve the quality of life and life
expectancy of ESRD patients, and the substantial savings that performing a live kidney transplant
generates, has driven the development, and subsequent expansion of multiple kidney exchange
programs in the U.S. [20]. These programs are seen as an alternative to increase the pool of living
donors.
In the last decade or so many countries have started kidney exchange programs as a way of
combating the great and growing imbalance between supply and demand for kidneys. A kidney
exchange program is a registry in which patients who need a kidney transplant are registered
together with their generally incompatible willing donor. The idea is that two (or more) such
patient-donor pairs may be able to exchange their donors, thereby utilizing the donor’s kidneys,
which would otherwise not be used at all. These exchanges also improve the status of the patients
on the national wait list for kidneys, as patients who are able to get a transplant through a kidney
1According to SRTP/OPTN national data retrieved at http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ on 28 March 2014
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exchange will not join this wait list or will depart from it once they are transplanted. Donors
without an intended recipient can also register, and several transplantation centers or hospitals may
be affiliated to a kidney exchange program. In earlier stages of the development of the programs,
exchanges were exclusively pairwise and surgeries occurred simultaneously, due to ethical issues
and incentives. Later developments have promoted the implementation of simultaneous exchanges
involving 3 or more pairs, and also exchanges initiated by a living donor without an intended
recipient. A donor without an intended patient initiates a chain of exchanges in which transplants
in the chain are not necessarily conducted simultaneously as in the case of cycles. Chains can
terminate in a patient without an intended donor or could be left open to be continued as more
pairs join the exchange program.
The compatibility between a potential recipient and a donor is mainly determined by their ABO2
blood-types and by their tissue type compatibility. The tissue type incompatibility is determined by
the presence in the patient’s blood of antibodies to the donor’s HLA (Human Leukocyte Antigen)
profile. A failure in tissue type compatibility is also known as positive crossmatch.
The existence of multiple kidney exchange programs in the U.S. has driven innovation and
development. However, it has also divided a national exchange pool, into smaller, thus limited,
exchange pools. This has reduced the number of opportunities for patients with incompatible
living donors. An analogous situation is encountered at transplantation centers. Depending on
the matching mechanism used by the kidney exchange program of its affiliation, a transplantation
center may have incentives to only report to the exchange program, the pairs that it could not
match internally. A transplantation center may be one hospital or multiple hospitals under some
sort of collaboration agreement. Incentives issues are also observed at the level of the patients,
who may have multiple willing donors. There is by now a large literature on kidney exchange
programs, starting with the pioneering work of Roth, Ünver and Sönmez in [33; 36; 35; 34] focused
on incentives facing the patient-donor pairs in the system. With the growing number of kidney
exchange programs, however, came the growing recognition that modeling the incentives of hospitals
or transplantation centers is important as well. The strategic behavior of hospitals as agents of
patient-donor pairs was first addressed by Ashlagi, Fischer, Kash and Procaccia in [7].
2ABO is the most important blood-group system in human-blood transfusion. According to it, blood-type can be
classified as O, A, B, AB.
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The innovation and development that have brought the kidney exchange programs are greatly
evidenced in the evolution of matching algorithms designed to match pairs through cycles in large
graphs. In [1], Abraham, Blum and Sandholm report that the U.S. market is projected to have
around 8,000 participant pairs. This has motivated the design of algorithms to efficiently compute
good matchings involving three or more patient-donor pairs [1; 27]. There is an ongoing debate
about the trade-off between innovation and development driven by competition and the loss of
efficiency inherent in a fractioned exchange pool. Although smaller pools are associated with losses
in efficiency, they are also linked to faster decision making processes due to several factors such
as fewer number of hospitals (centers), geographic distances, insurances etc. Understanding how
the size of the pool affects the performance of an exchange program will provide insights into this
debate.
Another important aspect of the kidney exchange market that has been widely studied is the
type of structures that suffice to clear the exchange pool [3; 4; 31; 5]. Due to the inherent logistical
constraints imposed by cycles- one surgery room need to be available for each patient and each
donor in the cycle, it is crucial to understand if short exchanges suffice to achieve satisfactory
levels of performance (a combination of fairness and efficiency); and if that is not the case, which
strategies can help. It has been shown in that in large compatibility graphs, cycles with at most
3 pairs suffice to clear the exchange pool [4]. This result follows from the fact that in standard
random graph models, when the number of nodes is large the graph tends to be highly connected
as argued in [3]. Nonetheless, compatibility graphs that have been observed in reality are sparse
and not large, and empirical results from available data show that matching longer chains results
in a substantially better performance.
In the vast majority of the current literature the kidney exchange problem is studied in a static
framework. Algorithms are typically evaluated by their performance on a large compatibility graph
and conclusions and recommendations have been drawn based on such models. In reality, pairs
arrive over time, matching algorithms are run at different points in time, and the compatibility
graph just before running a matching not only depends on the pairs that have arrived since the
last run, but also on the pairs that weren’t matched in the previous runs. Different strategies may
benefit/hurt different type of pairs over time, and those outcomes determine the size and the PRA-
ABO composition of the compatibility graph over time. Data-based dynamic evaluations have been
3
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conducted by Dickerson et al. [10; 16; 18; 17]. Ünver [39] considered a dynamic model in which
pairs arrive following a Poisson process. He designed an optimal dynamic policy for a model in
which pairs do not have tissue type incompatibilities, there are no departures without a transplant
and that there are arbitrarily many under demanded pairs in the exchange pool in the long run.
He also shows that in his model, it is not always an optimal strategy to match as many pairs as
possible at a given point in time.
Our work In Chapter 2 we continue the line of research that calls for designing mechanisms
that encourage transplantation centers to report all their registered pairs to the kidney exchange
program. For the transplantation centers to feel comfortable about reporting all their pairs, a
conservative approach is to design a strategy-proof mechanism: in such a mechanism, it is a dominant
strategy for the agents to truthfully report all the patients registered with them3. Specifically we
consider the problem of designing a strategy-proof mechanism for a centralized planner with two
agents that maximizes the total number of pairs that are matched through pairwise exchanges.
Each pair is represented by only one of the two agents and the goal of each agent is to maximize
the number of its patients matched by the exchange. We emphasize that this model does not
capture the dynamic nature of the kidney exchange problem.
Following Ashlagi, Fischer, Kash and Procaccia in [8] and Caragiannis and Filos-Ratsikas [15],
we consider the case of two agents. For general graphs we construct a strategyproof matching
mechanism that is guaranteed to return a matching that is at least 3/4 the size of a max-cardinality
matching. No better performance is possible if one focuses on mechanisms that return a maximal
matching; our mechanism always yields a maximal matching, and so our mechanism is best possible
within this natural class of mechanisms. This answers an open question of Caragiannis et al. For
path-cycle graphs we construct a randomized, truthful in expectation mechanism that returns a
matching that is at least 4/5 the size of a max-cardinality matching. This mechanism does not
necessarily return a maximal matching (A path-cycle graph is a graph in which each component is
either a path or a cycle). Finally, we construct a randomized mechanism that is universally truthful
on path-cycle graphs that is at least 2/3 the size of a max-cardinality matching. Again, it is known
that no better ratio is possible.
3 As is common in this literature, we assume that monetary compensations are disallowed.
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In Chapter 3 we propose a dynamic framework to evaluate extensively used kidney exchanges
strategies. We do this through a simulation-based study in which parameters are estimated from
data. In our model there is a single kidney registry at which pairs register directly, and to which
they arrive and depart over time. Pairs are classified by the donor’s blood type, the patient’s blood
type and their sensitization level. We consider two main scenarios depending on whether or not
compatible pairs join the exchange program. For each scenario we simulate the exchange program
during 9 years and study the effect of the (i) frequency at which matchings are run; (ii) presence
of altruistic donors; (iii) maximum length of cycles allowed in clearing the exchange pool; and (iv)
sensitization level of arriving patients on the (i) odds of the various types of pairs to receive an
offer (ii) waiting time distribution (iii) sensitization level of the pool over time (iv) benefit brought
by the presence of altruistic donors; and (v) bridge donor’s blood type distribution. Instead of
providing overall performance measures, we analyze the effects on each pair type. Due to the large
disparity in the raw numbers among the different types of pairs, overall measures could potentially
hide large disparity in the performance across different pair types, thus it is important to evaluate
the performance of policies in a more detailed way instead of aggregating the performance measured
across the various types.
We use as benchmark the scenario that results from matching at different frequencies the max-
imum number of pairs that could be matched through arbitrary length cycles. We propose policies
that use exchanges of length at most 5 including chains in the presence of altruistic donors. Our
findings suggest that while overall chains and long cycles improve efficiency, they also create large
disparity in the odds to receive an offer and waiting time distribution across the different type of
pairs. The frequency at which matchings are run does not have a significant effect on the number
of offers that are made when compatible pairs join the pool for any of the scenarios we consider,
however it has a substantial effect when only incompatible pairs join the pool. In this latter case
the frequency at which matchings are run impacts differently the different type of pairs. There is
a trade off in efficiency and waiting times across the different type of pairs when matching more
or less frequency which should be considered when evaluating a policy. The role of a pair donor’s
blood type or patient’s blood type or its sensitization level varies largely depending on the distri-
bution of the flow of arriving pairs — for example when compatible pairs do not enter the exchange
our findings suggest that the donor’s blood type plays a central role in the probability of a patient
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to receive an offer however when compatible pairs do not enter the pool this central role relies
on the patient’s blood type. On the presence of altruistic donors, particularly when 1% of the
arrivals are altruistic donors, we find that the increase in the number of offers when chains are
initiated is roughly 4%, however when compatible pairs do not join the pool this drops to 1%, and
in both cases the improvement on highly sensitized patients seems to be minor. Finally regarding
the distribution of the last bridge donor of a chain, not surprisingly, the brigde donor’s blood type
distribution changes significantly with respect to the altruistic donor’s blood type distribution that
initiated a chain. For example, while 65% of the altuistic donors in our model have blood type O,
the percentage of blood type O bridge donors that terminate chains is below 15%. Measures across
the different type of pairs as well as the interaction with the waiting list should be more carefully
incorporated in the evaluation and design of policies for the kidney exchange. In particular, it is
easy to overestimate the benefits obtained from redirecting altruistic donors from the waiting list
to start chains in the exchange pool, the effect of this on the patients on the waiting list should be
carefully evaluated.
1.2 Online scheduling for energy minimization
Energy conservation is a central concern in modern world. In 1992, the U.S. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency started Energy Star4 to promote energy-efficiency in electronic devices. Several federal
and state programs have been launched to promote the development of energy-friendly technologies
as well as to promote the use of cleaner energy sources. In computing devices, energy consumption
is a major concern. The power consumption rates of computing devices have increased exponen-
tially bringing with it many technological, economical, and environmental challenges. For example,
the amount of energy consumed worldwide by data centers in 2010 accounted for between 1.1%
and 1.5% of the total electricity use; and in the U.S. it accounted for between 1.7% and 2.2% of
total energy consumption, see [26]. As reported in [13], Google enginners warned that if energy
consumption continues to grow, energy costs can outweigh hardware costs by a large margin.
This issue has been addressed from different perspectives such as hardware design, system de-
4“ENERGY STAR is a U.S. Environmental Protection Agency voluntary program that helps businesses and
individuals save money and protect our climate through superior energy efficiency.” https://www.energystar.gov/
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sign, algorithmic techniques etc. From the algorithmic perspective, three main type of energy saving
strategies have been widely considered: power-down strategies, speed scaling and combinations of
both. Power-down strategies save energy by transitioning a device to a lower power state when
there is certain level of inactivity — anybody with a battery-operated electronic device is familiar
with this type of mechanism to conserve energy. Speed-scaling strategies can be implemented in
variable-speed processors. They make use of the full spectrum of speeds at which the processor
can operate and decide at which speed the processor should be operating at every point in time as
to achieve the desired level of performance — for example meeting deadlines. The dynamic speed
scaling problem without the sleep state was first studied by Yao, Demers and Shenker [42]. Irani
and Pruhs [24] and Albers [2] survey the extensive literature on dynamic speed scaling strategies
in the offline and in the online setting.
In a power-down strategy, the device always resides in one of several power states and transitions
across states have a fixed cost. In the most simple version of this problem there are two power
states. The device consumes H energy units per unit of time at high power state, L energy units
per unit of time at low power state, and U energy units to move from low power state to high
power state. Notice that is is assumed that the energy consumed to transit from the high power
state to the low power state is zero. This assumption can be made because the device is assumed
to be at the high power state when the inactivity period starts and terminates at the high power
state when the inactivity period is over, then the number of transitions from low to high power
state is equal to the number of transitions from high to low and thus the energy consumed in the
two directions can be included in one quantity. The two-state version of the problem corresponds
to a continuous version of the well-known ski rental problem [21]. It is generally assumed that
when the device is processing, it does so at the maximum power rate, which is generally called the
active state. The question that arises in this setting is when to transit and to which state should
the device transit during inactivity periods so as to minimize the total energy consumed during
an inactivity period. As the length of the inactivity period is unknown, a we would like to design
online strategies to manage power during inactivity periods with provable performance guarantee
with respect to an optimal solution that knows in advance the length of the inactivity period. For
this problem, the competitive ratio of an online algorithm ALG is defined as an upper bound on
the ratio between the total energy consumed by algorithm ALG during the inactivity period and
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the energy consumed by an optimal offline algorithm that knows the length of the idle period in
advance, over all possible lengths for the inactive period.
The problem previously described is well understood. Karlin, Manasse, McGeoch and Owicki
showed [25] that in the two-power state case an optimal deterministic algorithm is 2-competitive
and that an optimal randomized algorithm is ee−1 -competitive, in both cases they provided an
algorithm with the corresponding performance guarantee. Later on, Irani, Shukla and Gupta
studied [23] the case in which there are multiple power states. They presented online and an offline
algorithm under some assumptions on the energy required to transit among different states. They
provided a 2-competitive deterministic algorithm when the device has multiple power states, which
is the best competitive ratio a deterministic algorithm can achieve. Also they generalized the result
in the randomized scenario when the device has multiple power states. Finally, Augustine, Irani
and Swamy [9] provide a deterministic algorithm that for arbitrary energy parameters produces a
deterministic strategy whose competitive ratio is arbitrarily close to optimal ratio and provide a
simple 3+2
√
(2) ≈ 5.828-competitive strategy. Notice that this problem does not model scheduling
decisions, and is just concerned about power management during inactivity periods.
In many real life applications, the scheduler decides when and which job to schedule as well as
in which power-state the device should operate. In Chapter 4, we study an online version of the
problem of scheduling a set of jobs with release times and deadlines on a two-state processor so as to
minimize the total energy consumed. We assume that jobs are processed in the high power state and
the scheduler decides when to process the jobs and how to manage the power during the inactivity
periods. The corresponding offline problem with objective to minimizing the total number of idle
periods, was shown to be polynomial-time solvable by Baptiste [11]. When the switching energy
costs are sufficiently small, minimizing the total number of idle periods is equivalent to minimizing
the total energy consumption. When switching costs are larger, the problem is more challenging.
For this case, Baptiste, Chrobak and Durr [12] provide a polynomial time algorithm to minimize
the total energy consumption.
In many real-life problems the existence of jobs and their characteristics are not known until
they are released, hence the online version of this problem is of special interest. Unfortunately,
any online algorithm needs to process jobs as soon as they can be processed in order to guarantee
that deadlines will be met. To see this, consider the following example: a job with workload 1
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and deadline 2 is released at time 0; if this job is not processed at time 0, then the adversary can
release a job with deadline 2 and workload 1, thus at least one of them will not be able to meet
its deadline. This implies that online algorithms for this problem have no scheduling decisions to
make, and hence, they have no control on the number or length of idle periods. In many situations,
standard worst-case analysis may be pessimistic. For example, we may know that our system is
unlikely to be so heavily loaded that jobs must run as soon as possible. To model this, we introduce
a constrained adversary, who is limited in how much workload may be placed on the machine. The
constrained adversary has two parameters, smax and ρmax. The jobs release by the constrained





— ωj is the workload
of job j. We consider the problem of minimizing the total energy consumed by a two-power state
device, to process jobs that are sent over time by a constrained adversary. Jobs can be preempted,
but deadlines need to be met. In this problem, an algorithm must decide when to schedule the
jobs, as well as at which power state it should run at any time.
We provide an online algorithm to minimize the energy consumption for arbitrary values of
power consumption rates. We also provide an online algorithm to minimize the total number of
idle periods in the resulting schedule. In both cases, we provide upper bounds on the competitive
ratio of our algorithms, and lower bounds on all online algorithms. The bounds presented hold for
arbitrary power consumption rates of the processor.
The energy required to process an instance is at least the energy necessary to process the
workload. Given that the machine has a constant power consumption rate when processing, it
follows that the differences between schedules arises from two main features: the number and
length of the idle periods in the schedules, and the sequence of power states followed by the
algorithm during the idle periods. To solve the main problem addressed in this paper, we propose
an algorithm - called DEFER - that approaches these two main features independently. In other
words, scheduling decisions are taken independently of the power consumption rates. Decisions
regarding when to process jobs and which jobs to process are taken using our algorithm LAZY.
Algorithm LAZY waits as long as it is possible to start processing the pending workload as to
guarantee that all deadlines will be met, this includes the deadline of pending jobs as well as the
deadlines of any future possible arrival. Once it starts processing, LAZY processes under earliest
deadline first until there is no more pending workload. Decisions regarding the sequence of power
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states followed by the algorithm during the idle periods are taken using an optimal competitive
deterministic algorithm. During an idle period, an optimal competitive deterministic algorithm
stays in high power consumption state until the energy that it has consumed during that idle
period is equal to the energy that it would have consumed if it had switched at the start of the
idle period plus the energy required to power-up. We argue in this work that this separation is
appropriate. The jobs’ span are bounded by a parameter smax and bounds are given as a function of
smax. We show that for an arbitrary online algorithm the competitive ratio has an asymptotic lower
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Chapter 2
An Optimal Randomized Mechanism
for Kidney Exchange with Two
Agents
2.1 Introduction
Patient-donor pairs can register in a kidney exchange program directly or through a transplantation
center that is a member of the program. In the latter case, a transplantation center acts as an
agent of its patient-donor pairs. In an ideal scenario, each center reports all their registered pairs to
the exchange program, but it is not completely clear if this will actually be the case. If the kidney
exchange programs cannot guarantee a reasonable number of matches for the patients registered
through a given center, then that center may have an incentive to not reveal everyone who is
registered with them. As an example, if a transplantation center can match more of its pairs by not
reporting all of its pairs to the exchange program and instead matching some of them internally,
then it is reasonable to expect that this center will actually do so. Often this may come at the cost
of the total number of exchanges that can be done. As a way of addressing this drawback, research
in this area has focused on understanding the efficiency loss of natural mechanisms as well as on
designing mechanisms where this worst-case efficiency loss is as small as possible.
In this paper we continue this line of research that calls for designing mechanisms that encourage
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transplantation centers to report all its registered pairs to the kidney exchange program. For the
transplantation centers to feel comfortable about reporting all their pairs, a conservative approach is
to design a strategy-proof mechanism: in such a mechanism, it is a dominant strategy for the agents
to truthfully report all the patients registered with them.1Specifically we consider the problem of
designing a strategy-proof mechanism for a centralized planner who wishes to maximize the total
number of pairs matched through pairwise exchanges, assuming there are exactly two agents. Each
pair is represented by only one of the two agents and the goal of each agent is to maximize the
number of its patients matched by the exchange.
There is by now a large literature on kidney exchange programs, starting with the pioneering work
of Roth et al. [32]. To the extent that the early literature focused on incentives, it focused on
incentives facing the patients in the system, see Roth et al. [32; 36; 31]. With the growing number
of kidney exchange programs, however, came the growing recognition that modeling the incentives
of hospitals or transplantation centers is important as well.
Model and Prior Results. The incentive problem faced by the transplantation centers when
only pairwise exchanges are allowed can be modeled as a matching problem on a graph. Each node
in a graph represents a patient-donor pair; an edge connecting two nodes i and j indicates that i
and j can participate in a feasible exchange. Each node of the graph is controlled by exactly one
agent, which is the transplantation center where this pair is registered. By a mechanism, we mean
a function that returns a matching for any input graph. Given a mechanism M and a graph G
reported to the centralized planner, the utility of an agent r is simply the total number of nodes
controlled by r that are matched by M on reported graph G, plus the total number of nodes
controlled by agent r that are matched internally using nodes not reported to the central planner
and those left unmatched byM. Each agent wishes to maximize his utility. We assume that the set
of nodes controlled by an agent is private information, so that the only nodes that become known to
the mechanism are those that are reported by the agent. We also assume that the agents have the
capability to conduct internal matches by themselves, meaning a transplantation center is able to
match its own registered pairs without revealing them to the planner. We assume there is a central
planner who wishes to maximize the total number of patients who receive kidneys, i.e., who wishes
1 As is common in this literature, we assume that monetary compensations are disallowed.
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to find a matching of maximum size. However, if the planner implements this maximum-matching
mechanism, the transplantation centers may have an incentive to not report all of their registered
patients. The central question studied here is: what is the worst-case loss in efficiency if we are
required to use a mechanism in which the transplantation centers have no incentive to lie? We
comment briefly on the metrics used to measure efficiency loss and strategyproofness. We measure
the approximation ratio of a mechanism by the worst-case ratio of the maximum number of nodes
that can be matched to the number of nodes matched by the mechanism. The worst-case is taken
over all possible instances of the problem, and the goal is to design a mechanism for which the
approximation ratio is as close to 1 as possible. For deterministic mechanisms, truthfulness (or
stategy-proofness) is unambiguous as we demand this property in the dominant strategy sense. For
randomized mechanisms, however, there are (at least) two notions of truthfulness. A randomized
mechanism is universally truthful if it is a probability distribution over deterministic mechanisms,
each of which is truthful. A randomized mechanism is truthful in expectation if the expected benefit
for an agent from misreporting is non-positive. Obviously, a universally truthful mechanism is
also truthful in expectation, but not vice-versa. We also classify mechanisms according to the
maximality of the returned matching. A mechanism is inclusion-maximal if it always return a
maximal matching2. That the efficient mechanism—the one that always finds a maximum number
of matches—can be manipulated was recognized very early by Sönmez and Ünver [37]. Motivated by
this observation, Ashlagi et al. [6] present MIX-AND-MATCH—a universally truthful randomized
2-approximation algorithm for an arbitrary number of agents. This algorithm is based on a simple
deterministic 2-approximation algorithm that is truthful. Subsequently, Ashlagi and Roth [5] and
Toulis and Parkes [38] study similar problems in random graphs that are modeled based on realistic
data. For these problems they construct compelling mechanisms that satisfy individual rationality.
In their MIX-AND-MATCH paper, Ashlagi et al. [6] proposed a mechanism called FLIP-AND-
MATCH for the case of two agents. They showed that it is a 4/3-approximation, but were not
able to prove that it was truthful in expectation. This question was settled by Caragiannis et al.
in [15] who showed that FLIP-AND-MATCH is not strategy-proof in expectation. Given the
difficulty in understanding the case of many agents, Caragiannis et al. focused on the two-agent
case and proposed a mechanism with compelling properties. Their mechanism—WEIGHT-AND-
2 A matching M is maximal if M ∪ {e} is not a matching for every e /∈M
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MATCH—first assigns a weight to the edges of the graph in a specific way, and then they randomly
choose between two maximum-weight matchings: the one with the fewest number of edges and the
one with the most number of edges. It turns out that the max-weight matching with the fewest
number of edges is a strategyproof mechanism, but the one with the most number of edges is not.
However, they show that mixing the two gives an algorithm that is truthful in expectation and has
an approximation ratio of 3/2 (and that this is tight). In addition, they improved several lower-
bounds on approximation ratios: they showed a general lower bound of 5/4 on all mechanisms, 4/3
on all inclusion-maximal mechanisms, if the mechanism needs to be truthful in expectation; for
universally truthful mechanisms, they strengthened these bounds to 3/2 and 2 respectively. These
bounds all apply to problems with two agents (and hence also to more than two agents).
Our Contributions. Following Caragiannis et al. [15], we consider the case of two agents. For
general graphs we construct a strategyproof matching mechanism that is guaranteed to return a
matching that is at least 3/4 the size of a max-cardinality matching. As mentioned earlier, no
better performance is possible if one focuses on mechanisms that return a maximal matching; our
mechanism always yields a maximal matching, and so our mechanism is best possible within this
natural class of mechanisms. This answers an open question of Caragiannis et al. For path-cycle
graphs3 we construct a randomized, truthful in expectation mechanism that returns a matching
that is at least 4/5 the size of a max-cardinality matching. This mechanism does not necessarily
return a maximal matching. Finally, we construct a randomized mechanism that is universally
truthful on path-cycle graphs that is at least 2/3 the size of a max-cardinality matching. Again, it
is known that no better ratio is possible.
2.2 Algorithm BALANCE and its analysis
We let R denote the set of nodes controlled by the gray agent and B the set of nodes controlled by
the black agent. All the edges in the undirected graph—those connecting nodes of the same agent
and those connecting nodes of different agents—are commonly observable. We let G[R] denote
the graph induced by the gray nodes; G[B] denotes the graph induced by the black nodes; and
3 A path-cycle graph is a graph in which each component is either a path or a cycle
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G := G[R ∪B] denotes the entire graph.
We set forth some basic notation that will be useful in the rest of the paper. A matching M in
the graph G is simply a subset of the edges of G such that no two edges in the subset are incident
to the same node. A node v is matched if it is adjacent to an edge in the matching, and is free
otherwise; an edge e is matched if e ∈ M . Note that whether a node (or edge) is matched or
free is always with respect to a matching M , so when M changes the status of the nodes may
change as well. A path P in the graph G is a sequence (v1, v2, . . . , vk) of nodes of G such that
(vi, vi+1) is an edge of G for i = 1, 2, . . . , k − 1. Often it will be convenient to think of the path
P as the sequence (or even subset) of the edges that are in P . To keep things simple, we use
P to denote both the path itself and the subset of its edges; the interpretation we have in mind
will usually be clear from the context. A path is an alternating path with respect to M if its
edges (in sequence) alternate between matched and unmatched edges. An alternating path with
respect to M is augmenting if its first and last edges are unmatched; equivalently, an alternating
path is augmenting if its first and last nodes are free. By a black augmenting path, we mean an
augmenting path whose two end-points are controlled by the black agent; similar definitions apply
to the terms such as a gray augmenting path, a black alternating path, a gray-black augmenting
path, etc. Note that we do not need to distinguish between a gray-black augmenting path and a
black-gray one, because the graph is undirected. A node v in the graph G = (N,E) is vital if the
size of the maximum cardinality matching of graph G′ = (N\ {v} , E) is strictly less than the size
of a maximum cardinality matching of G.
If M is a matching and P is an augmenting path with respect to M , then define
M ⊕ P := (M ∪ P )− (M ∩ P ).
Note that M ⊕ P is the matching obtained by switching the matched and free edges of P (and by
retaining every edge of M that does not appear in P ). We say that M⊕P is the matching obtained
by augmenting M using the path P . Note that M ⊕ P is a matching and matches one extra edge
(or two extra nodes, which are the endpoints of P ) relative to M ; moreover, every matched node
in M continues to be a matched node in M ⊕ P . A well-known result due to Berge shows that M
is a maximum-cardinality matching if and only if there is no augmenting path with respect to M .
We first propose a strategy-proof deterministic mechanism BALANCE that is near-optimal. Specifi-
cally, we show that BALANCE finds a maximal matching and hence matches at least half the number
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of nodes that can be matched by a maximum-cardinality matching. Note that it is easy to con-
struct a deterministic truthful mechanism that guarantees a 2-approximation. The construction of
BALANCE is (surprisingly) somewhat intricate. Our main goal in constructing BALANCE is to use it
to design a more efficient randomized mechanism, and for this task we make use of a key property
BALANCE that may not necessarily hold in other 2-approximations. It appears that this additional
structure is necessary. Instead of specifying the algorithm in pseudo-code, we include a detailed
description of its various steps. At the end of each step, the resulting graph will satisfy certain
properties, and it is convenient to note these properties soon after describing the corresponding step.
Given R and B, the algorithm BALANCE in G[R ∪B] works as follows:
1. Let MBi and M
R
i be any maximum cardinality matching of the graphs G[B] and G[R] respec-
tively. Denote the total number of nodes matched in MBi and M
R
i as Bi and Ri respectively.
Let M = MBi ∪MRi .
Note that at the end of step 1, all vital nodes are matched by M .
2. If P is a gray-black augmenting path with respect to M , augment M using the path P
(equivalently set M ← M ⊕ P ); repeat this step until we find a matching M that has no
gray-black augmenting path.
Note that at the end of step 2, every augmenting path is either gray or black. Also, because there
is no gray-black augmenting path with respect to M , any gray augmenting path cannot have a
common edge neither a common node with any black augmenting path. None of the subsequent
steps of the algorithm will create of a gray-black augmenting path.
3. If there is a gray augmenting path PR with respect to M and a black augmenting path PB
with respect to M , augment M using the paths PR and PB; repeat this step until we find a
matching M for which every augmenting path (if any) is of one color.
The only augmenting paths (if any) with respect to the matching M at the end of step 3 are
those involving exactly one of the two agents. Without loss of generality, we take that agent to be
the black agent. The rest of the description of the algorithm is based on this assumption.
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4. Let UR be the set of free nodes of agent R (with respect to the “current” matching M), and
let VB be the set of non-vital black nodes reachable from some node in UR via an even-length
alternating path with respect to M . By assumption, every alternating path starting from
a node in UR must start with a free edge and end with a matched edge (otherwise it will
be an augmenting path). If there is a black augmenting path PB with respect to M , and if
VB 6= ∅, then augment M using the path PB and update the result by switching the matched
and free edges in some path from r ∈ UR to b ∈ VB. Repeat this step as long as there is
a black augmenting path and VB 6= ∅. (Note that this step cannot create any augmenting
paths involving a free gray node.)
This completes the description of the algorithm. It is clear that the algorithm terminates: every
iteration of steps 2 and 3 results in at least one extra matched edge; in addition, each iteration of
step 4 decreases the size of UR by 1, and VB must be empty whenever UR is.
Define the score of an agent in a matching M to be the number of his nodes matched in M and let
µB(M) and µR(M) denote the score of the black and the gray agent respectively. The main idea
behind the algorithm is the following. We first start with the maximum score that the gray and
black agents can achieve for themselves if they are isolated (i.e., if the other agent is absent). We
then try to increase their scores by the same amount: every iteration of step 2 increases each of
their scores by 1; and every iteration of step 3 increases each of their scores by 2. In each iteration
of step 4, the black score goes up by 2 because of the augmentation, but drops by 1 because we
switch the matched and free edges in the alternating path starting from a free gray node and ending
with a matched black node; effectively, this leads to an increase of 1 in both the black and gray
scores. We illustrate how the algorithm works on a simple example that appears in the Appendix
(Figures 1-5).
Proposition 2.2.1. At every iteration of Step 4 of BALANCE, the number of vertex-disjoint aug-
menting paths strictly decreases or BALANCE terminates.
Proof. Let G be an arbitrary graph, and let f(G) be the output of BALANCE when applied on G.
Assume WLOG that at termination of Step 3, there are no augmenting paths with a gray leaf.
By definition of BALANCE, at each iteration of Step 4 a path is alternated and another path is
augmented or the algorithm stops. This implies that the size of the matching strictly increases
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during each iteration of Step 4 or BALANCE terminates. From the relationship between the size of
the matching and the number of disjoint augmenting paths, we can conclude that the number of
disjoint augmenting paths strictly decreases or BALANCE terminates.
From Proposition 2.2.1 we can conclude that that once a node of agent black is unmatched
during execution of Step 4, it will never be matched again. To see this, let b be a black node that
was unmatched during the execution of Step 4 and later matched again. Consider the iteration of
Step 4 such that at its termination the unmatched node b is the leaf of an augmenting path. During
the execution of this iteration a path involving a gray node r is alternated and a path involving
two black nodes is augmented. However the fact that at termination there is an augmenting path
that involves node b implies that at the beginning of the iteration there is an augmenting path that
involves node r. Given that at termination of Step 3 there is no augmenting path with a gray leaf,
it follows that such path was created during the execution of Step 4, which contradicts the fact
that at each iteration of Step 4 the number of vertex-disjoint augmenting paths strictly decreases.
Proposition 2.2.2. Let f(G) be the output of the mechanism balance on the graph G. Then
either f(G) is a maximum-cardinality matching, or it maximizes the number of matched nodes for
at least one of the agents subject to the constraint that all vital nodes are matched. In other words,
f(G) maximizes the total score, or the gray score or the black score while matching all vital nodes.
Proof. Let M be the matching at the end of step 3 of the algorithm (i.e., just before step 4 is
executed). We already know that every M -augmenting path is of one color, and without loss of
generality, we take this to be black. The algorithm terminates after executing step 4 as many times
as needed, updating M in each of those steps. Note that for the algorithm to terminate, either
UR = ∅; or VB = ∅; or the matching M has no black augmenting paths. We show that in the last
case, the algorithm finds a max-cardinality matching, whereas in the other two cases the algorithm
maximizes the number of gray nodes that are matched subject to matching all vital nodes. If
UR = ∅, every gray node is matched, so the gray score is maximized trivially. Similarly, if there is
no black augmenting path with respect to M , then there is no augmenting path with respect to M
(from Proposition 2.2.1 it follows that no augmenting path is created in the last step), and so M
is a max-cardinality matching.
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The only remaining case to consider is when VB = ∅, but UR 6= ∅. We wish to argue that M
maximizes the gray score subject to matching all vital nodes. Let M ′ be a matching that maximizes
the gray score subject to matching all vital nodes (and if there are many such matchings, pick one
with maximum cardinality, breaking ties arbitrarily). We argue that the gray score in M is exactly
the same as that in M ′. Consider the components of the symmetric difference of M and M ′. It
is well known that each component in the symmetric difference is either an even-length cycle, or a
path (of odd or even length).
• In an even-length cycle both M and M ′ match all the nodes, and hence the same number of
gray nodes.
• In an even-length path, the end nodes cannot be vital nodes as they are unmatched in M or
in M ′. Suppose the leaf nodes belong to different agents; If the gray leaf node is not matched
by M , there is an even-length alternating path from an unmatched gray node to a black non
vital node, contradicting VB = ∅; if the gray leaf node is matched by M , then flipping the
edges of M and M ′ only in this component, we can find a matching M ′′ that matches more
gray nodes than M ′ does while matching all vital nodes , contradicting the definition of M ′.
Finally when both leaf nodes belong to the same agent, both M and M ′ match the same
number of gray nodes.
• In an odd-length path, if the first and last edges are matched in M , both M and M ′ match
the same number of gray nodes (and the leaf nodes of the path have to be black). If the first
and last edges are matched in M ′, then the two leaf nodes of the path have to be black as
well: otherwise there is an M -augmenting path with a gray leaf, which we assume does not
exist. Again, M and M ′ match the same number of gray nodes.
Thus we find that M matches the same number of gray nodes as M ′. As M ′ maximizes the
gray score subject to matching all vital nodes, so does M .
Note that if M is the outcome of balance, then there is a δ ≥ 0 such that µR(M) = Ri + δ
and µB(M) = Bi + δ. In other words, the “gain” over the best that each agent can do individually
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is the same for both the gray and black agents in balance. (This also justifies the name balance
for the algorithm.) We next prove that balance cannot be manipulated by either agent.
Proposition 2.2.3. Let f(G) be the output of the algorithm balance on the graph G. If v is
unmatched in f(G) then the score of the agents in f(G\{v}) is the same as their score in f(G).
Proof. Let G be an arbitrary graph and let G′ = G\{v}. Let us assume without loss of generality
that v is a black node and that it is unmatched in f(G). Suppose the black agent’s score is larger in
f(G) than in f(G\{v}). Because all the vital nodes are matched at termination of BALANCE on any
graph, it follows that δ > δ′ because Bi = B
′
i and Ri = R
′
i. But this contradicts Proposition 2.2.2
because f(G′) is not a maximum cardinality matching and does not match for any agent the
maximum number of nodes that it could match subject to matching all vital nodes. The latter
follows from the fact that f(G) is a matching on G′ that matches more nodes of both agents while
matching all vital nodes.
From Proposition 2.2.3 it follows that no agent can increase its score by reporting a node that
is not going to be matched in f(G). Thus, we can assume that the score of an agent is given by its
score in the matching returned by the centralized planner plus its score in a maximum cardinality
matching of the graph induced by the nodes not reported by the agent.
Next we prove a result that establishes a relationship between a set of vital nodes and the
number of nodes matched in a maximum cardinality matching of a graph in which such vital nodes
are forbidden to be matched.
Proposition 2.2.4. Let V be a set of vital nodes of the graph G = (N,E). The number of nodes
matched in a maximum cardinality matching of the graph induced by the nodes in N\V is at most
µ(G)− |V |.
Proof. Let M be an arbitrary maximum cardinality matching of G. Let G′ be the graph induced
by the nodes in N\V . Let M ′ be a maximum cardinality matching in G′. Clearly, M ′ is also a
matching of G. As none of the nodes in V are matched in M ′, it follows that
|M | ≥ |M ′|+ |V |,
which is the desired result.
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Now we proceed to prove strategy-proofness and the approximation ratio of BALANCE.
Proposition 2.2.5. Mechanism balance is truthful.
Proof. Let Re be the maximum gray score when all the vital nodes in the graph are matched (over
all matchings); similarly, let Be be the maximum black score when all vital nodes in the graph are
matched (over all matchings). For any matching M , we let µR(M) and µB(M) be, respectively, the
number of gray and black nodes matched in M . For any graph G, we let µ(G) be the number of
nodes matched by in a maximum cardinality matching of graph G. Recall that Ri (resp. Bi) denotes
the maximum number of nodes matched by the gray (resp. black) agent in the subgraph induced
by the gray (resp. black) nodes alone. Proposition 2.2.2 implies that the outcome of balance is a
maximum-cardinality matching, or one that maximizes the gray score, or one that maximizes the
black score subject to matching all vital nodes. We prove that balance is strategyproof in each
case.
Suppose balance finds a maximum cardinality matching f(G) on the graphG. Then µR(f(G)) =
Ri+δ and µB(f(G)) = Bi+δ, for some δ ≤ min{Re−Ri, Be−Bi}. Suppose the black agent “hides”
a subset of his nodes so that the H is the subgraph induced by the hidden nodes (known only to the
black agent), let {Gk} be the set of graphs seen by the mechanism and let F be the subgraph induced
by the hidden nodes and by the nodes of the black agent that are not matched in f (∪kGk). From
Proposition 2.2.3 it follows that no agent have incentive to report nodes that will remain unmatched
to increase its score in f(G), so we can assume without loss of generality that |µ(H)| = |µ(F )|. For
the black agent to do strictly better with this strategy, the gray agent must do strictly worse as
balance found a max-cardinality matching on G. Thus, we must have µR(f(∪kGk)) < µR(f(G)).





′ = Ri + δ
′, for some δ′ ≥ 0.
This implies that δ′ < δ. Now, the number of black nodes matched when black hides is simply
2 · |µ(F )|+ µB(f(∪kGk)), and we have:





≤ Bi + δ′ < Bi + δ = µB(f(G)).
Thus, it is not possible for the black agent to do better by hiding any portion of his subgraph in
this case. A a similar argument applies for the gray agent.
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Suppose balance maximizes the score of one of the agents subject to matching all vital nodes.
From the definition of BALANCE it follows that µB(f(G)) = Bi + δ, µB(f(G)) = Ri + δ and
δ = min{Re − Ri, Be − Bi}. Without loss of generality, we assume that it maximizes the score of
the gray agent, and so δ = Re − Ri. Suppose that the gray agent hides a subset of his nodes so
that H is the corresponding induced subgraph, {Gk} is the set of graphs seen by the mechanism
and F is the graph induced by nodes in H and gray nodes not matched in f(∪kGk). Let us define
the matching M̄ as the union of matching f(∪kGk) and a maximum cardinality matching of F .
From the definition of BALANCE, all the vital nodes of agent B in G are matched by M̄ . Consider
the symmetric difference between M̄ and M ′.
• In an even length cycle, M̄ and f(G) matched the same nodes and so the same number of
gray nodes.
• In an odd length path, we should only consider the case in which the path starts and finishes
with an edge in M̄ . In this case both leaves are black nodes, otherwise there is an augmenting
path respect to f(G) with a gray leaf, which is a contradiction. Thus, in these components
M̄ and f(G) matches the same number of gray nodes.
• In an even length path, if the path has leaves of the same color, then both matchings match
the same number of gray nodes in these components. Suppose the path has a black leaf and
a gray leaf; If the black leaf is matched by f(G), then it follows that this leaf node is a vital
node of agent B, otherwise one extra gray node could be matched by alternating such path
without unmatching a vital node, contradicting the definition of Re. But in this case, M̄ does
not match all the vital nodes of agent B, thus we can assume that the black leaf is matched
by M̄ and then it follows that the gray leaf is matched by f(G) and so, f(G) matches more
gray nodes than M̄ in these components.
We have shown that f(G) matches at least as many gray nodes as M̄ , in other words, the gray
agent has no incentive to hide nodes.
Suppose the black agent hides a subset of his nodes so that H is the induced subgraph, let
{Gk} the set of graphs seen by the mechanism and let F be the graph induced by the nodes in H
and the black nodes that are left unmatched in f(∪kGk). From the key property of BALANCE, the










′ = Ri + δ
′
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respectively. If δ′ ≤ δ, then it follows trivially that agent black has no incentive to be untruthful




i ≤ Bi. Let us assume that δ′ = δ + γ for some γ > 0. Let M ′ be the union




Bki + µ(F ) ≤ Bi − γ.
Let us consider the symmetric difference between M ′ and f(G). The definition of BALANCE together
with assumption that there are only black augmenting paths respect to f(G) imply that the only
components in the symmetric difference between M ′ and f(G) in which M ′ matches more gray
nodes than f(G) are even length paths with one gray leaf and one black leaf in which the gray
leaf is matched by M ′ and the black leaf is matched by f(G). This follows because all odd length
paths have black leaves, otherwise it contradicts the assumption that there are only black-black
augmenting paths respect to f(G). And in all even length cycles both M ′ and f(G) match all
nodes.
We can assume without loss of generality that in the symmetric difference between M ′ and f(G)
there are exactly γ even length path components with a gray leaf matched by M ′ and a black leaf
matched by f(G) . Let us denote such paths as P1, . . . , Pγ . Let Pj be an arbitrary path among
paths P1, . . . , Pγ ; denote the gray leaf as rj , and the black leaf as bj . From definition of BALANCE it
follows that bj is a vital black node in G. Otherwise, during execution of Step 4, BALANCE could
have alternated Pj to unmatch bj and match rj , while augmenting a black augmenting path. The
fact that bj is not matched by M
′ implies that bj is not a vital node, in the graph induced by the
black nodes in G′, or in the graph F .
Let us consider the problem of finding a maximum cardinality matching in the graph induced by
black nodes in G subject to forbidding matching the nodes b1, . . . , bγ . From Proposition 2.2.4 it
follows that:
µ (G\ {b1, . . . , bγ}) ≤ Bi − γ. (2.2.1)
From the definition of G′ and F together with the fact that nodes b1, . . . , bγ are not matched in




i + µ(F ) ≤ µ (G\ {b1, . . . , bγ}). This together with inequality 2.2.1 imply
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Bki + µ(F ) ≤ Bi − γ. (2.2.2)
Given that BALANCE matches δ+ γ black nodes in Step 2 through Step 4 in G′, the black agent
utility is: (∑
k
Bki + µ(F )
)
+ δ + γ ≤ (Bi − γ) + δ + γ
≤ Bi + δ.
Thus the black agent does not benefit from hiding any of its nodes.
Theorem 2.2.1. Mechanism BALANCE can be implemented in polynomial time, has an approxima-
tion ratio of 2, and is truthful.
Proof. Let G be an arbitrary compatibility graph with n nodes. The truthfulness follows from
Proposition 2.2.5. Note that BALANCE returns a maximal matching on all instances; and so for
every edge that is matched in a maximum cardinality matching at least one node is matched in the
output of BALANCE, thus the 2-approximation result follows.
We are left to argue that BALANCE can be implemented in polynomial time. At every step the
mechanism increases the cardinality of the matching by 1 or then the algorithm stops. Given
that a maximum cardinality matching has at most n/2 edges, then the number of augmentations
is bounded. As finding an augmenting path can be done in polynomial time, BALANCE can be
implemented in polynomial time.
2.3 Mechanism BALANCE-AND-AUGMENT
Consider the following randomized mechanism, BALANCE-AND-AUGMENT, based on BALANCE:
1. Apply BALANCE on G to get the matching M .
2. Augment all augmenting paths in G with respect to M to get a maximum cardinality matching
M̄ .
3. Select M with probability 1/2 and M̄ with probability 1/2.
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An illustrative example appears in Appendix A.
It is clear that this mechanism is not universally truthful, because it uses a max-cardinality matching
with probability 1/2 and in all of those realizations the mechanism can in fact be manipulated by
the result of Sönmez and Ünver [37].
Theorem 2.3.1. The Mechanism BALANCE-AND-AUGMENT can be implemented in polynomial time,
has an approximation ratio of 4/3, and is truthful in expectation.
Proof. That BALANCE-AND-AUGMENT can be implemented in polynomial time is straightforward.
Next we proceed to prove the approximation ratio of mechanism BALANCE-AND-AUGMENT. For any
graph G, we let µ(G) be the number of nodes matched in a maximum cardinality matching of graph
G. The expected number of nodes matched by BALANCE-AND-AUGMENT is at least 1/2 µ(G) with
probability 1/2, and µ(G) with probability 1/2. Simplifying, we find that this mechanism matches
at least 3/4µ(G), proving the approximation ratio. Note that this mechanism always returns a
maximal matching, and by a result of Caragiannis et al. [15], this is the best possible. The only
property left to prove is that BALANCE-AND-AUGMENT is truthful in expectation.
Let M be the output of BALANCE on G and let M̄ be the matching obtained by augmenting
M to a max-cardinality matching. From Proposition 2.2.2, we know that BALANCE maximizes the
gray score or the black score subject to matching all vital nodes in the graph; or return a maximum
cardinality matching. We will consider each case separately. Suppose it maximizes the gray score
while matching all vital nodes. We will argue that in this the case, the gray agent has no incentive
to lie. From the definition of BALANCE-AND-AUGMENT in Step 1 and Step 2, all vital nodes of both
agents are matched. Assume that gray agent has an incentive to lie. Denote the resulting matching
as G′. This implies that there exist a matching of G that matches more gray nodes than M (equiv-
alently M̄) while matching all of the black agent vital nodes. Notice that black vital nodes in G are
also vital nodes in G′ = {Gk}. Let L be a matching that matches more gray nodes than M subject
to matching all of the black agent vital nodes. Let us consider the symmetric difference between M̄
and L. Given that M̄ is a maximum cardinality matching of G it follows that the only components
in which L matched more gray nodes than M̄ is in the even length components in which one leaf is
gray the other one is black and the gray leaf is matched by L. Moreover as L matches all black vital
nodes, the black leaf node in such a component is not a vital black node. If M is not a maximum
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cardinality matching this contradicts the definition of BALANCE because in Step 4 BALANCE could
have alternated this component of the symmetric difference to match the gray leaf and augmented a
black augmenting path (such a path exist because if M is not a maximum cardinality matching). If
M is a maximum cardinality matching then M did not match the maximum number of gray nodes
subject to matching all black vital nodes. We can conclude that the gray agent has no incentive to
lie.
Then the only agent that could have incentive to lie is an agent that does not get the maximum
possible score subject to matching all vital nodes. Let us assume without loss of generality that M
does not match the maximum possible number of black nodes subject to matching all vital nodes.
Assume that the black agent has an incentive to lie. We shall show that when the black agent hides
a subset of nodes, the gain from this maneuver in Step 2 of BALANCE-AND-AUGMENT is offset by an
equal or larger loss in Step 1. As the matchings computed in these steps are equally likely to be
chosen, the result follows. Let H be the subgraph induced by the hidden black nodes (known only
to the black agent). From Proposition 2.2.3 we can assume without loss of generality that black
nodes that are matched by the black agent 4 were not reported to the centralized planner. Let M ′
be the output of BALANCE on G′ together with the maximum cardinality matching among nodes
hidden by the black agent and let M̄ ′ be the matching obtained from augmenting all augmenting
paths in M ′ together with the maximum cardinality matching among nodes hidden by black agent.
Define ∆BR := min{Re−Ri, Be−Bi, µ(G)−Bi+Ri2 }. From the definition of BALANCE, it follows that
µB(M) = Bi + ∆BR: the last term accounts for the case when BALANCE finds a max-cardinality
matching. Similarly, We define ∆′BR as the number of gray nodes (black nodes) matched by
BALANCE in G′ besides the R′i (B
′
i) nodes that are matched in Step 1 of BALANCE.
We divide this proof into two cases. We first consider the case in which ∆BR ≥ ∆′BR, then we
consider the case in which ∆BR < ∆
′
BR, and argue that in both cases, black agent has no incentive
to lie. Assume that ∆BR = ∆
′
BR + δ for some δ ≥ 0. We shall show that
µB(M̄
′) ≤ µB(M̄) + δ, (2.3.1)
4Nodes matched by BALANCE and BALANCE-AND-AUGMENT are matched by a centralized planner
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′) ≤ µB(M). (2.3.2)
Adding these inequalities, we find µB(M̄
′) + µB(M
′) ≤ µB(M̄) + µB(M), which implies the result.
Inequality (2.3.2) follows trivially from definition of M and M ′:
µB(M)− µB(M ′) = Bi + ∆BR −
∑
k
Bki − µ(F )−∆′BR
≥ Bi + ∆′BR + δ −Bi −∆′BR
= δ
Now we are left to argue inequality (2.3.1). Observe that µR(M
′) = Ri+∆
′
BR = Ri+∆BR−δ; using
µR(M) = Ri+∆BR, we see that µR(M)−µR(M ′) = δ. But we already know that µR(M̄) = µR(M),
and µR(M̄
′) ≥ µR(M ′). Putting all this together, we have
µR(M̄)− µR(M̄ ′) ≤ µR(M)− µR(M ′) = δ. (2.3.3)
Note that µR(M̄) + µB(M̄) is the size of the max-cardinality matching in the original graph,
and µR(M̄ ′) + µB(M̄
′) is the size of a matching of G when black agent matches some of his nodes
internally, and the rest of the graph is matched optimally. Trivially, we have:
µR(M̄
′) + µB(M̄
′) ≤ µR(M̄) + µB(M̄),
which when rearranged gives
µB(M̄
′)− µB(M̄) ≤ µR(M̄)− µR(M̄ ′) ≤ δ,
where the last inequality follows from (2.3.3).
Next we proceed to argue that if ∆′BR = ∆BR + δ for some δ ≥ 0, the black agent has no
incentive to be untruthful. To do so we will prove that
µB(M̄
′) ≤ µB(M̄)− δ, (2.3.4)
and that
µB(M
′) ≤ µB(M). (2.3.5)
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Adding these inequalities and using the fact that δ ≥ 0, we find that µB(M̄ ′) + µB(M ′) ≤





i + µ(F ) ≤ Bi − δ and that δ is the extra number of gray nodes matched
in M ′ when compare to M . To see this, let us consider the symmetric difference between M and
M ′. If M is not a maximum cardinality matching, from assumption that M does not matches the
maximum number of black nodes subject to matching all vital nodes, it follows that M matches
the maximum number of gray nodes subject to matching all vital nodes. This latter fact together
with the assumption that ∆′BR = ∆BR + δ for some δ ≥ 0 imply that M ′ matches exactly δ more
gray nodes than M . Consider M∆M ′, given that there is no augmenting path in G with respect to
M with a gray leaf, it follows that there are at least δ even length paths with a gray leaf matched
by M ′ and a black leaf matched by M ; This node is a vital node for black in G. This implies
that M ′ matches δ fewer black vital nodes than M and from Proposition 2.2.4 the desired result
follows. If M is a maximum cardinality matching, then for M ′ to match δ additional gray nodes
than M , it must match δ fewer black nodes than M . Given that from Step 2 to Step 4 algorithm
BALANCE matched ∆′BR = ∆BR + δ black nodes, we can conclude that in Step 1 it matched at most
Bi − δ black nodes.










Bki + µ(F ) + ∆
′
BR − (Bi + ∆BR)
≤ Bi − δ + ∆BR + δ −Bi −∆BR
= 0.
We are left to show that Inequality (2.3.4) holds. From the relation between M̄ ′ and M ′, it
follows trivially that µR(M̄
′) ≥ µR(M ′). From assumption that µR(M ′) = Ri + ∆BR + δ and
µR(M) = Ri + ∆BR it follows that µR(M
′) − µR(M) = δ. Also, µR(M) = µR(M̄). Putting these
inequalities together it follows that:
µR(M̄)− µR(M̄ ′) ≤ µR(M)− µR(M ′) = −δ.
Given that M̄ is a maximum cardinality matching of G and M ′ is a matching of G, then it
follows that:
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(c)
M ′ M ′
Figure 2.3.1: (a) Compatibility graph G which has two maximal connected components (b) Match-
ing M is the output of mechanism BALANCE on G (c) Output of any strategy-proof mechanism that
applies on each maximal connected component in isolation.
µR(M̄
′) + µB(M̄
′) ≤ µR(M̄) + µB(M̄),
which when rearranged gives
µB(M̄
′)− µB(M̄) ≤ µR(M̄)− µR(M̄ ′) ≤ −δ.
This completes the proof of Proposition 2.3.1.
A nice and somehow surprising feature to be highlighted about the algorithm is that it does
not require the graph to be connected: specifically if a graph has several maximal connected com-
ponents, applying BALANCE or BALANCE-AND-AUGMENT on the entire graph may result in a different
output than when applying these mechanisms on each maximal connected component of the graph
as if they were in isolation. The relevance of this feature is that it could bring improvements in
efficiency relative to mechanisms that work on each maximal connected component independently.
This is illustrated in Figure 2.3.1.
2.4 Matchings on Paths and Cycles
The approximation ratio we establish on BALANCE-AND-AUGMENT is best possible, assuming the
mechanism is required to find a maximal matching on all instances. While maximality is a natural
requirement, it is interesting to ask if one can improve the approximation ratio if it is relaxed.
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It is somewhat paradoxical that by matching “less” one can actually improve the worst-case per-
formance, but this is simply the interplay between truthfulness and efficiency: by a threat of not
matching an edge (even when such a match improves the performance on that instance), one can
dissuade untruthful behavior in other instances, thereby improving the overall worst-case perfor-
mance ratio. Motivated by this issue, we consider this question for path-cycle-graphs. Aside from
their simplicity, one reason for studying these closely is that the worst-case examples so far have all
been on path graphs. Our results show that indeed one can improve the worst-case performance
if maximality is not imposed on the mechanism. This leaves open the possibility of a stronger
performance guarantee on general graphs, but we have not been able to achieve that so far.
We first introduce a deterministic mechanism SHARE which will later be used by the our 54 random-
ized mechanism SHARE-BALANCE-AUGMENT. Given a path-cycle graph P , we consider the following
simple mechanism (mechanism SHARE) that always maintains a current matching M that gets
updated in each iteration in the following way:
1. If there is a gray augmenting path with respect to M , augment M using that path. Repeat
this step until the only augmenting paths left (if any) have at least one end-point black.
2. If there is a black augmenting path with respect to M , augment M using that path. Repeat
these steps until the only augmenting paths left (if any) have at least one end-point gray.
3. If M has not been updated during this iteration, then STOP. Otherwise, go to Step 1.
In general graphs, mechanism SHARE is not truthful. To see how SHARE fails to be strategyproof,
consider the graph G in figure 2.4.1. For general graphs the order in which the augmentations are
done affects the score of the agents.
Notice that the approximation ratio of mechanism SHARE is infinite because when given a single
edge between the gray and black agents, it does not match that edge! However, on path and cycles
graphs, we can show that mechanism SHARE is truthful.
Proposition 2.4.1. Mechanism SHARE is truthful on path-cycle graphs
Proof. Let P be an arbitrary path and let M be the output of mechanism SHARE applied to P .
We can assume that P is a connected graph, because applying SHARE to a non-connected graph
is equivalent to applying SHARE to each one of its components independently. From the definition
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r1 b1 b2 r2 r3
b3 b4
b5 b6 r4
Figure 2.4.1: Compatibility graph G in which SHARE is not SP. SHARE fails in G because the
matching that it returns depends on the order in which augmentations are done and so agent black
has incentive to hide nodes b1,b2,b5 and b6 to match all its nodes with probability 1.
of SHARE it follows that step 1 (step 2) is equivalent to finding the maximum number of disjoint
augmenting paths among nodes of agent gray (black) in P with respect to the matching M at the
beginning of step 1 (step 2), breaking ties arbitrarily.
We first argue that the way in which ties are broken does not affect the score of the agents at
termination. Consider iteration i of SHARE on P , and suppose the maximal set of vertex-disjoint
augmenting paths respect to the matching M at the beginning of step 1 or step 2 is not unique.
Step 1 and step 2 of SHARE at each iteration are symmetric, we can assume without loss of generality
we are currently at step 2 of iteration i. The fact that the largest set of disjoint augmenting paths
respect to the matching M at the start of step 2 of iteration i is not unique, implies that there
exist at least one sub path of P , such that respect to matching M the following holds: 1) All its
gray nodes are matched 2) It starts and finishes in an unmatched node of agent black 3) Each of




the set of sub
paths of P such that 1), 2) and 3) are satisfied with respect to M at the start of step 2 of iteration




are disjoint. From the definition of














unmatched, and otherwise eliminating such a sub path from P . Clearly, the augmenting paths in
P respect to M at the end of step 2 of iteration i are also in P i+1, independently of which black




is left unmatched. Thus at the end of iteration i, the same number
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of nodes are matched independently of the way that ties were broken.
Now we will argue that not matching the maximum number of disjoint paths at step 1 or step 2
cannot increase the number of nodes matched for any of the agents with respect to matching M .
Let us consider a modified version of mechanism SHARE, that we denote as SHARE’, in which at
each iteration the number of disjoint augmenting paths that are augmented at step 1 or step 2 is
not necessarily the maximum number of disjoint augmenting paths that could be matched at that
iteration. Denote as M ′ the output of mechanism SHARE’ when applied on P .
We claim that the number of nodes of agent gray (black) matched in M ′ is not larger than the
number of agent’s gray (black) nodes matched in M . This claim will be proved by induction on
the number of edges of P .
• In the base case we assume that P has one edge. In this case l and l′ return a non empty
matching only when the two nodes adjacent to the unique edge in P belong to the same agent.
After the first iteration, M matches both nodes in P , implying the result.
• Suppose that for all paths or cycles with at most k − 1 edges, M ′ matches at most the same
number of nodes of agent gray (black) than M . Let P be an arbitrary path or cycle of length
k and assume for the sake of contradiction that M ′ matches more nodes of agent gray than
M .
Let i be the first iteration of SHARE′ on P in which the number of gray nodes that could be
matched at the end of step 1 exceeds the number of nodes matched in M . Denote as M ′i the
matching at the beginning of iteration i during the execution of mechanism SHARE’. Let S be
an arbitrary gray augmenting path in M ′i . We will now argue that either a gray augmenting
path in M ′i could have been augmented during iteration i − 1 or that the augmentation of
such an augmenting path will not make the score of the gray agent at termination of iteration
i larger than his score in M .
– Suppose that S intersects a path that was found in a previous iteration, and it has not
been augmented at the start of iteration i. These paths intersect in one leaf, so only one
of these two paths could be augmented.
– Suppose S does not intersect any path that was found in a previous iteration and it has
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not been augmented at the start of iteration i. Denote as v1 and v2 the two leaves of S.
If both leaves are not matched in M , it implies that in the sub path of P that starts in v1
and finish in v2, SHARE’ matches more nodes of agent gray than mechanism SHARE, but
this contradicts the induction hypothesis. This contradiction follows from the definition
of mechanism SHARE; applying SHARE on P is equivalent to applying SHARE on the
graphs {P\v1, . . . , v2} and {v1, . . . , v2} independently. Up to iteration i applying SHARE’
on P is also equivalent to applying SHARE’ on graphs {P\v1, . . . , v2} and {v1, . . . , v2}
independently. Thus we can assume without loss of generality that v2 is matched in M .
From the definition of SHARE, v2 was matched during an augmentation in which another
node — denoted v3 of agent gray was matched. We may assume without loss of generality
that v3 is matched in M
′
i . Otherwise, it follows that SHARE’ has matched up to iteration
i at least two less black nodes than SHARE on the sub path v2, . . . , v3, so augmenting
S will make the score of the gray agent in M ′i at most the score of of the agent gray in
M . Thus, v3 is matched in M
′
i and it was matched through an augmentation in which a
node v4 was augmented. Given that the graph is finite, eventually we will hit a node vl
that is matched in M ′i and not in M . Then v1 and vl are two nodes matched by M
′
i and
not by M in which all nodes in the sub path between nodes v1 and vl are matched and
all of them have been matched through augmentations among nodes in the sub path of
P between nodes v1 and vl. This implies that SHARE’ matches more nodes in the sub
path of P that starts in v1 and finishes in vl which contradicts the induction hypothesis.
Then we can conclude that in this latter case augmenting path S cannot exist.
Now we are ready to argue that mechanism SHARE is SP . Suppose not, and that agent gray has
incentive to hide nodes to increase its utility. Let P ′ be the subgraph of P induced by the nodes
reported by agent gray and agent black. Given that all operations performed by SHARE on P ′ are
valid operations in P , it follows that applying SHARE on P ′ is equivalent to applying SHARE on
P but not necessarily augment all available augmentations at each step, which is the definition of
SHARE’. Given that the number of nodes of any agent matched by SHARE’ is at most the number of
nodes of such agent matched by SHARE on P, then we can conclude that SHARE is SP. The same
proof holds for cycles.
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Despite its poor performance when used all by itself, we show that one can profitably use mech-
anism SHARE along with the mechanism BALANCE-AND-AUGMENT. Specifically, consider the following
hybrid mechanism SHARE-BALANCE-AUGMENT. Let P be an arbitrary path-cycle graph.
1. Apply BALANCE-AND-AUGMENT on each maximal connected component of P to get the matching
M12.
2. Apply SHARE on each maximal connected component of P to get the matching M3.
3. Select M12 with probability 4/5 and M3 with probability 1/5.
Note that unlike mechanism BALANCE and BALANCE-AND-AUGMENT, mechanism SHARE applies to each
connected component of a graph as if they were in isolation.
Proposition 2.4.2. The Mechanism SHARE-BALANCE-AUGMENT can be implemented in polynomial
time, has an approximation ratio of 5/4 and is truthful in expectation on path-cycle graphs.
Proof. It is clear that SHARE-BALANCE-AUGMENT is truthful in expectation, as each of the component
mechanisms satisfies that property and the probabilities are exogenously chosen. We show that
mechanism SHARE-BALANCE-AUGMENT is in fact a 5/4-approximation.
Let G be an arbitrary maximal connected component of a path-cycle graph. Let M1 be the output of
mechanism BALANCE on G, let M2 be the maximum cardinality matching resulted from augmenting
all augmenting paths in G starting from matching M1, and let M3 be the output of mechanism
SHARE on G. Let N(M1) be the number of nodes matched in matching M1, similarly we define
N(M2) and N(M3). To prove that SHARE-BALANCE-AUGMENT is a 5/4-approximation, is enough to
show that N(M1) +
1
2 · N(M3) ≥ N(M2). This latter inequality together with the definition of
mechanism SHARE-BALANCE-AUGMENT imply that the expected overall utility is lower bounded by
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which prove the approximation ratio of 5/4.
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·N(M3) ≥ N(M2) (2.4.1)
Proof. Since G is a collection of paths or cycles any mechanism BALANCE terminates at the end
of step 3 thus M1 is a maximum cardinality matching or it matches all the nodes of one of the
agents. In the former case the inequality (2.4.1) follows trivially, so we may assume that M1 is not
a maximum cardinality matching and that it matches all nodes of agent gray. To prove this claim
let us consider the symmetric difference between M3 and M2.
• In an even length cycle or path component, as M3 matches the same number of nodes as M2,
and M1 is maximal, thus inequality (2.4.1) follows trivially.
• An odd length component of length at least 3 starts and finishes with an edge of M3: thus
from definition of M3, this component has a leaf that belongs to agent gray and a leaf that
belongs to agent black. The leaf that belongs to agent gray is matched by M1. From the
maximality of M1 and the fact that the graph is a path it follows that for every 3 consecutive
nodes 2 nodes are matched by M1. We will argue that inequality (2.4.1) holds in odd length









































For N(M2) = 4, which arises when the component in consideration has 3 edges, the inequality














• An odd length component of length 1 has only one edge that is incident to a node of agent
gray and a node of agent black and belongs to matching M2. From the relationship between
M2 and M1 and the fact that M1 matches all the gray nodes in the path, it follows that the
gray node in this component is also matched by M1. If this edge is in M1, the claim follows
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trivially. Otherwise there is an edge of M1 that is adjacent to this component and also match
the node of agent gray. Let us denote the edge that belong to M2 as e2 and the edge that
belongs to M1 as e1. See Figure (2.4.2).
Let us consider the component of M2∆M3 aside from e2 that have a node in common with e1.
We will argue that this component together with edges e1 and e2 satisfies inequality (2.4.1).
– If there is no component of M2∆M3 adjacent to e2− e1, given that every node matched
by M1 is also matched by M2 it follows that the edge of M2 adjacent to M1 is also in
M3. Let us denote the edge that is adjacent to e1 and is not e2 as (v1, v2), in which v1







Figure 2.4.2: e2 is matched by M2, e1 is matched by M1 and (v1, v2) is matched by both
M2 and M3. Additionally, v2 is not matched by M1.
We should assume that neither v2 nor the black node incident to edge e2 are matched
by M1. Otherwise it follows that in such component M1 matches 3 nodes, M3 matches
2 nodes implies that for this component N(M1) +
1
2 ·N(M3) = 4, which is equal to the
number of nodes matched by M2. If v2 is not matched by M1 then it follows that v2 is a
node of agent black, as otherwise there would be a black-gray augmenting path respect
to M1. If v1 belongs to agent gray there are 2 consecutive nodes of agent R adjacent
in both cases to a node of agent B and one of them is not matched, from definition of
mechanism SHARE, these 2 nodes will be matched in the first iteration and will never be
unmatched during the execution of the algorithm, so v1 cannot be a gray node. As v2 is
a vital node and it is unmatched in the output of mechanism BALANCE, M1, v1 cannot
belong to agent B. It follows that this cannot happen.
– If the component of M2∆M3 adjacent to e1 that does not contain edge e2 has even
length, let us denote the edge incident to e1 that is not e2 as (v2, v1) in which node v1
is incident to edge e1, see figure (2.4.3).
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Figure 2.4.3: The component of M2∆M3 that is adjacent to e1 and does not contain
edge e2 has an even number of edges.
In this case we should assume that v1 belongs to agent black, as otherwise there are 2
consecutive nodes of agent gray (nodes incident to edge e1) adjacent in both cases to a
black node, and none of them is matched in M3 which contradicts mechanism SHARE, in
which at least one node incident to e1 would have been matched in the first iteration.
Additionally, we can also assume that v2 is a black node as otherwise there would be a
gray-black augmenting path with respect to M1, which is a contradiction. Finally we
should also assume that the leaf of this component that is not incident to edge e1, v3,
is also a black node: because it is not matched by M2 and by M1, it can not be a gray
node because all gray nodes are matched by M1.
From the maximality of M1 it follows that for every 3 nodes in the component of M2∆M3
adjacent to e1 and that does not include e2, at least 2 nodes are matched by M1.
Moreover, as v3 is not matched by M1 we can conclude that the length of the even
component of M2∆M3 adjacent to e1 that does not include e2 (subpath v3, . . . , v1) is at
least 4. This follows because if such component has length 2 then (v1, v2) is matched by
M1 which contradicts that e1 is matched by M1. The fact that length of such component
is at least 4 and from the maximality of M1, it follows that M1 matches at least half the
nodes matched by M3 in the component of M2∆M3 adjacent to e1 that does not include
e2. Then it follows that:
N1(v3, . . . , v4) +
1
2



















·N3(v3, . . . , v1)
= N3(v3, . . . , v1) + 2
= N2(v3, . . . , v1) + 2
= N2(v3, . . . , v4),
which is the desired result.
– If the component of M2∆M3 adjacent to e2 − e1 has odd length of length at least 3, we
claim that the second edge of the component of M2∆M3 adjacent to e1 that does not
include e2 is matched by M1. Assume not. From the fact that v1 is not matched by M3
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it follows that v1 is a black node. If v2 is gray there is a black-gray augmenting path in
M1. If v2 is black, it must be vital and so it cannot be unmatched in M1. Given that
v1 is also a node of agent black, it follows a contradiction with definition of mechanism








Figure 2.4.4: The component of M2∆M3 that is adjacent to e1 and does not contain
edge e2 has a odd number of edges.
Let us denote as v3 the leaf of the component of M2∆M3 adjacent to e1 that is not e2
that is matched by M3. We claim that v3 is matched by M1 and that it is a gray node.
If this is not the case, then v3 it is a black node and given that v1 is also a black node it
follows that there is a black augmenting path with respect to M3 which contradicts the
definition of mechanism SHARE.
The number of nodes matched by M1 among nodes v3, . . . , v2 is at least:
N1(v3, . . . , v2) ≥ 3 +

2
3 (N2(v3, . . . , v1)− 4) if N2(v3, . . . , v1)− 4 mod 3 is 0
2
3 (N2(v3, . . . , v1)− 5) if N2(v3, . . . , v1)− 4 mod 3 is 1
2
3 (N2(v3, . . . , v1)− 6) + 2 if N2(v3, . . . , v1)− 4 mod 3 is 2
From the fact that v3 is matched by M1 and the edge of M3 that matches v2 is also
in M1, it follows that in the worst case all nodes matched by M1 in the sub path
{v3, . . . , v1} \ {v3}∪{e ∈M1 : v2 is incident to e} are matched with another node in the
sub path. There areN(v3, . . . , v1)−4 nodes in the component ofM2∆M3 in consideration
that could be matched besides the three that we have argued are matched by M1 in
v3, . . . , v2. From the maximality of M1, at of every, 3 consecutive nodes, 2 are matched
by M1 and given that N2(v3, . . . , v1)−4 is an even number, it follows that depending on
the value of N(v3, . . . , v1)− 4 mod 3 the three situations previously described will arise.
In the first case, if (N2(v3, . . . , v1)− 4) mod 3 is 0, it follows that:
N1(v3, . . . , v4) +
1
2
















N2(v3, . . . , v1)− 1
= N2(v3, . . . , v1) + 2 +
1
6




CHAPTER 2. AN OPTIMAL RANDOMIZED MECHANISM FOR KIDNEY EXCHANGE
WITH TWO AGENTS
= N2(v3, . . . , v4) +
1
6
N2(v3, . . . , v1)−
2
3
≥ N2(v3, . . . , v4).
The last inequality follows from the fact that N2(v3, . . . , v4) ≥ 4 from assumption. In
the second case, if (N2(v3, . . . , v1)− 4) mod 3 is 1, then it follows that:
N1(v3, . . . , v4) +
1
2
















N2(v3, . . . , v1)− 1
= N2(v3, . . . , v1) + 2 +
1
6
N2(v3, . . . , v1)−
10
3
= N2(v3, . . . , v4) +
1
6
N2(v3, . . . , v1)−
4
3
≥ N2(v3, . . . , v4).
In which the last inequality follows because if N2(v3, . . . , v1) − 4 mod 3 is 1 then
N2(v3, . . . , v4) ≥ 8. Finally we consider the case in which (N2(v3, . . . , v1) − 4) mod
3 is 2. In this case it follows that:
N1(v3, . . . , v4) +
1
2 N3(v3, . . . , v4) = (N1(v3, . . . , v2) + 2) +
(
1
2 N2(v3, . . . , v1)− 1
)
≥ + 23 (N2(v3, . . . , v1)− 6) + 2 + 2+
1
2 N2(v3, . . . , v1)− 1
= N2(v3, . . . , v1) + 2 +
1
6 N2(v3, . . . , v1)
≥ N2(v3, . . . , v4).
– If the component of M2∆M3 adjacent to e1, that is not e2, has length 1, let us denote
the nodes that are incident to this component as v1 and v2 in which v1 is the node that
is also incident to e1. Given that neither v1, v2 nor nodes incident to e1 and e2 are
matched by M3, then in the subpath v2v1 − e1 − e2 there are no two consecutive nodes
of the same color because this will contradict the definition of mechanism SHARE. Also
the leaf of this subpath that is not v2 is a black node because it is not matched by M1.
Then it follows that v2 is a gray node and so is also matched by M1 with an edge v3v2.
Given that all nodes matched by M1 are also matched by M2 then v3 is also matched by
M2. We repeat the argument just described until we encounter a node that is matched
by M3 and so we have encounter a component of M2∆M3 with length at least 2, or an
edge that is matched in both M2 and M3, or the entire graph is a path in which case
there are no two consecutive nodes that belong to the same agent. See figure 2.4.5.
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Figure 2.4.5: The component of M2∆M3 adjacent to e1 that is not e2 has length 1. (a)
the component of M1∆M2 that includes e2 intersect with a component M2∆M3 with
length at least 2 (b) the component of M1∆M2 that includes e2 intersect with an edge
that is matched by both M3 and M2 (c) M3 matches no node in the graph thus there is
no two consecutive nodes in the graph that belong to the same agent, and M1 and M2
matches are equal.
If the graph is a path or a cycle in which there is no two consecutive nodes that belong
to the same agent, then from definition of SHARE, it follows that M3 matches no node
in this graph and M1 and M2 are the same matching and so the desired results follows
trivially.
We should consider the case in which there are at least two consecutive nodes in the
graph that belong to the same agent, thus that M3 is not empty. Let us denote as PBR
the subpath in M2∆M1 that contains e2 and has only one node that is also matched by
M3. Denote as QBR the subpath of PBR of length three that has as leaf node x1. The
edge of M2 incident to x1 may be in a component of M2∆M3 or may not, but at least
one of its incident nodes is matched by M3. In the former case, denote as RBR such a
component of M2∆M3 and in the later case denote as RBR this edge of M2 that is also
in M3.
From definition of RBR and QBR and the results previously proved in this claim in the
case in which the component of M2∆M3 adjacent to e1 has length at least 2 it follows
that:
[N1(RBR ∪QBR)− 1] +
1
2
·N3(RBR ∪QBR) ≥ N2(RBR ∪QBR). (2.4.2)
From definition of PBR it follows that N1 (PBR\QBR) = N2 (PBR\QBR) − 1. Adding
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to the inequality (2.4.2) implies the desired result.
If we want a universally strategyproof mechanism on path-cycle graphs, we simply use the
output of BALANCE with probability 2/3 and the output of SHARE with probability 1/3. Note that
because BALANCE and SHARE are truthful mechanisms, this hybrid mechanism is in fact universally


















in which the last inequality follows from Claim 1 in Proposition 2.4.2.
2.5 On strategy-proofness
In Section 2.1 we have defined the utility of an agent as the total number of its nodes that are
matched by the mechanism, plus the nodes matched in a maximum cardinality matching of the
graph induced by the nodes that were either not reported or left unmatched by the mechanism.
In this definition of the utility of an agent, nodes that are not matched by the mechanism because
they were not reported and nodes that were reported but left unmatched by the mechanism treated
the same. However, due to the dynamic nature of the kidney exchange problem, an agent that
internally matches a node that was already reported to the centralized planner will lose trust from
the centralized planner once this becomes known.
We incorporate this consideration into the model by forbidding the agent from using the reported
nodes left unmatched by the mechanism. In other words, the utility of an agent is the total number
of its nodes that are matched by the mechanism, plus the nodes matched in a maximum cardinality
matching of the graph induced by its nodes that were not reported. It is clear that the definition of
utility of an agent has direct impact in the required conditions for strategy-proofness of a mechanism
and so we need to distinguish strategy-proofness in the 2 situations. In the former case we will say
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that a mechanism is strategy-proof in the strong sense and in the latter case a mechanism is strategy-
proof in the weak sense. Similarly we extend these notions to strategy-proofness in expectation.
It ts also clear that mechanisms that are strategy-proof in the strong sense are also strategy-proof
in the weak sense, so what we would like to analyze is the improvement in efficiency that can be
achieved with a weaker definition of strategy-proofness.
2.5.1 BALANCE-ALL and BALANCE-ALL-AND-AUGMENT
We argue that a modified version of mechanism BALANCE provides strategy-proofness in the weak
sense, even though for some instances it provides an incentive to the agents to report a node that is
finally left unmatched. Intuitively someone could see such a node as a warranty for the mechanism
to provide a higher utility for both agents and still preserve truthfulness.
We define mechanism BALANCE-ALL as a modified version of mechanism BALANCE in which VB is
defined as the set of black nodes reachable from some node in UR via an even-length alternating path
with respect to the matching at start of step 4. From the definition of BALANCE-ALL it follows that
it matches at least the same number of nodes for each agent that BALANCE and thus lower bounds on
the approximation ratio using the stronger definition of utility also apply. To see how BALANCE can
create incentive for an agent to report a node that is left unmatched and how BALANCE fails to be
strategy-proof in the strong sense see Figure 2.5.1.
As a natural extension, we define mechanism BALANCE-ALL-AND-AUGMENT as a modified version
of mechanism BALANCE-AND-AUGMENT in which mechanism BALANCE is substituted by BALANCE-ALL.
We proceed to present our results under the weaker notion of truthfulness. Due to the close
similarity between the strategy-proofness proof of BALANCE and the strategy-proofness proof of
BALANCE-ALL in this section we will just state our results and in Appendix B we present the proofs.
Proposition 2.5.1. Let f(G) be the output of the algorithm BALANCE-ALL on the graph G. Then
either f(G) is a maximum-cardinality matching, or it maximizes the number of matched nodes for
at least one of the agents. In other words, f(G) maximizes the total score, or the gray score or the
black score.
Proposition 2.5.2. Mechanism BALANCE-ALL-AND-AUGMENT is strategy-proof in the weaker sense
and is a 4/3 approximation mechanism.
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Figure 2.5.1: (a) Output of mechanism BALANCE on compatibility graph G, utility of agent black
is 5 (b) Output of mechanism BALANCE-ALL on G\{v1}. The utility of agent black is 7, 5 nodes
matched by BALANCE-ALL and 2 nodes matched by the agent black, the unmatched node v2 matched
with the non reported node v1 (c) Output of mechanism BALANCE-ALL on G\{v1, v2}. The utility
of agent black is 5, 3 nodes matched by BALANCE-ALL and 2 nodes matched by agent black, the
non reported nodes v1 and v2, thus agent black under mechanism BALANCE-ALL has incentive to
report node v2 which could remain unmatch to match it with non reported node v1.
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Figure 2.5.2: (a) Output of mechanism BALANCE on compatibility graph G, utility of agent black is
4 (b) Output of mechanism BALANCE-ALL on compatibility graph G. The utility of agent black is
5.
Proposition 2.5.3. Mechanism SHARE-BALANCE-ALL-AUGMENT is strategy-proof in expectation in
the weaker sense and is a 5/4 approximation mechanism.
Note that there is no need to make a similar extension to SHARE-BALANCE-AUGMENT because
given that it only applies to paths or cycles for which mechanism BALANCE and BALANCE-ALL are
the same. This equivalency follows from the fact that for paths and cycles no node is matched during
execution of step 4. As a consequence, the proof of Proposition 2.5.3, in which we prove that mech-
anism SHARE-BALANCE-ALL-AUGMENT is a 5/4 approximation (strategy-proofness in expectation fol-
lows as a direct consequence of strategy-proofness in expectation of BALANCE-ALL-AND-AUGMENT and
SHARE), mimics closely the proof of Proposition 2.4.2 and we omit it.
Notice also that even though the weaker notion of strategy-proofness improves the overall utility
for some instances (see Figure 2.5.2 for an example) it does not affect the worst case performance.
2.6 Discussion
While we focused only on the case of two agents, intriguing questions remain, even for this special
case. Is it possible to get a 5/4-approximation algorithm that is truthful in expectation for general
graphs? We showed that this is possible for paths and cycles, but it is not clear how to address
the general case. If we strengthen the truthfulness requirement to universal truthfulness, can we
get a 3/2-approximation for general graphs? Again, we could do this for paths and cycles, but
not in general. A problem of substantive interest is to better understand the case of more than 2
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agents. Specifically, is there an improved randomized algorithm for an arbitrary number of agents?
The best known bound is a 2-approximation. Finally, can one show non-trivial lower bounds on
approximation ratios for more than two agents? Or on other graph topologies?
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Chapter 3
A Dynamic Framework for the Design
and Evaluation of Kidney Exchange
Programs
3.1 Introduction
In most of the literature on the kidney exchange problem, strategies have been evaluated by their
performance on a randomly generated large compatibility graphs; conclusions and recommendations
have been drawn based on such a model. In reality, pairs arrive and depart over time, matching
algorithms are run at different points in time, and the compatibility graph just before running a
matching not only depends on the pairs that have arrived since the last run, but also on the pairs
that were not matched in the previous runs, moreover the actual rate of arrival is a lot lower than
the projected ones. Different strategies may benefit/hurt different type of pairs over time, and
those outcomes typify the size and the blood type-sensitivity level composition of the compatibility
graph over time. Data-based dynamic evaluations have been conducted by Dickerson et al. [10; 16;
18; 17]. Ünver [39] considered a dynamic model in which pairs arrive following a Poisson process.
He designed an optimal dynamic policy under some assumptions such as the impossibility of tissue
type incompatibilities, no departures and that there are arbitrarily many under demanded pairs
in the exchange pool in the long run. He also shows that in his model it may not be always an
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optimal strategy to match as many pairs as possible at a given point in time.
Our goal is to design a dynamic framework for the evaluation of extensively used kidney ex-
changes strategies through performance measures across the different type of pairs, while modeling
features like departures, tissue type incompatibilities, and data-based rates of arrivals. We would
like to provide a better understanding of the effects of these different features on the long-run
performance of policies, and ultimately provide recommendations for policy makers and healthcare
system administrators based on such a model.
We start by defining in Section 3.2 the model and the methodology for estimating the key
parameters of the model. Our simulation experiments and findings are described in Section 3.3
and 3.4, respectively. In Section 3.5 we discuss our findings.
3.2 The model
As the kidney exchange market is still in a very early stage of development, it is difficult to
understand the long-run effects of the strategies that are currently used given the small amount of
data. However, if we assume that the characteristics of pairs that have participated in the market
until now, are representative of the participants (patient-donor pairs, altruistic donors) that will
join in the future, then we could make inferences about the evolution of the exchange market under
different scenarios.
In this section we first describe the model elements: the patient-donor pairs and the underlying
compatibility graph. We also discuss the model’s fixed and variable parameters and describe how
we estimate their values and range of values respectively.
3.2.1 Description
The pairs In our model, each pair is characterized by its patient-donor blood type and by its
patient’s cPRA (Calculated Panel Reactive Antibody1), which ranges from 0 to 1 and accounts
for the patient’s probability of rejecting immunologically, a blood type compatible potential donor.
1“ The Calculated Panel Reactive Antibody (cPRA) is used in the allocation of kidney and pancreas organs as a
measure of sensitization level. The CPRA estimates the percentage of donors that would be incompatible with the
candidate, based on the candidate’s unacceptable antigens.”
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We model a pair’s patient cPRA as a discrete random variable with 3 possible values; each pair is
classified as a high sensitized, medium or low sensitized, and each sensitization level has associated
PRA value. Even though this classification is simplistic, it allows us to better understand the effect
of the policies on pair types due exclusively to its sensitization level.
Pairs are classified in 48 different types according to their donor’s and patient’s ABO classification as
well as their cPRA value. We assume that pairs arrive to an exchange pool in a Poisson manner and
are independently classified as one of the 48 PRA-ABO types according to a PRA-ABO inclusion
probability estimated from publicly available data. To estimate the pairs’s arrival rate, we use
information reported by the National Kidney Registry(NKR) 2 about their arrival rates and about
their relative size, compared to other exchange programs in the country.
The PRA-ABO inclusion probabilities are a function of the patient’s ABO blood type probability
distribution, the donor’s ABO blood type probability distribution and the patient’s sensitization
level probability distribution. We suppose that these probability distributions are independent. We
estimate the patients’ and donors’ ABO blood-type distribution from the United Network for Organ
Sharing (UNOS)3 waiting list patient’s ABO blood types distribution and living donors blood type
distribution, respectively. The patient’s sensitization level distribution is modeled as a variable
to incorporate the ongoing discussion about its criticality in the sufficiency of small exchanges to
clear the pool; however the corresponding PRA values are estimated from information reported by
the main kidney exchange programs, and are considered constant across all the studied scenarios.
We suppose that these probability distributions are independent. The methodology to model and
estimate features and parameters of altruistic donors is analogous to the one used for pairs.
The compatibility graph The compatibility among pairs is modeled by a directed graph (com-
patibility graph) in which each node represents a patient-donor pair and there is an edge from a
pair u to a pair v if the donor of pair u is blood type and tissue type compatible with the patient
of pair v. Once a pair arrives to the exchange pool, we execute a Bernoulli trial with each one of
the pairs whose donor is blood type compatible with the pair’s patient to determine incoming arcs
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one of the pairs whose patient is blood type compatible with the donor of the newly arrival pair to
determine outgoing arcs from the node associated with the newly arrived pair.
There are many other factors beyond blood type and tissue type compatibility involved in the
completion of a transplant. We model these factors through a post-matching failure probability.
Specifically once a matching policy is run on the compatibility graph at an instant in time, the
post-matching failure probability accounts for the probability that at edge is not available at the
moment of the transplant. Among the reasons for a post-matching failure to occur are the decline
in health condition of any of the involved agents, changes in tissue compatibility, reneging by a
pair’s donor, or simply because the pair declines the matching offered kidney.
3.2.2 Parameters estimation
Arriving patient’s ABO distribution We forecast the number of yearly arrivals of each ABO
type based on a model fitted to yearly past observations of the additions by ABO blood type to
UNOS’s waiting list from the year 1995 to 2012. We only consider additions that corresponds to
patients joining the waiting list for the first time. With this decision we aim to wane the effect of
specific policies in our characterization of the stream of arriving patients. Intuitively, the component
of the stream of arrivals composed by patients that were already served by the the UNOS’s waiting
list is not independent of the UNOS’s assignment policy. Notice that the incentive for a patient to
join the UNOS’s wait list for the first time may not be independent of the assignment policy. A
patient may feel that under the current policy they may be treated unfairly, and decide to not join
the waiting list. However the fact that joining the waiting list has no cost, and that an offer can be
rejected, supports the hypothesis that the effect of the current assignment policy on the decision
of whether or not to join the wait list is minimal. From the predicted number of arrivals of each
ABO blood type for our study time horizon, we determine the proportion of each ABO blood type
of patients that is expected to arrive. Appendix C has a detailed description of our methodology.
Arriving donor’s ABO distribution We based the estimation of the willing donor’s ABO
blood type distribution on the proportion of each ABO blood type in the yearly expected stream of
living donor’s arrivals to the UNO’s program in our study time horizon. To do so, we forecast the
number of yearly living donor arrivals to UNO’s program based on a model fitted to yearly past
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ABO 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
O 49.07 49.03 49.10 49.09 49.11 49.11 49.11 49.12 49.13 49.14
A 32.44 32.43 32.43 32.43 32.43 32.42 32.42 32.41 32.41 32.41
B 14.66 14.72 14.66 14.76 14.66 14.67 14.67 14.67 14.67 14.67
AB 3.83 3.82 3.81 3.81 3.80 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.79 3.78
Table 3.1: Forecasted percentage of Patient’s arrivals of each ABO blood type in the next 10 years.
observations of the living donor’s by ABO blood type that were transplanted in UNOS’s program
from 1995 to 2012. From the predicted number of yearly arrival by blood type we compute the
proportion of those out of the total stream of arrival that are of each blood type in year 2013, and
use this as the estimator of the ABO distribution of willing donors in the exchange pool. Notice
that we estimate the ABO blood type distribution of the living donors that are suitable to go
through a transplant from the data of living donors that actually went through a transplant.
As just mentioned, a downside of estimating the distribution of blood types among living donors
from this data, is that the ongoing policies of UNOS’s and its associated transplantation programs
have an impact on the ABO blood type distribution of those living donors that get transplanted.
Specifically, the requirements for a living donor candidate to become a viable donor depend on the
guidelines of a program. Although this is a relevant remark, it is out of the scope of our study
to evaluate when a living donor candidate actually becomes a donor. Precisely, for this work we
consider only those living donors candidates that became viable donors according to the transplant
program’s guidelines.
Another potential flaw of the use of this data to estimate the blood type distribution of viable
living donors is the fact that this estimate does not consider living donors who are willing to donate,
but for various reasons (reneging, sickness, etc) they never get transplanted. The NKR reported
in [29] that among 217 patient-donor pairs that were transplanted through chains, only 7 bridge
donors became unavailable. Additionally, unlike the exchange programs which need to not only
find a suitable donor for a patient in a patient-donor pair but also find a suitable patient for the
willing donor, there is no such constraint in the UNOS’s waiting list. This fact coupled with the
fact that there are many patients of each blood type waiting to be transplanted in the UNOS’s
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waiting list, suggest that unless the living donor makes a late withdrawal, we can assume that all
suitable living donors will go through transplantation.
Based on these facts and information reported by the kidney exchange community experience, we
will assume that the living donors that goes through a transplant in the UNO’s waiting list are
representative of the population of living donors that are suitable to go through a transplant (a
transplant that not necessarily occurs).
From the predicted number of living donors by ABO blood type that will be transplanted in the
2013-2022 time horizon, we estimate the yearly proportion of living donors of each ABO blood
that are expected to be transplanted in our study time horizon. For our study we assume that
ABO 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
O 65.52 65.55 65.58 65.60 65.63 65.63 65.65 65.67 65.69 65.68
A 26.26 26.28 26.29 26.30 26.31 26.31 26.32 26.32 26.32 26.32
B 7.47 7.45 7.44 7.43 7.41 7.39 7.38 7.37 7.36 7.36
AB 0.75 0.72 0.70 0.67 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.64 0.63 0.64
Table 3.2: Forecasted percentage of Donor’s arrivals of each ABO blood type in 10 years time
horizon
across all the considered scenarios the ABO composition of the stream of arrivals of willing donors
is determined by the percentage of the living donors that are forecasted to join the UNOS’s waiting
list in 2013, see Table 3.2.
Departures Pairs depart from the exchange pool without a transplant offer because of the pa-
tient or the donor’s medical condition, death or their own will. In our model we just consider
departures without a transplant offer due to the patient’s medical condition, specifically when a
patient is too ill or when he or she dies. We do not model departures without a transplant offer due
to donor related reasons mainly because of the ethical issues related to donor’s coercion or change
in medical condition. Specifically, a policy should not be penalized for not making an earlier offer
to a pair with a donor that reneges or got sick while waiting.
A pair departs without a transplant offer because of the patient’s medical condition mainly when
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the patient is too ill to receive a transplant, or when the patient dies. The patient’s rate of de-
parture because of the death is estimated from the UNOS’s waiting list. This result is a good
estimator of the rate at which pairs leave the exchange pool as consequence of the patient’s death.
The mortality rate attending for a transplant can be considered independent of the transplantation
system (exchange pool or waiting list). Particularly this holds under the assumption that patients
waiting to be transplanted are on similar transient medical treatments (dialysis), whether they are
waiting in the exchange pool or in the waiting list. The patient’s annual death rate in the UNOS’s
waiting list is reported in [19], see Table 3.3. According to UNOS’s “the death rate is calculated
by dividing the number of patients who died in a given year by the sum of the years that patients
spend waiting and then multiplying by 1,000”. Notice that this is a rate per 1,000 patients. More
details about the methodology to compute the patient’s death rate in the UNOS waiting list can be
found in [19]. Innovation and new medical findings have made important contributions to this area,
year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
rate 84 73.6 73.5 76.8 75 73.4 70.5 70.4 65.0 63.3
Table 3.3: Number of deaths for every 1,000 patient-years on the waiting list, 1999 to 2008
which can be observed in the negative trend of the rate of deaths on the waiting list in 1999-2008
period. In this work we set the rate of departure due to the at 63.3 deaths/year (the annual death
rate per 1,000 patient-years at risk in 2008 report by UNOS) .
To model the departures from the exchange pool because the pair’s patient is too ill to get a
transplant, we define a threshold waiting time (taken to be 3 years), after which a patient is no
longer suitable for a transplant. We justify this as follows: 22% of the patients in UNOS’s active
waiting list at the end of 2008 have waited more than 3 years, and 6.9% of the patients have waited
more than 5 years. Patients that fell in this category have been on dyalisis for at least 3 to 5 years
and so their health conditions and long-term survival expectation have been strongly undermined,
see [28] and [41]. Thus, we can conclude that patients who have waited for so long are at high risk
of departing the system without being served, but moreover that they were healthy enough when
they joined the waiting list to be able to wait for such time as active patients. This suggests that
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the policy failed these patients.
Additionally, for patients with a willing donor, exchanges pools are seen as an “improved” alter-
native to the UNOS waiting list. Thus, we expect any reasonable policy for the exchange pool to
reduce the waiting time with respect to the expected waiting times on the UNOS wait list (which is
independent of the fact that a patient has or not a willing donor). Likewise The threshold waiting
time also serve as benchmark for policy evaluation.
Donors cPRA distribution As said earlier in section 3.2.1, pairs are characterized by their
patient-donor blood type and by their cPRA. Next, we describe how our model determines that
the donor of another pair is a suitable donor for a recipient of a pair given that they are blood
compatible, by making use of the information provided by the cPRA of the patient. We use the
cPRA of a patient as an estimator of the likelihood that the patient and a blood compatible donor
are tissue type incompatible. The cPRA is defined by the HRSA/OPTN as the “likelihood that
the recipient and donor would be incompatible”. Notice that the cPRA already accounts for blood
type incompatibility. This latter fact implies that while using the cPRA as an estimator of the
likelihood that a patient and a blood compatible donor are tissue type incompatible, we are over
estimating the probability of a recipient and a blood compatible donor to be incompatible. This
result in a more pessimistic model.
To estimate the cPRA’s distribution, we use as reference the data reported by the NKR in [29]
that includes the cPRA values of the registered pairs in their program at the time of the 100th
transplant, classifed in 3 categories: 0-9%, 10-79% and 80%-100%. Even though the sample has
only 172 pairs, the results are consistent with the PRA data reported in [19] under the same
classification. We choose as representative value of each cPRA category its third quartile, under





Table 3.4: cPRA probability mass function used in our model
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Pairs’ rate of arrivals The NKR reported the number of new pair’s registrations per month
from January 2010 to June 2013 in [30]. For this work we use the average number of pairs that
arrived to the NKR exchange program from January 2013 to June 2013 as the pair’s arrival rate.
This period of time presents the largest average over any contiguous 6 months period of time in
the reported data. The data reveals a trend of growth over time of the number of registrations in
the NKR, see Table 3.5.
Jan 13 Feb 13 Mar 13 Apr 13 May 13 Jun 13 Average
26 50 45 44 29 34 38
Table 3.5: New pair registrations per month in the NKR exchange program from January 2013 to
Jun 2013
Post matching failure probability According to [30], in 2012 the NKR made 1623 individual
matches offers out of which only 226 end up in a transplant. Among these 1623 offers, 692 were
requested a Lymphocite Crossmatch test (XMs). Notice that offers are made based on a computer
software which consider a large amount of information of the patient’s history. As the immunological
characterization of a patient changes over time, some patients are requested an additional test called
XM. It is also reported in [30] that an unacceptable XM is the largest primary cause of swap failures
in the NKR. We model this feature through a post matching failure probability.
3.2.3 Altruistic Donors
The number of altruistic donors has shown an increasing trend over the years, and there is an
ongoing debate about how they should be allocated. Specifically, it is not clear if an altruistic
donor’s kidney should be allocated to someone in the waiting list or if it should be allocated to
a pair in the exchange pool to initiate a chain of exchanges, which could end up with a donation
to the waiting list. It is not clear how much we gain in efficiency and what the improvement in
waiting times are for pairs in the exchange pool due to the participation of altruistic donors. On one
hand, when an altruistic donor is used to launch a chain of exchanges, it removes the synchronous
transplants constraint. On the other hand, the decision of using an altruistic donor to catalyze
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a chain instead of donating directly to the waiting list, may hurt patients in the waiting list. To
illustrate this latter point, consider the case in which an O type altruistic donor is used to launch
a chain that ends with a non-O donation to the waiting list. This may benefit patients in the
wait list that will move forward in the queue because pairs in front of them received a transplant
through a chain (patients who were listed in the wait list and also in an exchange program, and
who participated in the chain). However, this will hurt patients, particularly O patients, without
an intended donor that have higher priority than any patient who participated in the chain. The
overall effect in welfare is not clear. With the inclusion of a parameter to control the percentage of
arrivals that corresponds to an altruistic donor we intend to measure the long-run gain in efficiency
and waiting time improvement due to the allowance of altruistic donors initiating chains in the
exchange pool. Considering that protective policies should not only guarantee overall improvement
in overall measures but also guarantee acceptable performance measures to vulnerable patients, we
analyze efficiency and waiting times across the 64 ABO-PRA patient-donor pairs in our model. To
do so, we study the performance of various policies with and without altruistic donors. In this work
we assume that 1% of the stream of arrivals are altruistic donors with ABO blood type distribution
in Table 3.7. This analysis allows us to asses the relative benefits of diverting altruistic donors from
the wailing list. Also, we asseses the dependence of those “benefits” on market parameters such as
the rate of arrivals, the frequency at which matchings are decided, and whether or not compatible
pairs participate in the exchange market.
3.2.4 Compatible pairs
Patient-donor pairs that are compatible do not need to join an exchange program. Although an
exchange program may increase the chances of improving the quality of the match and benefit
another recipient who is incompatible with his or her intended donor, it also burdens the process:
longer waiting times, more involvement of the donor (more blood draws, days off work etc.) and
donor’s coercion. In this work we study the dynamics of the exchange pool in both cases: when
compatible pairs join the pool, and when they do not. We define the random variables Xp and
XPRA to be the blood type and cPRA level respectively of an arriving pair’s patient, and the
random variable Xd to be its donor’s blood type. From the model definition Xp, Xd takes values
in {O,A,B,AB} and XPRA is high, medium, or low as in Table 3.4.
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Compatible pairs join the pool To model this, we assume that the blood type of an arriving
patient is independent of the blood type of its intended donor. Thus,
P (Xp = x,Xd = y,XPRA = z) = P (Xp = x) P (Xd = y) P (XPRA = z) ,
for all x, y ∈ {O,A,B,AB} , z ∈ {H,M,L}. At first sight, this scenario does not seem to be of
interest if the ABO distribution of patients and donors are estimated to be identical, because in the
long run the expected number of pairs with patient ABO ’x’ and donor ABO ’y’ that have arrived
is equal to the expected number of pairs with patient ABO ’y’ and donor ABO ’x’. Thus, matching
symmetric pairs should be enough to clear the exchange pool. This conclusion, however, does not
tell the whole story. (1) Pairs arrive and depart over time; (2) Long waiting times on dialysis hurt
the chances of a successful transplant; and (3) The arrival rate of different pair types is significantly
different. The dynamics have an important effect on who waits and for how long etc. For instance,
the average rate of arrivals to NKR from January 2013 to June 2013 is 38 patients per month, see
[30]. Using as estimate of the distribution of donors’ ABO, the ABO distribution of living donors
to UNOS waiting list from 1998-2009, and as estimator of the distribution of patients ABO the
ABO distribution of patients in UNOS waiting list during the same period of time. For example,
the expected inter-arrival time of a pair with patient type B and donor type AB in our model is
8.8 months, whereas the expected inter-arrival time of its ABO symmetric pair is 9.4 months. This
together with the fact that ABO compatibility is not enough for pairs to be compatible and that
waiting time is a key factor in the graft survival rate suggest that the scarcity of pairs’ types over
time plays an important role in the design of policies and long-run behavior of the exchange pools.
Also, the dynamic nature of the problem introduce complications that cannot be visualized in a
static model, or in a dynamic model that does not model departures and patients’ sensitization
levels.
Compatible pairs don’t join the pool For the scenarios in which compatible pairs don’t join
the pool, we assume that the blood type distribution of the general population of willing donors as
well as the patients is in Table 3.7. However, the distribution of the willing donors that actually
join the exchange program is dependent on the blood type distribution of the patients as well as the
cPRA distribution. We define random variable Dg to be the blood type of a living donor randomly
selected from the general living donor population. For an arbitrary x ∈ {O,A,B,AB} we define
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S(x) as the maximal subset of {O,A,B,AB} such that a donor with blood type in such subset is
blood type compatible with a patient whose blood type is x. We model the dependency of Xd on
Xp and XPRA by conditioning the distribution of the willing donors that enter the exchange on the
blood type of the patient:





w∈S(x) P (Dg=w) (1−z)




w∈S(x) P (Dg=w) (1−z)
If y ∈ S(x)
Recall that the distribution of Dg, Xp and XPRA are given in Tables 3.4 and 3.7.
3.2.5 Matching policies
We consider three categories of matching policies: 1) Pairs are matched using cycles of arbitrary
length, 2) Pairs are only matched through cycles of length at most 3 or 5, and 3) Pairs are matched
through cycles of length at most 3 or 5, and through chains. Notice that chains are possible only in
the presence of altruistic donors. As discussed in Section 2.1, the logistics involved in the execution
of the exchanges in a cycle are one of the main challenges faced by exchange programs. We use
as benchmark, in efficiency as well as in waiting times assessments, the results obtained using a
matching policy in which cycles and chains of any length can be used at any point in time. Even
though all the matching policies considered in this work match myopically - they decide matchings
considering only pairs currently in the compatibility graph, and does not use available information
about potential future arrivals - we capture the non-myopic effect when running matchings at dif-
ferent frequencies. In [18] Dickerson, Procaccia and Sandholm provide evidence of gain in efficiency
due to the use of non-myopic matching policies; however, exchanges mostly match myopically in
practice.
Next we proceed to describe our matching policies. Before doing so, we introduce some useful
definitions. Let G(t) = (N(t), E(t)) be the compatibility graph at time t. We let v(P,D, t),
P ∈ {O,A,B,AB}∪{NA} and D ∈ {O,A,B,AB} as the set of nodes in G(t) associated with a pair
with patient’s blood type P and donor’s blood type D. Altruistic donors are modeled as pairs with
an intended patient with blood type NA who can receive the kidney of any donor. We define directed
cycle C = (Nc, Ec) as a graph such that Nc = {v1, . . . , vl} and Ec = {(vi, vi+1) : ∀i ∈ 1, . . . , l − 1}∪
{(vl, v1)} . A cycle C belongs to a matching structure P1D1, . . . , PlDl if vi ∈ v(Pi, Di) for all
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ID Description ID Description ID Description
1 AA-AA 2 BB-BB 3 ABAB-ABAB
4 OA-AO 5 BA-AB 6 BAB-ABB
7 BO-OB 8 BO-OA-AB 9 AAB-ABO-OA
10 ABA-AAB 11 ABO-OAB-ABB 12 BAB-ABB-BB
13 AAB-ABA-AA 14 ABO-OAB-ABO-OO-OAB 15 BO-OB-BB
16 OAB-ABA-AO 17 OO-OO 18 AO-OB-BA
19 ABO-OB-BB 20 OA-AA-ABO 21 BB-BO
22 ABO-OAB 23 AO-AO 24 BO-BO
25 ABA-ABA 26 ABB-ABB 27 BA-AO
28 OO-OA-AO-OB-BO 29 OO-OA-AO 30 OB-BO-OO
31 OA-AO-OO-OB-BO
Table 3.6: Some matching structures used in our matching algorithms
i = 1, . . . , l. Finally, for a matching structure S we define the compatibility graph G(S, t) as the
subgraph of G(t) in which all cycles belongs to the matching structure P1D1, . . . , PlDl. In Table 3.6
we specify matching structures that will be used to define some of our matching algorithms. The
matching structures with ID 4, 7 can trivially be extended to have length 4. Similarly, matching
structure with ID 17 can be extended to have length 3 or 5. In addition to the matching structures
defined in Table 3.6, we define the matching structure with ID 32 as the set of matching structures
in which all pairs’ patients have AB blood type. Similarly, we define the matching structure with
ID 33 as the set of matching structures in which all pairs’ have patient blood type O or donor blood
type O. Let A(t) be the set of altruistic donors at time t.
Next we define some sets of matching structures ID′s that will be used to describe our algo-
rithms:
S2,3 = [3, 11, 6, 12, 15, 2, 9, 10, 13, 16, 14, 5, 7, 8, 1, 4, 17, 18, 20, 27, 23, 24, 25, 26, 21, 22, 32, 19, 29, 30] ,
S2,3,5 = [3, 11, 6, 12, 15, 2, 9, 10, 13, 16, 14, 5, 7, 8, 1, 4, 17, 18, 20, 25, 26, 22, 19, 29, 30, 28, 31, 33] .
We proceed to describe the matching algorithms used in this work. For a given matching
frequency δ and a maximum time horizon T , we define the ith component of the time vector ~t as
(i− 1) δ. For an arbitrary t ∈ T and for a set of altruistic donors A(t),
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Matching algorithm 1
Step 1. Let SID = S2,3.
Step 2. For j = 1 : length(SID), Find a circulation f
∗ of G (S(j), t) that maximizes the number of
edges that carries non-zero flow and such that the flow entering a node is at most one. For
every edge (v, u) ∈ E(t), if f∗u,v is non zero, update the status of the pairs associated with
nodes v and u as matched and update G(t). Otherwise, do nothing.
Step 3. If the set of altruistic donors is not empty, A(t) 6= ∅. For every altruistic donor a ∈ A(t),
find the longest shortest path from the node associated with the altruistic donor a to all
nodes in G(t) associated with patient-donor pairs that are reachable from the altruistic
donor’s node under consideration. Update A = A\ {a}, update the status of all nodes in
the selected path as matched, and update G(t). Otherwise, STOP.
Matching algorithm 2
Step 1. Randomly rearrange components in vector S2,3. Let SID = S2,3.
Step 2. For j = 1 : length(SID), Find a circulation f
∗ of G (S(j), t) that maximizes the number of
edges that carries non-zero flow and such that the flow entering a node is at most one. For
every edge (v, u) ∈ E(t), if f∗u,v is non zero, update the status of the pairs associated with
nodes v and u as matched and update G(t). Otherwise, do nothing.
Step 3. If the set of altruistic donors is not empty, A(t) 6= ∅. For every altruistic donor a ∈ A(t),
find the longest shortest path from the node associated with the altruistic donor a to all
nodes in G(t) associated with patient-donor pairs that are reachable from the altruistic
donor’s node under consideration. Update A = A\ {a}, update the status of all nodes in
the selected path as matched, and update G(t). Otherwise, STOP.
Matching algorithm 3
Step 1. Let SID = S2,3,5.
Step 2. For j = 1 : length(SID), Find a circulation f
∗ of G (S(j), t) that maximizes the number of
edges that carries non-zero flow and such that the flow entering a node is at most one. For
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every edge (v, u) ∈ E(t), if f∗u,v is non zero, update the status of the pairs associated with
nodes v and u as matched and update G(t). Otherwise, do nothing.
Step 3. If the set of altruistic donors is not empty( A(t) 6= ∅): For every altruistic donor a ∈ A(t),
find the longest shortest path from the node associated with the altruistic donor a to all
nodes in G(t) associated with patient-donor pairs that are reachable from the altruistic
donor’s node under consideration. Update A = A\ {a}, update the status of all nodes in
the selected path as matched, and update G(t). Otherwise, STOP.
Matching algorithm 4
Step 1. Randomly rearrange components in vector S2,3,5. Let SID = S2,3.
Step 2. For j = 1 : length(SID), Find a circulation f
∗ of G (S(j), t) that maximizes the number of
edges that carries non-zero flow and such that the flow entering a node is at most one. For
every edge (v, u) ∈ E(t), if f∗u,v is non zero, update the status of the pairs associated with
nodes v and u as matched and update G(t). Otherwise, do nothing.
Step 3. If the set of altruistic donors is not empty( A(t) 6= ∅): For every altruistic donor a ∈ A(t),
find the longest shortest path from the node associated with the altruistic donor a to all
nodes in G(t) associated with patient-donor pairs that are reachable from the altruistic
donor’s node under consideration. Update A = A\ {a}, update the status of all nodes in
the selected path as matched, and update G(t). Otherwise, STOP.
Unconstrained
Step 1. Find a circulation f∗ of G (t) that maximizes the number of edges that carries non-zero flow.
For every edge (v, u) ∈ E(t), if f∗u,v is non zero, update the status of the pairs associated
with nodes v and u as matched and update G(t). Otherwise, do nothing.
3.3 The Experiments
In this work we study the scenario in which there is a national unified exchange program. Specif-
ically, all pairs that are willing to participate in an exchange are registered in a centralize clear-
inghouse that run the matchings over time under different matching mechanisms. We consider a
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Table 3.7: Distribution of blood types of patients and donors in the stream of arrivals
variety of matching mechanisms parametrized by: (i) presence of altruistic donors; (ii) the par-
ticipation of compatible patient-donor pairs; (iii) allowed matching structures (cycles or chains);
(iv) length of the allowed structures; and (v) the frequency with which matchings are run. In
particular, the analysis of these features establishes an overarching link between the dynamics of
the kidney exchange market and parameters under the control of policy makers and healthcare
administrators. We assess the mechanisms by their long-run efficiency and waiting times on the 48
ABO-PRA pairs types considered in the model. Each scenario is run by matching pairs every 5,
10, 15 or 30 days, over a time horizon of 10 years. To generate the pairs, we use the same cPRA
distribution, patient’s and donor’s blood type distribution as well as departure rate across all the
scenarios, these are shown in Tables 3.4, 3.7 and 3.3.
In the Table 3.9 we present the conditional distribution of the donors blood type given the
patient’s blood type and its cPRA and in Table 3.10 we show the donor’s blood type distribution
when compatible pairs do not join the exchange pool.
3.4 Our findings
In this section we present our results in the context of three central questions: What is the prob-
ability of receiving an offer? How frequently should we run the matching mechanism? And who
benefits when chains and longer cycles are allowed? We also discuss the sensitization level of the
exchange pool over time. For each scenario in Table 3.8 we run 10 realizations. For each realization
we run the matching algorithm every 5, 10, 15 and 30 days during 9 years and study the behavior
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Scenario Matching algorithm Description
1 1 No altruistic donors, compatible pairs join the pool.
2 2 No altruistic donors, compatible pairs join the pool.
3 unconstrained No altruistic donors, compatible pairs join the pool.
1a 1 Altruistic donors, compatible pairs join the pool.
2a 2 Altruistic donors, compatible pairs join the pool.
4 3 No altruistic donors, compatible pairs don’t join the
pool.
5 4 No altruistic donors, compatible pairs don’t join the
pool.
6 unconstrained No altruistic donors, compatible pairs don’t join the
pool.
4a 3 Altruistic donors, compatible pairs don’t join the pool.
5a 4 Altruistic donors, compatible pairs don’t join the pool.
Table 3.8: Description scenarios recreated in our experiments
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(a) Pair’s with patient’s cPRA value 0.075
D / P O A B AB
O 0.1247 0.3254 0.1513 0.6552
A 0.6667 0.1304 0.8084 0.2626
B 0.1896 0.4946 0.0172 0.0747
AB 0.019 0.0496 0.0231 0.0075
(b) Pair’s with patient’s cPRA value 0.625
D / P O A B AB
O 0.542 0.624 0.564 0.6552
A 0.348 0.2502 0.362 0.2626
B 0.1 0.1144 0.064 0.0747
AB 0.01 0.0114 0.01 0.0075
(c) Pair’s with patient’s cPRA value 0.95
D / P O A B AB
O 0.6435 0.652 0.646 0.6552
A 0.2715 0.262 0.272 0.2626
B 0.0.077 0.078 0.074 0.0747
AB 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.0075
Table 3.9: Conditional distribution of donor’s blood type in the stream of arrivals given the patient’s






Table 3.10: Donor’s blood type distribution when compatible pairs don’t join the pool.
63
CHAPTER 3. A DYNAMIC FRAMEWORK FOR THE DESIGN AND EVALUATION OF
KIDNEY EXCHANGE PROGRAMS
overtime of 1) the number of pairs waiting over time in the pool 2) the number of pairs that receive
an offer 3) the number of pairs that depart after waiting one year or more and 4) the waiting time
distribution of pairs that receive an offer. The standard deviations of the provided measures are
not reported in this document but can be found in the Excel technical report associated with this
work. To measure the performance of policies regarding departures, we don’t penalize a policy for
pairs that depart without an offer within one year of their arrival. Fielded exchange programs have
average waiting times of at most 18 months depending on the different ABO-PRA pair types, and
thus we assume that a policy failed a patient only when the patient departs without an offer after
having waited more than one year.
3.4.1 How frequently should we run the matching algorithms?
We measure the effect of the frequency at which the matchings are run on the long-term efficiency
across the different ABO-PRA pairs’ types in our model, as well as on their waiting times.
Compatible pairs join the pool In Scenario1, Scenario1a and Scenario3 the differences in
the performances for low and medium sensitized patients for the different matching frequencies
are negligible. Moreover, more than 95% of low and medium sensitized patients receive an offer
within one year of their arrival independent of type of their donor; this result is not surprising. As
expressed by the attendees of the symposium “Future Directions in Paired Exchange”4 in 2013,
“all KPD5 programs struggle to transplant highly sensitized recipient candidates (cPRA>98%)”6.
Thus, we will discuss our findings for the highly sensitized patients. The results for the low and
medium sensitized patients can be found in the Excel technical report.
Our findings for Scenario1 when running matchings every 5 days, 10 days 15 days or 30 days
suggest that in the long-run, the frequency at which matchings are run has only a slight impact on
the efficiency across the different ABO-PRA pair types. The waiting times are in average shorter
4Continuing Medical Education event organized by the Weill Cornell Medical College, April 19th 2013.
5Kidney Paired Donation
6Adam Bingaman, Director of the Live Donor and Incompatible Kidney Transplant Program at the Methodist
Specialty and Transplant Hospital in San Antonio ,TX
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when matching every 5 days than when matching every 30 days — recall that we are discussing
highly sensitized patients. The patient’s waiting time cumulative density function obtained when
matching every 5 days is lower bounded by the one obtained matching every 30 days with few
exceptions, as pairs with a B patient and an A or B donor. Specifically, our findings suggest that
matching every month instead of every 5 days does not increase the number of pairs that receive a
matching offer neither reduce the time that pairs attend in the exchange program before receiving
an offer in Scenario1. To illustrate this observation, in Table 3.11 we show the cumulative density
function of pairs with an O highly sensitized patient and a B donor in Scenario1.
5 days 10 days 15 days 30 days
6m 73.59% 70.07% 70.27% 70.00%
12m 94.38% 93.19% 91.65% 91.22%
18m 99.51% 98.30% 98.28% 98.78%
2y 100.00% 99.27% 99.51% 99.76%
2.5y 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
3y 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Table 3.11: Cumulative density function of the waiting time of pairs with an O highly sensitized
patient and an B donor that receive an offer in Scenario1
About efficiency performance across the different type of pairs with a highly sensitized patient,
in Scenario1 at least 95% of O and A patients receive an offer, and at least 85% of all B and AB
patients do. Given that pairs with an AB patient are blood compatible with any donor and given
their low rate of arrival, in algoritm 1 there are a limited set of structures through which pairs with
an AB patient are matched. This latter is hurting the number of pairs with an AB patient that
receive an offer.
For Scenario3 we found that the frequency at which matchings are run has negligible impact
in the number of pairs that receive an offer but for pairs with an O patient and an AB donor; for
which matching less frequently significantly improve their efficiency and waiting times. For pairs
with a non AB donor Scenario3 offers a transplant to at at least 95% of the pairs that arrive to
the program while only 59% of the pairs with an O patient and an AB donor receive an offer. Even
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though in overall in Scenario3 more offers are made, the disparity in the performance due to the
donor’s blood type is larger than in Scenario1 and Scenario1a.
About waiting times in Scenario1, Scenario1a and Scenario3, for all pair types but pairs with
an AB donor 90% of the pairs that receive an offer do it within 12 months of arrival and at least
95% does it within 18 months of arrival. However in Scenario1 at least 90% of the pairs with an
AB donor receive an offer within 18 months of arrival while in Scenario1a this percentage drops to
82.5% when matchings are run every 5 days and is at least 90% when matchings are run every 10,
15 and 30 days and in Scenario3 it drops to 56% when running every 5 days and is at least 75%
when running every 10, 15 and 30 days.
In conclusion, contrary to the static model, our findings suggest that running matching less
frequently doesn’t provide a significant improvement in efficiency. While in Scenario1 and Sce-
nario1a running more frequently offers smaller waiting times for those pairs that receive an offer,
we observe the opposite behavior in Scenario3, in which matching less frequently result in smaller
waiting times for highly sensitized patients.
Due to the disparity in the quantities of the different ABO-PRA types in consideration that
arrives to the pool, measures across all patients with the same blood type and cPRA level hide
the differences in performance due to their particular donor blood type. In Tables 3.12 we present
the percentage of pairs with O or A highly sensitized patient by donor’s blood type that receive an
offer. The results for pairs with patients with blood type B or AB as well as the number of offers
and other details can be found in the technical report in Excel.
Compatible pairs don’t join the pool From the donors blood type distribution in Table 3.10
and the patient’s blood type distribution in Table 3.7 it follows that in the stream of arrivals there
is a large disparity between the supply and the demand of blood type O kidneys. Meanwhile
49.07% of the patients that arrive to the pool have blood type O, only 39.7% of the donors do. As
consequence is expected that a considerable percentage of blood type O patients depart from the
exchange program without an offer.
In contrast to the case when compatible donors join the pool, in Scenario4, Scenario4a and
Scenario6 the performance across patients with low and medium cPRA varies depending on their
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Scenario3 Scenario1
Donor BT Patient BT 5 days 10 days 15 days 30 days 5 days 10 days 15 days 30 days
O O 99.11% 99.14% 99.24% 99.32% 98.81% 98.91% 98.91% 98.99%
O A 99.55% 99.55% 99.57% 99.64% 99.11% 98.58% 98.74% 98.53%
A O 98.25% 98.53% 98.53% 98.86% 97.90% 97.89% 97.96% 98.10%
A A 99.22% 99.40% 99.46% 99.46% 90.75% 91.20% 90.98% 90.54%
B O 98.50% 99.31% 98.77% 99.32% 97.85% 97.16% 96.90% 96.47%
B A 99.18% 99.79% 99.38% 99.59% 95.91% 97.41% 95.24% 97.79%
AB O 59.26% 83.87% 77.05% 92.31% 97.83% 96.08% 95.92% 95.92%
AB A 88.68% 92.73% 92.45% 96.15% 85.19% 89.29% 89.66% 89.66%
Table 3.12: Percentage of highly sensitized O and A patients by donor that receive an offer in
Scenario1 and Scenario3
donor’s blood type . The difference in the number of pairs that receive an offer as a function of the
frequency at which matchings are run is meaningful mainly for non O blood type patients with a
non O donors. We will focus our discussion on pairs with a non blood type O donor. In Table 3.13,
3.14 and 3.15 we show the percentage of O patients with a non O donor that receive an offer in
Scenario4, Scenario4a and Scenario6 for low, medium and highly sensitized patients respectively
when matching every 5 days and every 30 days.
Scenario6 Scenario4a Scenario4
Frequency A B AB A B AB A B AB
5 days 87.28% 80.37% 10.36% 79.37% 81.25% 89.81% 77.45% 81.02% 93.65%
30 days 86.13% 78.63% 5.18% 74.65% 80.10% 93.71% 71.86% 80.53% 96.03%
Table 3.13: Percentage of patients with an O low sensitized patient that receive an offer classified
by their’s donor’s blood type
While slightly more O low sensitized patients with a non O donor receive an offer when matching
more frequently (every 5 days), more O medium and highly sensitized patients with a non O donor
receive an offer when matchings are run every 30 days in Scenario4, Scenario4a and Scenario6. The
percentage differences are larger as the cPRA level increases. For example when matching every 5
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Scenario6 Scenario4a Scenario4
Frequency A B AB A B AB A B AB
5 days 74.75% 62.50% 13.89% 81.59% 70.37% 80.95% 83.42% 72.00% 79.87%
30 days 77.78% 73.91% 11.11% 90.85% 67.74% 85.71% 90.83% 73.01% 86.90%
Table 3.14: Percentage of patients with an O medium sensitized patient that receive an offer
classified by their’s donor’s blood type
Scenario6 Scenario4a Scenario4
Frequency A B AB A B AB A B AB
5 days 25.58% 28.69% 0.00% 62.13% 36.96% 31.82% 56.78% 32.18% 62.44%
30 days 32.12% 35.05% 5.36% 73.37% 37.21% 60.87% 71.85% 32.10% 67.96%
Table 3.15: Percentage of patients with an O medium sensitized patient that receive an offer
classified by their’s donor’s blood type
days in Scenario4 56.78% of the highly sensitized patients that have arrived by the year 9 with an
O patient and A donor receive an offer, 71.85% does when matching every 30 days. For pairs with
medium sensitization level the relation is 83.42% to 90.83% and for pairs with low sensitization level
it goes from 77.45% to 71.86%. This suggest that the effect of the frequency at which matchings
are run is more significant for highly sensitized pairs and that running less frequently does benefit
these pairs on detrimental of pairs with a low sensitized patient. Notice also that highly sensitized
O patients with an AB donor receive significantly more offers in Scenario4 than in Scenario4a and
Scenario6 when chains and unconstrained length cycles are allowed. Also, a meaningful additional
percentage of medium sensitized O patients with an AB donor receive an offer in Scenario4 and
Scenario4a than in Scenario6.
The frequency at which matchings are run also impact the distribution of the waiting times for
pairs with an O patient in all the scenarios in consideration, and do not have significant impact
for pairs with non O patient which are low and medium sensitized, because these latter receive an
offer in average within 12 months of their arrival for all the frequencies and matching algorithms in
consideration with few exceptions as pairs with an AB donor and an AB patient which are scarce.
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We found that the percentage of pairs with an O patient that receive an offer and do it within 12
months of their arrival is larger when matching every 30 days than when matching every 5 days.
In Table 3.16 we present the waiting time cumulative density function of pairs with an O highly
sensitized patient and an A donor.
Scenario6 Scenario4a Scenario4
5 days 10 days 15 days 30 days 5 days 10 days 15 days 30 days 5 days 10 days 15 days 30 days
6m 29.53% 30.49% 33.04% 27.24% 20.03% 26.11% 30.53% 40.58% 14.63% 21.75% 25.40% 37.2%
12m 47.67% 57.85% 56.52% 63.07% 33.79% 43.52% 49.50% 64.68% 27.95% 38.45% 44.90% 58.88%
18m 64.19% 71.75% 75.00% 80.80% 49.24% 58.53% 65.18% 81.02% 43.90% 54.17% 62.08% 74.97%
2y 77.21% 84.08% 84.35% 89.21% 65.37% 75.09% 77.72% 89.89% 60.98% 71.26% 76.39% 86.95%
2.5y 86.28% 91.26% 93.48% 94.88% 80.65% 85.84% 88.94% 95.43% 78.05% 83.88% 87.48% 94.41%
3y 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Table 3.16: Waiting time cumulative density function for pairs with an O highly sensitized patient
and an A donor
3.4.2 What are the odds to receive an offer?
Besides the natural motivation that arises from the concern of many practitioners and exchange
programs of the inherent difficulty of some pairs to participate in an exchange due to a highly
sensitized patient or a donor with a under demanded blood type, gaining insights on how policies
impact the odds of a pairs to receive an offer would help us to understand the success of small
single center programs whose decisions of offering or not a transplant to a patient heavily relies
in the use of practitioners knowledge rather than on the maximization of overall efficiency; small
exchange programs generally match pairs through short cycles and rarely through chains. We
model the practitioner’s knowledge in the decision process through the matching structures define
in Table 3.6.
Let Xd be a set of donor’s blood type, Xp a set of patient’s blood types and S a set of patient’s
cPRA levels: high, medium or low. Let P (Xd, Xp, S, t), be the number of pending pairs at time
t with donor blood type in set Xd, patient’s blood time and cPRA in sets Xp and S respectively.
Similarly, M(Xd, Xp, S, t) and P (Xd, Xp, S, t) denote the number of matched and departed pairs
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that attended at least one year by time t with donor blood type in set Xd, patient’s blood time and
cPRA in sets Xp and S respectively. We define the percentage of matched pairs for a set Xd, Xp, S
as
peff (Xd, Xp, S) =
M(Xd, Xp, S, t)




We define peff (Xd, Xp, S) as the odds that pairs with patients blood type in Xp, cPRA classification
in S and donor’s blood type in Xd receive an offer when t goes large.
Compatible pairs join the pool As discussed in Section 3.4.1, the odds to receive an offer
for low and medium sensitized patients in Scenario1, Scenario1a and Scenario3 are at least 95%
independently of their willing donor’s blood type, thus we focus our discussion on pairs with a
highly sensitize patient. The odds to receive an offer for a patient randomly selected are at least
85% in Scenario1 and at least 90% in Scenario1a and Scenario3. However the large disparity in the
number of pairs with the same blood type but different donor’s blood type hides large differences
in the odds for highly sensitize patients with the same blood type to receive an offer depending on
their willing donor’s blood type.
Meanwhile allowing pairs to be matched through cycles of arbitrary length it roughly increases
by 2% the odds to receive an offer for O and A highly sensitize patients but the ones with an AB
willing donor, it significantly reduces the odds to receive an offer for pairs with an AB donors and
patient with blood type O or A, which drops from 97% in Scenario1 to 59% in Scenario3 when
running matchings every 5 days respectively, see Table 3.12. In other words, matching through
small cycles we reduce the disparity in the odds to be matched across the different ABO pair types
in consideration for highly sensitized patients at expenses of a 2% drop in the odds to receive an
offer for pairs with a non AB donor. Notice that the odds obtained for AB patients in Scenario1
are significantly smaller than in Scenario1a and Scenario3. The reason behind this result is the
limited set of structures used in matching algorithms 1 in which pairs with an AB patient are
included, we do so due to their inherent ease to receive an offer.
Compatible pairs don’t join the pool Our results suggest that the odds to receive an offer
for pairs with an non O patient are at least 80% in Scenario4 as well as in Scenario6. Unlike the
results obtained in Scenario6 in which the odds to receive an offer for pairs with a non O patient
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are at least 95% for all cPRA levels, in Scenario4 and Scenario4a the cPRA level of the pair has a
larger impact on the odds for pairs with a non O patient to receive an offer and it drops from 89%
to 83% for pairs with an A low and medium sensitized patient respectively.
The increase in the odds to receive an offer obtained in Scenario6 for non O patients contrasts
with the odds to receive an offer obtained for pairs with an O patient. Meanwhile in Scenario6 at
least 80% of the O low sensitized patients with an O, A or B donor receive an offer, at most 12% of
those with an AB donor receive one. This dissacords with the results in Scenario4, in which at least
75% of the O low sensitized patients receive an offer for each donor’s blood type, and at least 80%
of the low sensitized patients receive an offer in overall. This disparity in the likelihood of the O low
sensitized patients to receive an offer extends to medium and low sensitized O patients as well as
to all pairs with non O donor. In summary our findings suggest that when compatible pair’s don’t
participate in the exchanges matching through small cycles we can potentially reduce the disparity
in performance across different pairs in the model, while still offering acceptable levels of odds to
receive an offer. Not surprising the results in efficiency reflect on the waiting time distributions.
Meanwhile the majority of non O patients that receive an offer do it within 12 months of their
arrival, this proportion drops to 50% or less for O patients with a non O donor in both Scenario4
and Scenario6 across for highly sensitized patients. Significant drops in the proportions of pairs of
pairs that receive an offer within 12 months of their arrival also occur for medium and low sensitized
patients.
3.4.3 How is the sensitization level of the pool?
One of the main arguments that supports the call for long chains is that the exchange pools that we
are observing in practice are mainly composed by pairs with highly sensitized patients and given
that chains would lift the tight coincidence requirements imposed by small cycles, more pairs could
benefit through the allowance of chains. In this Section we discuss about the sensitization level of
the pairs in the pool that results from our model and how it differs from the sensitization level of
the stream of arrival in Table 3.4.
Compatible pairs join the pool For all the ABO-PRA pair types in the model, the composition
of the pool is stable after 9 years of been running in Scenario1, Scenario1a as well as in Scenario3.
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However the proportion of low sensitized and high sensitized patients behave differently in these
two scenarios. In Scenario3 we encounter a pool for which for all ABO pair types but pairs with
an AB donor the proportion of highly sensitized patients is at most 50%. However in Scenario1 we
encounter a pool for which at most 50% of the patients are low sensitized. Thus, we observe a more
sensitize pool when matching through small cycles than when allowing arbitrary length cycles. In
Table 3.17 we present the percentage of each ABO pair type with donor’s blood type O, A and B
that have a highly sensitized patient by the end of the 9th year the exchange program is running. In
this table we can observe that for the different ABO pairs type for which we display information, the
percentage of highly sensitized patients in Scenario1 and Scenario1a is higher than in Scenario3,
for instance, meanwhile 25% of the pairs with a B donor and a B patient in Scenario3 pending by
the end of the 9th year, this percentage rise to 85.71% and 70.59% in Scenario1a and Scenario1
respectively when matchings are run every 30 days.
Scenario3 Scenario1a Scenario1
Patient BT O donor A donor B donor O donor A donor B donor O donor A donor B donor
O 24.71% 35.37% 23.81% 33.57% 37.10% 41.67% 28.57% 41.43% 52.00%
A 17.05% 16.67% 22.22% 37.50% 63.16% 70.00% 39.13% 70.65% 46.15%
B 25.49% 20.00% 25.00% 28.89% 39.77% 85.71% 30.43% 38.24% 70.59%
AB 12.50% 14.29% 0.00% 53.85% 52.94% 50.00% 50.00% 52.17% 87.50%
Table 3.17: Percentage of the different ABO pair types with a highly sensitized patient pending to
receive an offer by the end of the 9th year when compatible pairs join the pool and matchings are
run every 30 days
In both Scenario1 and Scenario3 the cPRA distribution found in the pool varies significantly
from the cPRA distribution in the stream of arrivals. Even though the pool observed in Scenario1
is more sensitized, it results in a more equilibrate solution in terms of odds to receive an offer for
all ABO-PRA pairs in consideration while providing acceptable waiting times distribution. This
observation could be explained by the fact that the size of the pool at an arbitrary point on time is
larger in Scenario1 than in Scenario3 however the extra burden introduce by higher sensitization
level seems to be compensated by the larger size of the pool. In figure 3.4.1 and figure 3.4.2 we
show the number of pairs with O patient and A donor over 9 years and the number of pairs with
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A donor and B patient over 14 years respectively for the three sensitization levels in the model
in Scenario1 and Scenario3 respectively just after and before running a matching when matching
every 30 day.
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Figure 3.4.1: Number of pairs with an O patient and an A donor pending to receive an offer over

















































































 Number of Pairs Pending to Receive an Offer
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Figure 3.4.2: Number of pairs with an B patient and an A donor pending to receive an offer over
time in Scenario1 and in Scenario3 when matching every 30 days
In conclusion, when matching through unconstrained length cycles or cycles bounded by length
3 we observe a pool with a sensitization level higher than the one of the stream of arrivals. This
difference is larger when matching through small cycles. However this latter results in a solution
with smaller disparity in the likelihood of receiving an offer across the different ABO-PRA pair
types. Our results suggest that rate of arrivals, disparity among the supply and demand of kidneys
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of the different blood types as well as the sensitization level play an important role in the success
of a policy, and not only the level of sensitization of the pairs pending to be matched over time as
it is more commonly modeled.
Compatible pairs don’t join the pool Unlike the case when compatible pairs join the pool,
the composition of the pool does not reach a steady state by the 9th years that is running; there
are build ups of O low sensitized patients with non O donor as shown in Figure 3.4.3 for pairs with
an B donor and an O patient. Contrary to what is expected from a pool that is difficult to clear
even when the constraint on the length of the cycles is lifted, we found that for the different ABO
pair types in consideration but the ones with an O donor, the proportion of low sensitized patients
is at least 50%, thus we are observing a pool with lots of low sensitize patients. In Table 3.18 we
present the proportion of each ABO pair type with donor’s blood type O, A and B and highly
sensitized patient by the end of the 9th year. This observation seems to be consequence of the
rate of arrivals of pairs with low cPRA, 55%, together with the disparty of the demand and suply
of blood type O kidneys which cause large build ups of pairs with O patient and non O donor
that weaken the advantage of pairs with low cPRA due to a larger size pool. This is observed in
Scenario4, Scenario4a as well as in Scenario6.
Scenario6 Scenario4a Scenario4
Patient BT O donor A donor B donor O donor A donor B donor O donor A donor B donor
O 71.43% 27.96% 25.41% 82.55% 13.03% 21.66% 82.70% 15.00% 20.93%
A 38.81% 22.73% 4.60% 51.72% 68.85% 9.16% 34.71% 78.15% 6.10%
B 61.11% 27.03% 66.67% 37.50% 23.08% 66.67% 44.59% 18.92% 100.00%
AB 33.33% 40.00% 50.00% 33.33% 50.00% 100.00% 14.89% 64.62% 79.38%
Table 3.18: Percentage of the different ABO pair types with a highly sensitized patient pending to
receive an offer by the end of the 9th year when compatibles don’t join the pool.
In conclusion we encounter a pending pool by the end of the 9th year with more than 50% of
low sensitized patients for the different ABO pair types with an O patient however difficult to clear.
This result extends to the pool in overall. The disparity in the supply and demand of kidneys of
a particular blood type, in this case blood type O, seems to play a significant role in the difficult
to clear the pool and affects the relevancy of the sensitization level of pairs in order to receive an
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Figure 3.4.3: Number of pairs with an O patient and an B donor pending to receive an offer over
time in Scenario4 and in Scenario6 when matching every 30 days for a realization
offer.
3.4.4 Who benefits from allowing chains and longer cycles?
Compatible pairs join the pool The overall increase in the numbers of patients that receive
an offer for all ABO-PRA pairs when 1% of the arrivals are altruistic donors is 4%; however
among highly sensitized patients this improvement is of at most 2% in average for all the matching
frequencies.
The distribution of the bridge donors that terminate a chain have a pivotal importance in the
ongoing debate about the pros and cons of deviating altruistic donors from the waiting list to the
exchange programs and offer the last bridge donor in a chain to the waiting list. We found that
for all the matching frequencies in consideration the blood type distribution of the bridge donors
is significantly different from the one of the altruistic donor’s. 67.7% of the altruistic donors have
blood type O, only 12.08% of the bridge donors that terminate a chain have blood type O; also
while 26% of the altruistic donors have blood type A 66% of the bridge donors have blood type
A. In Table 3.19 we show the blood type distribution of the last bridge donor of the chains that
were created in Scenario3. Recall that the expected altruistic donor’s blood type distribution is
equal to the willing donor’s blood type distribution. Meanwhile 65% of the altruistic donors are
expected to have blood type O, only 13% of the chains terminated with an O donor when bridge
donors do not wait for the next run of the matching and the matchings are run every 5 days, this
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percentage raise to 16% when matchings are run every 30 days. We are not aware of any work in
the literature that measure the impact on patients in the waiting list of deviating altruistic donors
from the waiting list to initiate chains in the exchange pool and this latter is an important element
to understand what are the pros and cons of allowing chains initiated by altruistic donors.
Bridge Donor BT 5 days 10 days 15 days 30 days
O 12.08% 12.92% 15.77% 16.06%
A 66.29% 66.85% 63.10% 71.55%
B 15.17% 15.17% 14.08% 9.58%
AB 6.46% 5.06% 7.04% 2.82%
Table 3.19: Chain’s last bridge donor blood type distribution in Scenario1a
Compatible pairs don’t join the pool Unlike the case in which compatible pairs join the pool,
our results suggest that when 1% of the arrivals are altruistic donors the overall improvemet in the
number of offers is negligible, in Scenario4a we observe an improvement in the number of offers
respect to Scenario4 of at most 1% for the different matching frequencies in consideration. What
result surprising is that among highly sensized patients chains did not increase the total number
of offers, and in fact there is a decrease of 1.6% when matching are run every 5 days and of 1.14%
when matchings are run every 30 days. However it is important to recall that in Scenario4 the
pair’s rate of arrival is 1% less than its rate of arrivals in Scenario4 because 1% of the arrivals are
altruistic donors. The donor’s rate of arrivals is the same in Scenario4 and in Scenario4a. These
latter facts together with the fact that the impact of the rate of arrivals on the performance of the
exchange program is not linear does not allows to conclude that chains actually reduce the number
of offers to highly sensitized patients while increase by a small margin the overall number of offers.
However these findings suggest that the improvement in the number of offers seems to be marginal
whe compatible pairs don’t enter the pool and thus reinforce the call to measure the actual impact
of desviating altruistic donors from the waiting list to initiate a chain in the exchange program.
Among pairs that receive an offer, pairs with a low sensitized patient increase their expected
waiting times when chains are allowed while pairs with a highly sensitized patient reduce their
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waiting times. In Tables 3.20 and 3.21 we show the waiting time’s cumulative density function of
pairs with an A donor and an O highly sensitized patient and low sensitized patient respectively
when matchings are run every 5 days and every 20 days.
Scenario4a Scenario4
5 days 30 days 5 days 30 days
6m 20.03% 40.58% 14.63% 37.20%
12m 33.79% 64.68% 27.95% 58.88%
18m 49.24% 81.02% 43.90% 74.97%
2y 65.37% 89.89% 60.98% 86.85%
2.5y 80.65% 95.43% 78.05% 94.41%
3y 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Table 3.20: Pairs with an O highly sensitized patient and an A donor Waiting time’s cumulative
density function
Scenario4a Scenario4
5 days 30 days 5 days 30 days
6m 29.31% 36.15% 28.67% 33.92%
12m 49.73% 54.90% 49.65% 53.91%
18m 70.66% 69.89% 65.48% 68.36%
2y 84.85% 81.01% 78.84% 78.97%
2.5y 95.30% 89.55% 91.11% 87.78%
3y 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Table 3.21: Pairs with an O low sensitized patient and an A donor Waiting time’s cumulative
density function
In Conclusion, for pairs with an O patient, more low sensitized patients receive an offer when
chains are allowed however among those that receive an offer the expected time to receive an offer
increases, for pairs with a low sensitized patient, the increase in the number of offers is minimal
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however pairs that receive an offer does faster than when chains are not allowed.
3.5 Discussion
We have examined the impact of the frequency at which matchings are run, the length and type of
the structures through which matching can be performed -cycles or chains and the will of compatible
pairs to participate in an exchange with another pair on the number of first time offers that are done,
the waiting time to receive an offer as well as the level of sensitization of the observed pool across
48 ABO-PRA pairs types considered in our model. These features of the kidney exchange program
are well understood in the static set up and some theoretical models as well as empirical work have
been done in the dynamic set up, mainly on the structure that are used and overall performance
measures. In this work we identified key features in the design of policies to run kidney exchange
programs and analyze their long term impact on the 1) number of pairs that receive an offer 2)
expected waiting time to receive an offer 3) sensitization level of the observed pool and evaluated
performances across the different ABO-PRA pair types instead of overall measures 4) bridge donors
that terminate chains blood type distribution.
The main contribution of this work is that it provides insights on several central questions in this
subject. Our findings suggest that the on going debate on the unified call for the use of long chains
and their benefit on the different type of pairs in the exchange pool classified by their donor’s blood
type, patient’s blood type and sensitization level should be more carefully consider, while in overall
it brings improvement in efficiency it does so increasing the number of offers to pairs with low
sensitization level instead of pairs with high sensitization level when compatible pairs do not join
the exchange program. When compatible pairs join the pool, the overall improvement brought by
chains is larger than in the case in which compatible pairs don’t participate in exchanges with other
pairs and there is is not clear evidence to support the idea that pairs with highly sensitized patients
benefit meaningfully. The frequency at which matchings should be run does not seems to be a key
differentiator element when compatible pairs join the exchange pool however it has a substantial
effect when only incompatible pairs join the pool. In this latter case the effect of the frequency at
which pairs are matched varies across the different type of pairs, in other words, there is a trade off
across the different type of pairs when matching more or less frequently. The difficulty to clear a
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pool is usually associated and modeled with the proportion of pairs with a highly sensitize patient.
Our findings suggest that even though this latter is of central importance, the large disparity in the
supply and demand of kidneys of the different blood types is a prime factor to determine the success
of a particular policy and the needs of different type of structures - longer cycles or chains to match
the pairs. In particular, we found a more sensitized pool prior to a matching when compatible
pairs join the pool, however the performance across the different pair types -efficiency and waiting
times obtained for the different policies in these scenarios were better than when compatible pairs
did not join the pool, and the policies in consideration were having difficulty even though the pool
seen by a central planer prior to a matching was less sensitized. Finally our findings also indicate
that when allowing larger cycles or chains larger disparity in number of offer and waiting times
arise across the different type of pairs however in overall there is improvement in the number of
pairs and expected waiting times. Particularly, when compatible pairs join the pool, pairs with an
AB donor are significantly hurt when cycles length are unconstrained. In the case that compatible
pairs do not join the pool, pairs with an O patient are significantly less likely to receive an offer
and among those that receive an offer, waiting times are ostensible longer than for the pairs with
non O patients. These differences are accentuated as the level of cPRA increases.
Another contribution of this work is the evaluation of policies through worst performance mea-
sures across the different type of pairs in the model. Specifically, we use the notion of minimizing
of the disparity in performance across the different type of pairs as a response to a concern raised
by some practitioners and exchange programs staffs that consider that the actual challenge of the
programs should not focus in the ability to match those pairs that any policy or program could
match but identifying and help to match those pairs that have an inherent disadvantage to receive
an offer under the majority of policies currently running fielded exchanges programs. Due to the
disparity in the numbers of the different pairs blood types that arrive to an exchange program
overall measures hide serious under performance for some pair types.
We acknowledge that our study have several limitations, which in consequently suggest multiple
future research directions. First we did not have access to detailed empirical data about patients
that joined exchange programs from fielded exchange programs, in particular it would be interesting
to have data from different sizes exchange programs which are actually running under different
policies to validate our findings. Second a sensitivity analysis on the rate at which pairs join the
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pool would help to answer questions as: is there a threshold rate of arrivals after which relative
improvements are minimal? could we achieve similar level of performances with multiple regional
exchange programs and avoid the burden of inter institutional nationwide logistics instead of an
unified national one?, which will provide further insights in the success of small programs, as the
one directed by Adam Bingaman at the Methodist Specialty Hospital in San Antonio,Texas. At
last, in this work we focus on the odds of a pair to receive a first offer after arrival and how it
is affected by the different features involve in the design of a policy. We understand that a flaw
of this model is the assumption that pairs departed after the first offer after their arrival to the
exchange program, however it provides insights in the inherent difficulty that is measured by cPRA
level as well as blood type, which is the preliminary information used to consider the possibility
of conducting further tests that may result in an actual transplant offer. In practice, making an
offer is by far no guarantee of an actual execution of a transplant an actually the reported ratios
of offers and actual transplants reported by field exchange programs are somehow worrisome. It
is central to understand the impact on the performance of a nonzero post-offer failure probability,
which we consider the next stage of this work. Our preliminary results in this latter suggest that
post-offer failure probability significantly hurts the performance of our benchmark policy, pairs
could be matched through unlimited length cycles; which is somehow not surprising due to the
increasing risk in the post-offer failure. Lastly, it would be very interesting to identify and study
key features in the design of kidney exchange policies when pairs are registered in multiple exchange
programs; this latter models could model the decision of the pairs that could have more than one
offer -e.g the one that offers first to decide accepting or rejecting an offer.
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Chapter 4
Online scheduling for energy
minimization with a constrained
adversary
4.1 Introduction
We study an online version of the problem of scheduling a set of jobs with release times and deadlines
on a single machine in order to minimize the total number of idle periods. We also study an online
version of the problem of scheduling a set of jobs with release times and deadlines on a single machine
in order to minimize the total energy consumed under a given machine energy consumption model.
The offline problem of scheduling a set of jobs with release times and deadlines on a single machine,
in order to minimize the total number of idle periods, was shown to be polynomial time solvable
by Baptiste in [11]. When the switching energy costs are small enough to make a transition from
high power state to low power state during any idle period less costly than staying in high power
state while not processing, minimizing the total number of idle periods is equivalent to minimizing
the total energy consumption. When switching costs are larger, the problem is more challenging.
For which case, Baptiste, Chrobak and Durr in [12] provided a polynomial time algorithm in order
to minimize the total energy consumption.
In many real-life problems, the existence of jobs and their characteristics are not known until they
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are released, hence its online version is of special interest. Unfortunately, any online algorithm
needs to process jobs as soon as they can be processed in order to guarantee that deadlines will be
met. Previous work has focused on how to manage the energy consumption in idle periods [22; 23;
9].
In many situations, standard worst-case analysis (an offline adversary) may be pessimistic. For
example, we may know that our system is unlikely to be so heavily loaded that jobs must run as
soon as possible. To model this, we introduce a constrained adversary, who is limited in how much
load may be placed on the machine. The constrained adversary is inspired in the adversarial model
used in adversarial queuing theory. A constrained adversary is an arbitrary that send jobs under a
restriction analogous to the load condition in queuing theory [14]. In this chapter, we consider the
problem of minimizing the total energy consumed by a two power state device, to process jobs that
are sent over time by a constrained adversary. Jobs can be preempted and deadlines need to be met.
In this problem, an algorithm must decide when to schedule the jobs, as well as at which power
state it should run at any time. The constrained adversary is defined by two parameters: smax and
ρmax. The former is the upper bound on the span of the jobs released by the constrained adversary




dj−rj , in which ωi, ri and di are the workload,
released time, deadline of a job i released by the constrained adversary and t is an arbitrary time.
The problem energy(ρmax,smax) is the problem of minimizing the total energy consumed by a
single machine with two power states to process an instance produced by a constrained adversary
with parameters ρmax ≤ 1 and smax. We provide an online algorithm to minimize the energy
consumption for arbitrary values of power consumption rates. We also provide an online algorithm
to minimize the total number of idle periods in the resulting schedule. In both cases, we provide
upper bounds on the competitive ratio of our algorithms, and lower bounds on all online algorithms.
The bounds presented hold for arbitrary power consumption rates of the processor.
Now we proceed to describe the organization of this chapter. As previously mentioned the
differences in the energy consumption between schedules arises from two main features: the number
and length of the idle periods and the sequence of power states followed by the algorithm during
the idle periods. In Section 4.2 we address the first of these aspects, the number and length
of the idle periods in the resulting schedule. We present our online algorithm LAZY, which is
used by our energy saving algorithm DEFER to schedule the jobs. In Section 4.3 we consider
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the special case of a processor’s power management mechanism in which the processor always
transits to zero energy consumption power state when there is no workload pending to be processed.
Additionally the processor requires a non zero amount of energy to restart processing. Under this
power management mechanism, minimizing the energy consumption is equivalent to minimizing
the number of idle periods. We give an upper bound on its competitive ratio and the smaller lower
bound on the competitive ratio of any online algorithm when the performance measure is the number
of idle periods in the resulting schedule of our algorithm LAZY. Next in Section 4.4 we present
our algorithm DEFER to solve problem energy(ρmax,smax) and its analysis. DEFER schedule
jobs according to the schedule produce by LAZY, and uses a competitive optimal deterministic
algorithm, to decide the processor’s sequence of power states and the elapsed time in each state.
An asymptotic upper bound on its competitive ratio, and an asymptotic lower bound on the
competitive ratio of any online algorithm are given. Finally in Section 4.5 we discuss open directions
and conclusions.
Preliminaries All parameters in this chapter are non negative integers, unless otherwise noted.
We assume that time is discrete. More specifically, it is divided into unitary length time intervals,
(t, t + 1], where t is an integer. A job Ji is a 3-tuple (ωi, ri, di), with workload ωi, release time ri,
and deadline di. The span of job Ji, si = di − ri, is the difference between its deadline and its
release time. The density of an arbitrary job Ji is ρi =
ωi
si
. There are n jobs, J1, . . . , Jn, indexed in
order of their release date, which arrive over time. Until a job is released we are not aware of its
parameters, but once it is released we know them.
The processor is a single machine with two power states, high and low. H and L are the energy
consumed per unit of time processing in high power state and low power state respectively. We
assume that U is the energy necessary to power up the processor and that the energy necessary to
power down the processor is 0. This assumption can be made even if there is a cost to power-down,
because every power-up is preceded by a power-down, thus, the total cost require to complete a
transition can be charged when it power-up. The cost of the last power-down, when all the instance
have been processed, it is incurred by any algorithm. We also assume that transitions among power
states occur in a negligible fixed amount of time. We assume that at time zero the machine is in
high power state and that when the last job is released, the processor is notified that it is the last
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job of the instance. Given that at time 0 we assumed that the machine is in high power state, it
follows that any algorithm that does not transit immediately to low power state at time 0 will have
an unbounded competitive ratio, because the adversary could release no job and then the online
algorithm will consume a positive amount of energy and the optimal offline algorithm will consume
no energy.
In a feasible schedule all jobs meet their deadlines. For a given schedule, ωi(t) is the amount
of work of job Ji that has been processed by time t. The set of active jobs at time t, A(t), is the
set of indexes of jobs with release time at most t and deadline strictly greater than t which are
not fully processed by time t, A(t) = {i : ri ≤ t < di, ωi(t) < ωi}. The set of partially active jobs at
time t, Ā(t), is the set of indexes of jobs with release time at most t and deadline strictly greater
than t which are totally processed by time t, Ā(t) = {i /∈ A(t) : ri < t < di}. For every i in A(t),
the active workload of job Ji at time t, Q(t, i), is the total workload of jobs that are in A(t), and
have deadline at most di, Q(t, i) =
∑
{j∈A(t):dj≤di} ωj . The density of an instance at time t, ρ(t), is




ρi. We assume that the jobs in an instance are released by a constrained
adversary. A constrained adversary with parameters ρmax ≤ 1 and smax is an adversary such that
for every time t and for every instance I that it produces, ρ(t) ≤ ρmax, and all jobs in I have span
at most smax.
In summary, in this chapter we design an online algorithm to schedule the jobs released by a
constrained adversary in order to minimize the total energy required to process the jobs and meet
their deadlines. We present an upper and a lower bound on the competitive ratio of our algorithm
and on an arbitrary online algorithm respectively.
4.2 Online scheduling algorithm
In this section we present our online scheduling algorithm LAZY. From now onwards we will denote
by LAZY(t) the algorithm used by LAZY at time t. The key idea of LAZY(t) relies on the following
observation. By waiting as long as possible before starting to process, there will be a larger amount
of workload pending to be processed, and more jobs could be processed without creating additional
idle periods. Thus, there tend to be fewer and longer idle periods, which is less costly than more
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frequent smaller idle periods.
4.2.1 The algorithm
4.2.1.1 The optimization problem
We first introduce an optimization problem used by LAZY(t). Given a partial schedule of an arbitrary
instance of problem energy(ρmax,smax) let t be the current time. We can assume that t is an integer
because all jobs have integer release time and deadline, which implies that changes in the workload
pending to be processed and in the density available to be used by the constrained adversary only
occurs at integer time, unless otherwise specified. Recall that a feasible schedule completes all jobs
by their deadlines.
Let us also assume without loss of generality that starting to process at time t the workload
that is pending to be processed at time t we guarantee that all deadlines are going to be met.
We should also assume that by time t all deadlines in the given partial schedule have been met.
The problem that we describe in this section computes the latest time at which we could start
processing workload pending to be processed at time t and still meet the deadline of those jobs and
the deadlines of any future arrivals. We provide a dynamic program that solves this optimization
problem when jobs have unit workload, no two jobs have the same deadline and no two jobs have
the same release time. For the general case we do not know how to compute an exact solution to
this optimization program.






and let u2 be an arbitrary integer time
such that u2 ≥ u1. Define S(A(t)) as the set of feasible schedules for jobs in A(t) in which no job
is started to be processed before time u1. For every S in S(A(t)) let q(S) be the total processing
time in [u1, u2] if S(A(t)) is not empty, otherwise let q(S) = ∞. Then define υ (t, u1, u2) as the
optimal value of:
υ (t, u1, u2) = min
S∈S(A(t))
q(S),
that is the smallest amount of workload that an arbitrary feasible schedule S ∈ S(A(t)) processes
before time u2. Additionally define ω
N (t, u1, u2) as the largest amount of workload that could
be released by the adversary in time interval [u1, u2) and need to be processed before time u2 to
guarantee that no deadline will be violated. Let J = {J1, . . . , Jk} be the set the of jobs with release
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time at most t. Let J ′ = {jk+1, . . . , jh} be a set of jobs with release time at least u1, u1 > t, such
that the set of jobs J ∪ J ′ satisfies the adversary density constraint at any time. The adversary




We define define S (J ′) as the set of feasible schedules for J ′. For S ∈ S(J ′) let p(S) be the total
processing time in [u1, u2). Then ω
N (t, u1, u2) is defined as:





We will refer as J ′∗ to an arbitrary element of arg maxJ ′ min
S∈S(J ′)
p(S). Notice that ωN (t, u1, u2) does
only depend on the density of the jobs in J and is independent of the scheduling decisions.
We wish to compute the latest time u1 for which for all u2 ≥ u1 there exist a feasible schedule
of jobs in A(t) ∪ J ′∗ with starting time at least u1. In other words, we aim to compute the largest
u1 for which for all u2 ≥ u1 workload in A(t)∪J ′∗ could be processed and its deadlines will be met.
In Section 4.2.1.1 we present an optimization problem to find u1 when the job’s processing time is
allowed to not be an integer and in Section 4.2.1.1 we present an optimization problem to find u1
when the job’s processing time is constrained to be integer. From now onwards we will refer to the
constraint on the integrality of the workload - the workload is assumed to be an integer or not, as
the workload’s integrality constraint.
Non integer workload Let us consider the following optimization problem with decision vari-







subject to u1 + ω
N (t, u1, u2) + υ (t, u1, u2) ≤ u2 (4.2.1)









u1 ≤ u2. (4.2.3)
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The inequality (4.2.1) is a necessary condition for the the existence of a feasible schedule with
starting time at least u1 of jobs in A(t) ∪ J ′∗, the inequality (4.2.2) implies that time u1 is in the
future of time t and it is smaller that the latest time at which we could start processing the work-
load in A(t) to meet their deadlines, and inequality (4.2.3) implies that u2 is always after u1. Given
that ωN (t, u1, u2) ≥ 0 and υ (t, u1, u2) ≥ 0, then it follows that inequality (4.2.3) is dominated
by inequality (4.2.1) and it is redundant. Problem 1 computes for each value u2 larger than u1,
the largest u1 for which the necessary condition for the existence of a feasible schedule of jobs in




We describe next how to solve Problem 1. Before doing so, we establish some useful definitions.





subject to u1 + ω
N (t, u1 + 1, u2) + υ (t, u1, u2) ≤ u2 (4.2.4)













in a finite subset of U ′ ⊂ U , with size at most smax. This fact together with definition of the feasible
set of Problem 2 imply that there is an optimal solution to Problem 1 in the finite set
T =
{
(u1, u2) : u1 ≤ u2, u2 ∈ U ′
}
.
The size of T just defined is upper bounded by s2max.
We argue in Proposition 4.2.1 that there exists a J ′∗ such that all jobs in J ′∗ have deadline at
most u2 (release times of jobs in J
′∗ are at least u1 by its definition). This result implies that to
compute ωN (t, u1, u2) suffices to consider a set of jobs with release time and deadline in [u1, u2].
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such that all jobs in J ′∗ have deadline at most u2.
Proof. Let J ′1 be an optimal solution to problem maxJ ′ minS∈S(J ′) p(S) with the smallest total
processing time. We may assume that at least one job in J1 has deadline strictly larger than u2
otherwise the proposition follows trivially. To prove this statement we will argue that all jobs in
J ′1 have deadline at most u2. To do so, we will show that if this is not the case then J
′
1 is not an
optimal solution to problem maxJ ′ minS∈S(J ′) p(S) with the smallest total processing time, which
is a contradiction.
Let u = maxi∈S0 di. By assumption u > u2. Let J
u = J ′1. From the set J
u define the following
sets of jobs:
Su1 = {j ∈ Ju : dj = u, rj ≤ u− 2}
Su2 = {j ∈ Ju : dj < u} ∪ {j ∈ Ju : dj = u, rj = u− 1}
Su3 = ∅.
For each v = u2, . . . , u−1 construct an augmented instance Jv and sets Sv1 , Sv2 and Sv3 as follows:
1. Let Sv3 = S
v+1




2. For each job jk in S
v+1
1 :
• Add to Jv a job with release time rk, deadline dk−1 and workload ωkdk−rk · (dk − 1− rk).
If rk ≤ v − 2 add this job to set Sv1 otherwise add it to the set Sv2 .
• Add to Jv a job with release time dk − 1, deadline dk, and workload ωkdk−rk . Add this
new job to set Sv3 .
3. For each job Jk in S
v+1
2 add the corresponding job to J
v. Additionally, if the job has deadline
v and release time at most v−2 add it to the set Sv1 . Otherwise add it to the set Sv2 if deadline
is strictly less than v, otherwise add it to Sv3 if deadline is v + 1.
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In Figure 4.2.1 we illustrate the construction of set of jobs Jh, for h = u2, . . . , u through an example.




Ju = {j1, j2, j3}
Su1 = {j1} , Su2 = {j2, j3}




Ju−1 = {j4, j5, j2, j3}
Su−11 = {j4, j2} , S
u−1
2 = ∅
Su−13 = {j5, j3}




Ju2 = {j8, j9, j6, j7, j5, j3}
Su21 = {j8} , S
u2
2 = {j6}
Su23 = {j5, j3, j9, j7}
Figure 4.2.1: (a) Set of jobs Ju (b) Set of jobs Ju−1 (c) Set of jobs Ju2 .
From the construction of Ju−1 from Ju = J ′1 it follows that from each job k in S
u
1 , two jobs
in Ju−1 are created, one with release time rk, deadline dk − 1 and workload ωkdk−rk · (dk − 1− rk),
denote as job k1, and another one with release time dk−1, deadline dk and workload ωkdk−rk , denote
as job k2. The total processing time of J
u is equal to the total processing time of Ju−1 however
the total amount of workload in Ju−1 with deadline u− 1 is strictly larger than the one in Ju with
deadline u − 1, which together with the construction of Ju−1 from Ju and the adversary density
constraint, imply that the total workload processed before u− 1 in a schedule of Ju that minimize
the processing time before u− 1 is at most the total processing time before u in a schedule of Ju−1
that minimize the processing time before u − 1. This fact together with the fact that the subset
of jobs in Ju−1 with deadline at most u − 1 has strictly less total processing time than Ju allow
us to conclude that J ′1 is no the optimal solution to maxJ ′ minS∈S(J ′) p(S) with the smallest total
processing time. Because
{
j ∈ Ju−1 : dj ≤ u
}
is also an optimal solution and it has strictly less
total processing time.
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A direct consequence of Proposition 4.2.1 is that to compute ωN (t, u1, u2) we only need to
consider the set of jobs that could be released by the constrained adversary which all jobs have
release time in u1, . . . u2 and deadline at most u2. Before presenting our next result, we introduce
a new definition. Define ρapriori (t, u) for an arbitrary u ≥ t as:




Intuitively ρapriori (t, u) is the density that is available to the adversary at time u to release new
jobs if no release occurs from current time t up to time u. In the example in Figure 4.2.2 jobs
do not necessarily have integer workload however release times and deadlines are integer. t time
0 job 1, J1 = (0, 10, 3) is released. Such job is fully processed by time 3.7, otherwise at time 1
a job with deadline 10 and workload 6.3 could be released and both jobs could not be processed
on time. Consider that current time is 4, due to the adversary density constraint jobs 2 and 3,
J2 = (7, 14, 3), J3 = (10, 13, 1) could be released by the adversary after time 4, so together they
constituted an augmented instance at time 4 but also on their own. However J4 = (5, 6, 1) cannot
be released by the adversary due to the adversary density constraint, so it is not contain in any
augmented instance at time 4. Notice that the area of the rectangle associated with each job
corresponds to the workload of the job.








Figure 4.2.2: Example to illustrate the computation of ωN (t, u1, u2) when workload is allowed to
not be integral
Now we show that ωN (t, u1, u2) is equal to the area under the curve defined by ρapriori (t, u) for
u ∈ [u1, u2].
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u2 ≥ u1 it holds that,
ωN (t, u1, u2) =
u2∑
h=u1
ρapriori (t, h) , (4.2.6)
Proof. To prove this proposition we consider the following optimization problem in which there
is one decision variable per possible release time-deadline combination that lies in time interval
[u1, u2]. Decision variable Ititj represent the workload of a job with deadline tj and release time ti.
Problem 3.













k−j ≤ ρapriori (t, l) , ∀l = du1e , . . . u2 − 1 (4.2.7)
Iij ≥ 0, i = du1e , . . . , u2 − 1, j and u1 + 1, . . . , u2
The set of constraints defined by inequality (4.2.7) guarantee that the adversary density con-
straint is respected at any time l in time interval [u1, u2). Intuitively the optimal solution to
Problem 3 is given by the area under the curve ρapriori (t, u) for u ∈ [du1e , u2]. Let us consider the
dual of Problem 3:
Problem 4.








l−k+1 ≥ 1, ∀l ≥ k, l = du1e , . . . u2 − 1, k = du1e , . . . , u2 − 1 (4.2.8)
yj ≥ 0, j = du1e , . . . , u2 − 1.
The solution y∗j = 1 for j = du1e , . . . , u2 is a feasible solution to Problem 4 with objective value∑u2−1
i=du1e ρapriori (t, i). Additionally the solution I
∗
i(i+1) = ρapriori (t, i) for i = du1e , u2−1 and 0 for all
other decision variables, is a feasible solution to Problem 3 with objective value
∑u2−1
i=du1e ρapriori (t, i).
From duality theory it follows that such solutions are optimal for their respective problems and so
ωN (t, du1e , u2) = ωN (t, du1e , u2) =
∑u2−1
i=du1e ρapriori (t, i).
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Now we proceed to argue that to solve Problem 1 we just need to solve Problem 2 for a finite
number of values of u2, at most |A(t)| ≤ smax of them. Specifically we will argue that the optimal




We will first introduce some useful notation. Let Sp be a schedule of jobs in A(t) such that
for an arbitrary time u the total workload processed before time u is υ (t, t, u). Equivalently, Sp
is a schedule of A(t) in which jobs are processed as late as possible. Denote as I(Sp) the set of
bounded maximal time intervals in schedule Sp in which no workload unit is processed during
the time interval and let us denote as B(Sp) the set of maximal time intervals in schedule Sp in
which workload is processed during all the time interval. For an arbitrary I = [a, b) ∈ I(Sp), a
is an integer number and b is a real number. Similarly, for an arbitrary I = [b, a) ∈ B(Sp), b is
a real number and a is an integer, see Figure 4.2.3 for an example. Assume that for an arbitrary
I = [a, b) ∈ I(Sp) a is not an integer. Given that all deadlines are integral it follows that the jobs
that are processed in time interval [bac , a] in Sp have deadline at least dae. Consider the schedule
S′p equal to Sp but it processes workload processed in Sp in interval [bac , a], dae − a units later.
S′p is a feasible schedule in which the workload processed before time a is smaller than υ (t, t, a),
which contradicts definition of υ (t, t, a).
I1 B1 I2 B2
Figure 4.2.3: Sp is a schedule such that I(Sp) = {I1, I2} and S(Sp) = {B1, B2}
Now we are ready to show that f(u2) is non decreasing on ∪I∈I(Sp) (I ∩ Z) and non increasing on
∪I∈B(Sp) (I ∩ Z), which imply that f(u2) is minimized at the supremum of some I ∈ B(Sp). These
facts together with the fact that {sup I : I ∈ B(Sp)} ⊆ {di : i ∈ A(t)} imply that the optimal value
to Problem 1 is min{di:i∈A(t)} f(di), which is the desired result.
Proposition 4.2.3. f(u2) is non decreasing on ∪
I∈I(Sp)
(I ∩ Z).





] From definition of set I (Sp) it follows that υ (t, u1, a+ δ) = υ (t, u1, a) for all
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δ = 0, . . . , bbc−a. Then it follows that inequality (4.2.4) for f(a+δ) for an arbitrary δ = 0, . . . bbc−a
can be written as:
u1 + ω
N (t, u1 + 1, a) +
a+δ−1∑
j=a
ρapriori (t, j) + υ (t, u1, a) ≤ a+ δ,
which can be rewritten as:
u1 + ω
N (t, u1 + 1, a) + υ (t, u1, a) ≤ a+ δ −
a+δ−1∑
j=a
ρapriori (t, j) .
Given that δ −
∑a+δ−1
j=a ρapriori (t, j) is increasing in δ, then it follows that f(a + δ) ≥ f(a) for
an arbitrary δ = 0, . . . , bbc − a, which is the desired result.
Proposition 4.2.4. f(u2) is non increasing on ∪
I∈B(Sp)
(I ∩ Z).





]. From definition of set B (Sp) it follows that υ (t, u1, dbe+ δ) = υ (t, u1, dbe)+δ
for all δ = 0, . . . , a − dbe. Then it follows that inequality (4.2.4) of f(dbe + δ) for an arbitrary
δ = 0, . . . , a− dbe can be written as:
u1 + ω
N (t, u1 + 1, dbe) +
dbe+δ−1∑
j=dbe
ρapriori (t, j) + υ (t, u1, dbe) + δ ≤ dbe+ δ,
which can be rewritten as:
u1 + ω
N (t, u1 + 1, dbe) + υ (t, u1, dbe) ≤ dbe −
dbe+δ−1∑
j=dbe
ρapriori (t, j) .
Given that −
∑dbe+δ−1
j=dbe ρapriori (t, j) is decreasing in δ then it follows that f(dbe) ≥ f(dbe + δ)
for an arbitrary δ ∈ [0, a− dbe].
In conclusion, when workload’s integrality is relaxed, to solve optimization Problem 1 it suffices
to compute 1) schedule Sp, and 2) ω
N (t, t, dj) for all j ∈ A(t).
We finish this section arguing that the optimization problem 1 captures the desired features-
that starting to process strictly later than time minu2≥t f(u2) the adversary could release a set of
jobs J such that at least one job will not meet its deadline. To show this we will argue that for an
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arbitrary given u2 value, if u
∗
1 + 1 is the smallest u1 value for which inequality (4.2.1) is violated,
then for all u2 ≥ u1 ≥ u∗1, inequality (4.2.1) is also violated. If this is not the case then, f(u2) > u∗1
which implies that Problem 1 is not capturing the desired result. From assumption:
(u∗1 + 1) + ω
N (t, u∗1 + 1, u2) + υ (t, u
∗
1 + 1, u2) > u2 (4.2.9)
Let us consider u1 + δ ≤ u2 for some arbitrary δ > 1:
(u∗1 + δ) + ω
N (t, u∗1 + δ, u2) + υ (t, t, u2) = (u
∗
1 + δ) +
[





+ υ (t, t, u2)
≥ (u∗1 + δ) +
[
ωN (t, u∗1 + 1, u2)− δ
]
+ υ (t, t, u2)
> u2.
thus for any u1 > u
∗
1 inequality (4.2.1) is violated. The last inequality follows from assumption in
Inequality (4.2.9). Assume that u1 is in the interval defined by the two consecutive elements of set
T (t): [ao, ao+1]. If this is the case then inequality (4.2.4) can be written as:
Workload is integral We will start this section by arguing that when workload’s integrality
is required Problem 5 computes the largest time at which we could start processing the pending








subject to (u1) + ω
N (t, u1, u2) + υ (t, u1, u2) ≤ u2 (4.2.10)









u1 ≤ u2. u1, u2 ∈ Z+ (4.2.12)
To do so, we first argue that for a given u2, ω
N (t, u1 + 1, u2) ≥ ωN (t, u1, u2)−1 for any u1 that
satisfied Inequality (4.2.2).
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Proposition 4.2.5. If u1 satisfies Inequality (4.2.2) and the constrained adversary only releases
jobs with integral workload, then for an arbitrary u2 ≥ u1 it holds that:
ωN (t, u1 + 1, u2) ≥ ωN (t, u1, u2)− 1.
Proof. For a given u1, u2 let J
′∗ be the optimal solution to maxJ ′ minS ∈ S(J ′)p(S) with the
smallest largest deadline. Consider the set of jobs J ′ such that for every job j in J ′∗ there is a
job with release time rj + 1, deadline dj + 1 and workload ωj . From the fact that ρapriori (t, u)
is a non decreasing function in u it follows that J ′ is a set of jobs that could be released by the
constrained adversary in which all jobs have release time at least u1 + 1. From assumption that
at least ωN (t, u1, u2) units of the total workload of jobs J
′∗ are processed in [u1, u2] in any feasible
schedule together with the construction of J ′ from J ′∗ then it follows that at least ωN (t, u1, u2)
units of the total workload of jobs in J ′ are processed in [u1 + 1, u2 + 1] in any feasible schedule,
thus at least ωN (t, u1, u2)− 1 workload units are processed in [u1 + 1, u2] in any feasible schedule
of jobs in J ′, which is the desired result.
Proposition 4.2.6. If u1 satisfies Inequality (4.2.2) and u1 +ω
N (t, u1, u2) + υ (t, t, u2) > u2 then:
u+ ωN (t, u, u2) + υ (t, t, u2) > u2 ∀u ≥ u1
Proof. Let u = u1 + δ for some arbitrary δ ∈ Z+. We will prove this statement by induction on δ.
For the base case let δ = 1. From assumption it holds that:
u1 + ω
N (t, u1 + 1, u2) + υ (t, u1 + 1, u2) > u2 (4.2.13)
Let us consider u = u1 + 1:
(u∗1 + 1) + ω
N (t, u∗1 + 1, u2) + υ (t, t, u2) ≥ (u∗1 + 1) +
[
ωN (t, u∗1, u2)− 1
]
+υ (t, t, u2)
≥ u1 + ωN (t, u1, u2) + υ (t, t, u2)
> u2,
the last inequality follows from Inequality 4.2.13. The inductive step follows the base case.
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We argue next that once workload’s integrality is required, computing ωN (t, u1, u2) appears
to become “difficult”. Even though we do not present hardness results of this problem, we will
described different features that makes computing ωN (t, u1, u2) difficult. Notice that to establish an
efficient procedure to solve Problem 1 when workload’s integrality is relaxed, it was critical to find
a bounded subset of the feasible region in which we could guarantee lies an optimal solution, as well
as to be able to efficiently compute ωN (t, u1, u2) over this bounded subset of the feasible region.
When the workload is required to be integer we no longer know how to compute ωN (t, u1, u2)
efficiently, we also don’t know how to bound the feasible region for the corresponding optimization
problem, Problem 5, in the general case.
The example in Figure 4.2.4 shows that when the adversary could release jobs with integer workload,
it is no longer true in general that there exist a set of jobs J ′∗, J ′∗ ∈ arg maxJ ′ minS∈S(J ′) p(S),
such that all job’s deadlines are at most u2. In this example, the adversary can not release any job
with integral workload in [2, 4] with deadline at most 4, however it can release an unit job at time
2 with deadline 5 and an unit job with deadline 5 at time 3, at least one of those jobs is processed
before time 4. Given that the area under the density profile up to time 4,
∑4
u=2 ρapriori (t, u) = 1.44,
it follows that ωN (2, 2, 4) ≤ 1, thus the given set of jobs is arg maxJ ′ minS∈S(J ′) p(S).
We explain next why the procedure to solve Problem 1 used when workload is not necessarily
















≤ ρapriori (t, l) , ∀l = u1, . . . d− 1 (4.2.14)
Iij ∈ Z+ ∪ {0} , i = u1, . . . , d− 1, j and u1 + 1, . . . , d
If we relax the workload’s integrality constraint in Problem 6, equivalently Iij ∈ R+ ∪ {0}, it
follows that Problem 3 and Problem 6 are the same, and thus it follows that for arbitrary d > u1,
g(d) = ωN (t, u1, d), which together with the closed form solution of ω
N (t, u1, u2) in inequality 4.2.6
allow us to conclude that g(d + 1) ≤ g(d) + 1 when workload is not necessarily integral. This
result is fundamental in computing ωN (t, u1, u2) for an arbitrary u2, as well as in the proofs of
Proposition 4.2.3 and Proposition 4.2.4 which allow us to fully characterize the set of local minimum
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0 1 2 3 4 5
0.45
0.99
(a) No job with deadline at most 4 can be release after time 2.
0 1 2 3 4 5
0.45
0.99
(b) Two jobs with deadline 5 could be release after time 2 and at least
one should be processed before time 4.
Figure 4.2.4: Example that shows that when workload needs to be integer it is no longer true that
there exist a set of jobs J ′∗, J ′∗ ∈ arg maxJ ′ minS∈S(J ′) p(S), such that all job’s deadlines are at
most u2
of f(u) with domain {u ∈ Z : u ≥ du1e}, thus solving Problem 1 when the workload’s integrality
constraint is lifted. We proceed to address in detail these two problems.
About computing ωN (t, u1, u2), when workload’s integrality is lifted we could prove that g(d+
1) ≤ g(d) + 1, thus ωN (t, u1 + 1, u2) ≤ ωN (t, u1, u2) + 1. This result implies that ωN (t, u1, u2) =
g(u2) when workload’s integrality constraint is lifted, which can be computed efficiently. When
it does not hold then it is not difficult to see that ωN (t, u1, u2) = maxd≥u2 [g(d)− (d− u2)] and
unless ωN (t, u1, u2) reach its upper bound ( floor of the area under the density profile ρapriori (t, u)
for u1 ≤ u ≤ u2) for some feasible value of d, we do not know how to provide a certificate of
optimality for a given d value. Thus we do not know how to compute ωN (t, u1, u2) when workload
released by the constrained adversary is integral in the general case.
Suppose we could compute ωN (t, u1, u2) when workload’s integrality is required. It is no longer
true that ωN (t, u1, u2) ≤ ωN (t, u1, u2) as shown in the example in Figure 4.2.4. It implies that
f(u2) is no longer non decreasing for all u2 ∈ ∪
I∈I(Sp)
(I ∩ Z). Consider constraint 4.2.4 in definition
of f(u2). For a given u1, u2, without been able to guarantee that ω
N (t, u1, u2) ≤ ωN (t, u1, u2), u1
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may not be a feasible solution to f(u2 + 1) but it is a feasible solution to f(u2), which is equivalent
to say that f(u2 + 1) < f(u2) and thus f(u)is no longer non decreasing. The implication of it is
that we no longer know how to find a finite countable set of values u2 in which we guarantee there
is an optimal solution to the problem minu2≥u1 f(u2). Moreover we do not know how to provide
a certificate of optimality for a given u2 in the general case. We can conclude that for any set of
instances for which we could guarantee that:
ωN (t, u1, u2 + 1) ≤ ωN (t, u1, u2) + 1 (4.2.15)
the procedure used to solve Problem 1 will solve Problem 5. Clearly, in the set of instances in
which all jobs have unit workload, not two jobs have the same deadline Inequality (4.2.15) holds.
Even under these simplifications, we do not know how to compute ωN (t, u1, u2) efficiently when
workload is constrained to be integral. Next we show a dynamic programming approach and its
running time analysis.
In Corollary 4.2.1 we argued that for a given u1, u2, ω
N (t, u1, u2) = g(u2) for the set of instances
in which all jobs have unit workload and no two jobs have the same deadline.
Corollary 4.2.1. If the adversary only releases jobs with unit workload and no two jobs have the
same deadline then it follows that for a given u1, u2 there exist a





such that maxj∈J ′∗ dj ≤ u2.
Proof. Let us consider an augmented instance J ∈ arg maxJ ′ minS∈S(J ′) p(S) with the smallest
number of jobs. Define d as d = maxj∈J di. We may assume that d > u2, otherwise the desired
result follows trivially. Given that jobs have unit workload and that not two jobs can have the same
deadline, it follows that the schedule in which every job j in J is processed in time interval [dj−1, dj ]
is a feasible schedule, and it is clearly an optimal solution to minS∈S(J) p(S). It implies that there
is a subset of jobs of J with deadline at most u2 and total workload ω
N (t, u1, u2), contradicting the
assumption that J was the instance in maxJ ′ minS∈S(J ′) p(S) with smallest number of jobs.












. Before stating the dynamic programming recursion to solve Problem 6 we introduce
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some useful notation. Let ~ρapriori be a vector with u2− u1 components in which the ith component
takes value ρapriori (t, u1 + i− 1). We consider the subproblem υN (t, u1, d, ~wd) which includes the
jobs with release time at least u1, deadline at most d under density profile ~wd. The density profile ~wd
corresponds to a density profile from time u1 to time d, thus it is a vector with d−u1 dimensions. Let
~ρjd for some j ∈ {u1, . . . , k − 1} and some j ≤ d ≤ u2 be a vector with dimension d−u1 in which the
last d−j components have value 1d−j , and the rest have value zero. Let I
OPT (~wd) and fd(~wd) denote
an optimal solution and the optimal value for subproblem υN (t, u1, d, ~wd). Notice that I
OPT (~wd)
is a vector with (d−u1)(d−u1+1)2 components. It has one component per release time-deadline pair
that may occur in time interval [u1, d]. We set fd(~wd) = −∞ if the subproblem υN (t, u1, d, ~wd) is
infeasible. Notice that infeasibility of fd(~wd) arises when at least one component of ~wd takes value
outside the interval [0, ρmax]. In an optimal solution to subproblem υ
N (t, u1, d, ~wd) at most one
variable among variables in IOPT (~wd) that corresponds to the job with deadline d has value one and
the rest have value zero. If the component of IOPT (d, ~wd) corresponding to a job with release time
j and deadline d takes value one, then fd(~wd) = fd−1 (~wd[1 : d− 1]− ~ρjd[1 : d− 1])+1, the optimal
value of subproblem υN (t, u1, d− 1, ~wd[1 : d− 1]− ~ρjd[1 : d− 1]) plus one (because all jobs have
unit workload). If all components of IOPT (~wd) take value zero, then fd(~wd) = fd−1 (~wd[1 : d− 1]),
the optimal value of the subproblem υN (t, u1, d− 1, ~wd[1 : d− 1]). Taking the maximum of the
preceding objective values gives the optimal solution of problem υN (t, u1, d, ~wd). Denote cj (~wd)
for j = u1, . . . , d− 1 as
cj(~wd) =
 1 if wd−1 ≥ 1d−j ,. . . , wd−j ≥ 1d−j ,0 Otherwise, (4.2.16)
which takes value one if under the density profile ~wd it is feasible to release a job with release time
j and deadline d, and zero otherwise. Thus, the dynamic programming recursion can be stated as
fd(~wd) = max
j=u1,...,d−1
[fd−1 (~wd[1 : d− 1]− ~ρjd[1 : d− 1]) + cj (~wd)] for d = u1 + 1, . . . , u2, (4.2.17)
with initial condition fu1(∅) = 0. The objective is to compute fu2(ρapriori).
We proceed to analyze the running time of the dynamic program defined by the recursion in
equation (4.2.17). To do so we will first argue that the number of subproblems υN (t, u1, d, ~wd)
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k! (d+ 1− k) . (4.2.18)
Notice that problems of type υN (t, u1, d, ~wd) arise when solving problems υ
N (t, u1, d+ 1, ~wd+1), for
some d ∈ {u1, . . . , u2 − 1}. The number of different subproblems υN (t, u1, d, ~wd) is determined by
the number of different wd profiles that may arise as well as by the number of jobs with deadline
d+ 1 that should be considered under a given profile.
The different wd profiles that υ
N (t, u1, d, ~wd) could receive as parameter are a function of the jobs
that could be released with deadline strictly larger than d + 1 and release time at most d, see
Figure 4.2.5. In Figure 4.2.5 we consider the subproblems with wd = ρapriori−~ρ(u1+1)(d+2)−~ρ0(d+1),
wd = ρapriori − ~ρ(u1+1)(d+2) − ~ρ1(d+1) and wd = ρapriori − ~ρ(u1+1)(d+2) − ~ρ2(d+1). Let us consider an





Figure 4.2.5: The problems υN (t, u1, d, ~wd) arise while solving problems υ
N (t, u1, d+ 1, ~wd+1)
arbitrary density profile ~wu2 in which there are exactly k jobs with release time strictly smaller





sets of size k of different deadlines





set of size k of different release times with value at most d − 1 and k!
different ways to match the k different deadlines with the k different release times. Notice that
profiles with one job release at time d, appears among profiles in which k−1 jobs have release times
at most d − 1 and deadline in (d + 1, u2], which explain why we only consider jobs with release
time 1, . . . , d− 1 when counting the different profiles that arise when there are exactly k jobs with
release time strictly smaller than d and deadline in (d + 1, u2]. Another way to see why we will
be double counting if we consider jobs with release time d is that a job release at time d does not
affect ~wd. From the constraint that no two jobs are released at the same time and given that in the
profile ~wd there are k jobs with release time at most d and deadline greater than d + 1, it follows
that among the d+ 1 release times prior to d, there are d+ 1− k − u1 available release times slots
100
CHAPTER 4. ONLINE SCHEDULING FOR ENERGY MINIMIZATION WITH A
CONSTRAINED ADVERSARY
to release jobs with deadline d + 1. Considering that k ranges from 0 to min {d− u1, u2 − d− 1},










k! (d+ 1− k − u1) ,












k! (d+ 1− k − u1)
problems need to be solved in order to compute υN (t, u1, u2, ~wu2), equivalently the optimal value
to Problem 6.
Now we proceed to prove the lower and upper bound in the running time. To do so, we
consider the case in which u2 − u1 is an even number and when it is an odd number. Assume








solved for k = u2−u12 − 1 it is a lower bound on the total number of subproblems that are solved to
























This together with the fact that u2 − u1 ≤ smax, imply the desired result. The dynamic program





. The argument for the case in








that are solved for k = u2−u1−12 .
Next, we will argue that the dynamic program defined by the recursion in equation (4.2.17) has





k! (d+ 1− k − u1) ≤ (u2 − u1)! (4.2.20)
for some fix k and d. The left hand side of inequality (4.2.20) can be written as:





k! (d+ 1− k − u1) ≤
((u2 − u1)− (d+ 1− u1)
k
) (d− u1)!
(d− u1 − k)!
(d− u1 − (k − 1))
≤
((u2 − u1)− (d+ 1− u1)
k
) (d− u1 + 1)!
(d− u1 − k)!
≤ ((u2 − u1)− (d+ 1− u1))! (d+ 1− u1)!
= (u2 − u1)!
(d+ 1− u1)!∏d−u1
i=0 (u2 − u1 − i)
= (u2 − u1)!
d−u1∏
i=0
(u2 − u1)− (u2 − d− 1 + i)
(u2 − u1)− i
(4.2.21)
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≤ (u2 − u1)! (4.2.22)
The inequality (4.2.22) follows from the fact that (u2−u1)−(u2−d−1+i)(u2−u1)−i ≤ 1 for all i ∈ {0, . . . , d− u1},






































2 u2 − u1 − j




(u2 − u1 − i)
= (u2 − u1) + 2 · (u2 − u1) ·
(


















≤ (u2 − u1)2,
which implies that the total number of terms in the left hand side of inequality (4.2.19) is at most
(u2−u1)2. In conclusion, in a worst case analysis each term in the left hand side of inequality (4.2.19)
is bounded above by smax! and given that there are at most s
2
max terms and u2 − u1 ≤ smax, it





We proceed to show that to solve Problem 5 we just need to compute f(u2) for u2 ∈ {dj : j ∈ A(t)}.
The proofs of Proposition 4.2.7 and 4.2.8 mimic the proofs of Proposition 4.2.3 and 4.2.4 respec-
tively.
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Proposition 4.2.7. If the constrained adversary is constrained to release only unit jobs and for
which no two jobs have the same deadline,
f(u2 + 1) ≥ f(u2), ∀u2 ∈ ∪
I∈I(Sp)
(I ∩ Z) .
Proof. Let I = [a, b) be an arbitrary interval in I (Sp). Let u2 be an arbitrary element of I. Assume
for the sake of contradiction that f(u2 + 1) < f(u2) for an arbitrary u2 ∈ I. Let f(u2) = u∗1. It
implies that u∗1 is not a feasible solution to f(u2 + 1):
u∗1 + ω
N (t, u∗1, u2 + 1) + υ (t, t, u2 + 1) > u2 + 1.
Given that ωN (t, u∗1, u2 + 1) ≤ ωN (t, u∗1, u2) + 1 and that υ (t, t, u2 + 1) = υ (t, t, u2) for all u2 ∈ I
then it follows that:
u∗1 + ω
N (t, u∗1, u2) + υ (t, t, u2) ≥ u∗1 + ωN (t, u∗1, u2 + 1)− 1 + υ (t, t, u2 + 1)
> u2,
which contradicts optimality of u∗1 to f(u2).
Proposition 4.2.8. If the constrained adversary is constrained to release only unit jobs and for
which no two jobs have the same deadline,
f(u2 + 1) ≤ f(u2) ∀u2 ∪
I∈B(Sp)
(I ∩ Z) .
Proof. Let I = [b, a) be an arbitrary interval in B (Sp). Let u2 be an arbitrary element of I. Assume
for the sake of contradiction that f(u2 + 1) > f(u2) for an arbitrary u2 ∈ I. Let f(u2 + 1) = u∗1. It
implies that u∗1 is not a feasible solution to f(u2):
u∗1 + ω
N (t, u∗1, u2) + υ (t, t, u2) > u2.
Given that ωN (t, u∗1, u2 + 1) ≥ ωN (t, u∗1, u2) and that υ (t, t, u2 + 1) = υ (t, t, u2) + 1 for all u2 ∈ I
then it follows that:
u∗1 + ω
N (t, u∗1, u2 + 1) + υ (t, t, u2 + 1) ≥ u∗1 + ωN (t, u∗1, u2) + υ (t, t, u2 + 1) + 1
> u2 + 1,
which contradicts optimality of u∗1 to f(u2).
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The results in Proposition 4.2.7 and Proposition 4.2.8 allow us to conclude that there is an
optimal solution to solve problem minu2∈Z+ f(u2) in the set:
{inf {I} : I ∈ I (Sp)} ,
for the corresponding Sp.
We just argued that to solve problem 2 we could only compute minu2≥u1 f(u2) for a finite







Then we can conclude that to solve optimization problem 1 for a given u1 and the corresponding
density profile, someone could evaluate function f(u2) for every u2 ∈ {di : i ∈ A(u1)} and pick the
smallest value.
4.2.1.2 START(t)
We gave a procedure START(t) which is used by LAZY(t) to compute when it should start processing
the pending workload after an idle period. It implies that we assume that during time interval
[t − 1, t) no workload unit is processed. START(t) receives as input the information regarding jobs
with indexes in the set A(t)∪Ā(t), that is the set of jobs that have been released by time t and have
deadline strictly larger than t and compute a value which we will call Tcritic(t). In Section 4.2.2
we will argue that Tcritic(t) is the latest time at which LAZY(t) could start processing the workload
that is pending to be processed at time t and guarantees that all deadlines will be met. Notice that
this statement holds under the information known up to time t and if no job is released before time
START(t), then START(t) is the latest time at which LAZY(t) could start processing the workload
that is pending to be processed at time t and guarantees that all deadlines will be met.
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START(t)
1 if A(t) 6= ∅
2 for i ∈ A(t)
3 Compute minj∈A(t) f(dj)
4 if minj∈A(t) f(dj) = t
5 return minj∈A(t) f(dj)
6 else
7 return START(minj∈A(t) f(dj))
8 else
9 return ∞
4.2.1.3 On the dynamics of the processor
We use power(t) and status(t) to describe the processor’s state at time t. The variable power(t)
can take values H, L and 0 and the variable status(t) can take values process and not process.
If power(t) = H and status(t) = process then the processor is in state Processing, if power(t) = H
and status(t) = not process then the processor is in state Not processing and in high power state,
if power(t) = L and status(t) = not process then the processor is in state Not processing and in
low power state, and if power(t) = 0 and status(t) = not process then the processor is in state off.
Any other combination of values of variables power(t) and status(t) do not map to a processor’s
state.
To delimit the time horizon in which algorithms are evaluated we assume that any algorithm is
notified by the adversary when the last job is released. This notification is received through a
variable OVER (t) that takes value zero until the last release time of the instance and takes value
one from there onwards. and to bound the total energy consumed we have created the state off
which is just accessible by any algorithm once it has processed the entire instance.
4.2.1.4 LAZY
After introducing the notation to describe the dynamics of the processor, we are ready to introduce
our procedure LAZY(t) used by LAZY to compute status(t) for every time t ≥ 0. We define as
SLAZY the schedule return by algorithm LAZYfor a given instance I. The procedure START(t)
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assumes that t is an integer time, however status(t) can change at any time during the execution of
the algorithm, when integrality is not assumed. Due to integrality assumption over release times
and deadlines this does not present any inconvenient. To see why, let u be an arbitrary time in
(t, Tcritic(t)]. Advert that the output of START(t) differs from the output of START(u) only if an
arrival occurs. Given that releases times and deadlines only occurs at integer times it follows that
to know the value of START(t) for an arbitrary time t is enough to compute START(btc).
For an arbitrary time t ≥ 0, LAZY(t) receives as input status(t−) and all the available information
regarding jobs that are released by time t (this include the value of the variable OVER (t) at that
time) , and returns status(t). The variable status(t) changes from process to not process when
there is no workload to be processed during time step (t, t+), and it changes from not process to
process at time Tcritic(t). To simplify the analysis, we assume that status(0
−) = process for any
algorithm.
4.2.2 Correctness of LAZY
In this section we show that in the schedule produced by algorithm LAZY for an arbitrary instance
of problem energy(ρmax,smax) all deadlines are met. We also show that starting to process after time
Tcritic(t) the workload pending to be processed by algorithm LAZY at time t, no online algorithm
can guarantee that all deadlines will be met.
We first introduce some definitions which are used to argue the correctness of algorithm LAZY. As
defined in Section 4.2.1.4, SLAZY is the schedule produces by algorithm LAZYfor an instance I.
For an arbitrary schedule S, a processing block, is a maximal time interval where S is processing.
An idle period is a maximal and finite time interval where S is not processing. Processing blocks
are indexed in chronological order. The cardinality of a schedule S, |S|, is the number of processing







which j ≥ 1, we also define lB0 = 0 and uB0 = 0. To prove that in the schedule SLAZY produce by
LAZY for an arbitrary instance of the problem energy(ρmax,smax) all jobs meet their deadlines we
use induction on the number of processing blocks in SLAZY. If we consider an arbitrary processing













no deadline is missed.
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Lemma 4.2.2. Let I be an arbitrary instance of problem energy(ρmax,smax), in the schedule re-
sulting from applying algorithm LAZY on instance I all jobs meet their deadlines.
Proof. We prove correctness of our algorithm LAZY by induction in the number of processing






for all 1 ≤ j ≤ |SLAZY|.
• In the base case when at least one job has released time 0, it follows trivially that all
jobs with release time in Y1 meet their deadlines, because they are processed under earliest
deadline first starting to process at time 0. If no job is release at time 0, assume for the
sake of contradiction that a job with release time in Y1 did not meet its deadline in SLAZY.
It implies that there exist a latest time s < lB1 such that starting to process at time s the
deadline of all jobs pending to be processed at time s together with the deadlines of all jobs
in an arbitrary augmented instance Js will be met. Given that uBj > s then it follows that
LAZY(s) returns not process, which implies that START(s) > s. It implies that there is no
augmented instance Js such that to meet the deadlines of jobs pending to be processed at
time s and the deadlines of jobs in Js someone should start processing at time s, thus it
follows a contradiction with definition of time s.
• In the inductive step, from induction hypothesis we may assume that all jobs with release
time at most uBj−1 have met their deadlines. We argue next that jobs with release time in
Yj meet their deadlines. Assume for the sake of contradiction that at least one job with
release time in Yj does not meet its deadline. Denote as s







which the total workload pending to be processed together with the workload that could be
released by the adversary can not be processed without violating a deadline. Let s = s′ − 1.
From definition of s it follows clearly that starting to process at s all deadlines could be met,
otherwise it will contradict the assumption that s′ is the earliest time in Yj at which if we
have not started processing the pending workload at least one deadline will be violated. We






, otherwise LAZY was already processing
by time s contradicting the assumption that a deadline could be violated. From definition of
routine LAZY(t) for some arbitrary time t together with definition of time s and the fact that
at time s no job with release time larger than uBj−1 is being processing it follows that LAZY(s)
returns process, thus s = lBj , which contradicts the assumption that s ∈ Yj . This conclude
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the proof that in SLAZY all jobs meet their deadlines.
4.3 Minimizing the number of idle periods
In this section we study the special case of a processor’s power management mechanism in which
the processor goes to a zero energy consumption power state when there is no workload pending
to be processed. Also the processor consumes a non zero amount of energy, U , to power up and it
consumes H power units per unit of time once is processing. We aim to minimize the total energy
used to process an instance of problem energy(ρmax, smax). From the definition of this special case
of processor’s power management mechanism, it follows that the total energy required to process
an arbitrary instance is equal to the energy required to process the workload plus the total energy
consumed to restart processing. The total energy consumed to restart processing is equal to the
total number of idle periods times the energy required to wake up the processor. As consequence,
under this processor’s power management mechanism the difference in the energy consumption
between two algorithms, for the same instance, is completely determined by the number of idle
periods in the resultant schedule and so it is independent of the length of the idle period.
Before presenting the competitive analysis of algorithm LAZY with performance measure the
total number of idle periods, we will introduce some notation. Let S be a feasible schedule for
an arbitrary instance of problem energy(ρmax,smax). We denote as Nidle(S) the number of idle
periods of schedule S. We denote as OPTN(I) a feasible schedule of instance I with the smallest
number of idle periods. We first argue that for the competitive analysis of algorithm LAZY we
should only consider instances in which the optimal schedule has at least one idle period. This
latter follows because for instances in which the optimal schedule has no idle period algorithm
LAZY is optimal. To see why this is true, consider an arbitrary instance in which the optimal
schedule has no idle period, then it follows that at any time instance from time 0 to the completion
time of such schedule there is workload available to be processed. From the facts that at time 0
there is workload available to be processed (otherwise there is at least one idle period) and that
from definition uB0 = 0, it follows that algorithm LAZY will process at time 0 the workload that is
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available and will stop processing just until there is no workload available to be processed. Thus
it will processes at least until completion time of the optimal schedule, and so optimality of the
schedule produces by LAZY follows.
Theorem 4.3.1. Let I be an arbitrary instance of problem energy(1,smax) and let S(I) be the











+ 2 for smax ≥ 5
2 for smax ∈ {3, 4}
1 for smax ∈ {1, 2}
and LAZY is optimal for smax = 1.
Proof. We will first construct an instance I of a constrained adversary with parameters ρmax = 1,
smax ≥ 5, such that Nidle(OPTN(I)) = 1 and such that any online algorithm will produce a schedule
S(I) with Nidle(S(I)) ≥
⌊∣∣ smax−5
3
∣∣⌋ + 2. Then we will prove that such instance is actually a valid
instance, in other words is an instance that could have been released by the constrained adversary.
Then we will conclude exposing an instance I of a constrained adversary with parameters ρmax = 1
and smax ∈ {2, 3, 4} such that Nidle(OPTN(I)) = 1 and such that any online algorithm will produce
a schedule S(I) with Nidle(S(I)) ≥ 2. Finally we argue that for smax = 1, LAZY produces an
optimal schedule.
Let ALG’ be an arbitrary online algorithm with finite competitive ratio. We will first expose the







nl (smax) = 2 · ngaps (smax)− 3,
ns (smax) = ngaps (smax) ,
n (smax) = nl (smax) + ns (smax) + 1.
At time 0 the adversary releases a job J0 = (1, 0, 1). Any algorithm should process it at its
release time to satisfy the deadline. At times i = 1, . . . , nl (smax) the adversary released jobs
Ji = (1, i, smax + i) for i = 1, . . . , nl (smax). We claim that any online algorithm with a finite
competitive ratio process all jobs Ji, i = 1, . . . nl (smax) as soon as they are released. Assume not.
Then the adversary will not release any other job and will process all jobs Ji for i = 1, . . . , nl (smax)
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without idle period. Given that at least one of the jobs was not processed at its release time, then
the schedule produces by algorithm ALG’ has at least one idle period, thus ALG’’s competitive ratio
is not finite which is a contradiction.
At times nl (smax) + 3 · i− 1 for i = 1, . . . ns(smax) the constrained adversary released jobs:
Jnl(dmax)+i = (1, nl (smax) + 3 · i− 1, nl (smax) + 3 · i− 1) , i ∈ 1, . . . , ns (smax) .
From definition of such jobs, they are fully processed by any algorithm in time interval defined
by its release time and deadline and given that these time intervals are not overlapping for any
pair of these jobs, it follows that at least one idle period is produced. So any online algorithm
will produce a schedule with at least ns (smax) idle periods for this instance meanwhile the optimal
produces a schedule with one idle period. In figure 4.3.1 we show the previously defined instance
when smax = 9. We can conclude that the schedule produces by any online algorithm with finite
competitive ratio for such instance has at least ns(smax) idle periods meanwhile the optimal schedule
has one idle period.






J1 J5 J2 J3 J6 J4 J7 (a)
J1 J2 J5 J6 J7J3 J4 (b)
Figure 4.3.1: An instance of problem energy(1,9). (a) optimal schedule (b) schedule produces by
an arbitrary online algorithm with finite competitive ratio.
For smax ∈ {3, 4}, the adversary releases a job J1 = (1, 0, smax). Any online algorithm should
process J1 at its release time, otherwise the adversary will not send any other job and the al-
gorithm has an unbounded competitive ratio which is a contradiction. At time smax − 1 the
adversary releases job J2 = (1, smax − 1, smax + 1). Finally at time smax the adversary releases job
J3 = (1, smax + 1, smax + 2). Clearly this instance is an instance of a constrained adversary with
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parameters ρmax = 1 and smax 3 or 4. In figure 4.3.2 we show the previously described instance
when smax = 4. For this particular instance, J2 should start to be processed at most at time 3 to
guarantee that all deadlines will be met , and so at least one idle period occurs before the release
time of J3.
For smax ∈ {1, 2}, LAZY is an optimal algorithm, specifically, SLAZY has the same number of




J1 J2 J3 (a)
J1 J2 J3 (b)
Figure 4.3.2: An instance of problem energy(1,4) (a) optimal schedule (b) schedule produces by an
arbitrary online algorithm with finite competitive ratio.
idle periods than the optimal schedule. For smax = 1 optimality of SLAZY follows trivially. We are
just left to argue optimality for smax = 2. Let I be an arbitrary instance of problem energy(1,2)
Assume that SLAZY is not an optimal schedule. Let [t, t + 1) be the first time interval such that
OPTN(I) or LAZY are processing while the other one it is processing. Consider the case in which
[t, t + 1) is an idle period in SLAZY. From assumption that jobs are unitary, denote as J1 the job
that is processed in OPTN(I) in [t, t+1). J1 has release time t−1, which together with assumption
that SLAZY do not process in [t, t + 1) imply that J1 is processed in [t − 1, t] in schedule SLAZY.
Given that the only job that could be pending to be processed at time t is J1 in both schedules, it
follows that OPTN(I) has processed more jobs up to time t than schedule SLAZY, then it follows a
contradiction with the definition of time t. The same argument holds for the case in which [t, t+ 1)
is an idle period in OPTN(I).








Proof. Let I be an arbitrary instance of problem energy(1,smax). From definitions, SLAZY, OPTN(I)
are instance’s I schedule produces by LAZY and the schedule with minimum number of idle pe-
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riods, respectively. We denote as {Cl} the set of processing blocks of schedule OPTN(I). Let us
define the following sets for each processing block Cl :
N l1 =
{
Bk ∈ SLAZY : uCl−1 ≤ uBk < lCl
}
∀l ≥ 1, . . . , Nidle(OPTN(I)),
N l2 =
{
Bk ∈ SLAZY : lCl ≤ uBk < uCl
}
∀l ≥ 1, . . . , Nidle(OPTN(I)).
From definition of sets N l1 and N
l















|N l1|+ |N l2|
]
.
The +1 in the first inequality counts a processing block of SLAZY that may terminates after the
last processing block of OPTN(I) which is not in N
Nidle(OPTN(I))
2 from definition. The −1 comes
from the fact that the number of gaps is the number of processing blocks minus 1 (by default
we have assume that there is a processing block that started at time 0− not preceded by an idle
period). We will show:
max
l=1,...,|OPTN(I)|




which imply that Nidle(SLAZY)Nidle(OPTN(I)) ≤
smax
2 + 2, which is the desired result. We will denote from now
onwards as l∗ the index in 1, . . . , |OPTN(I)| that maximizes the LHS of inequality (4.3.2). To prove
inequality (4.3.2) we first we argue that the length of any idle period that precedes a processing
block Bj ∈ N l
∗
2 but the last one has length at least 2. Next we argue that the length of any
processing block in N l
∗
1 but the first one is at least 2.
Claim 1. For every Bj ∈ N l
∗
2 but the last one it holds that l
B
j − uBj−1 ≥ 2.
Proof. Let Bj be a processing block in N
l∗
2 but the last one. Assume for the sake of contradiction
that lBj − uBj−1 = 1. We may assume that at time lBj schedule OPTN(I) has pending workload
with release time at least uBj−1 − 1, otherwise it contradicts definition of LAZY (if release time is
uBj−1) or it implies that Bj is the last processing block in N
l∗
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will have available the same amount of workload to process) which is a contradiction. Thus the
density profile from time lBj and onwards takes at least one non one value affected by a job with
released time at most uBj−1 and already processed in SLAZY, and given that SLAZY has no pending
workload immediately before time uBj−1 + 1 (which from assumption is equal to l
B
j ) , algorithm
LAZY will start processing at least at time lBj + 1 and guarantee that all deadlines will be met,
which contradicts assumption that LAZY starts processing at time lBj .
Claim 2. For every processing block Bj ∈ N l
∗
1 but the first one, l
B
j − uBj−1 ≥ 2.
Proof. Assume not. There exist a processing block Bj ∈ N l
∗
1 such that u
B
j − lBj−1 = 1. This implies
that a job J1 is released at time u
B
j−1 + 1 and it should be processed by LAZY at its release time.
There was no workload pending to be processed in OPTI just before time lBj−1, which implies that
Bj is the first processing block in N
l∗
1 which is a contradiction. So we may assume that there is
at least one job pending to be processed in OPTN(I) at time l
B
j and already processed in SLAZY.
The density profile from time lBj and onward takes at least one non one value, which implies that
LAZY could start processing at time lBj + 1 and still meet all deadlines. This contradicts definition
of lBj .
We now complete the proof of Theorem 4.3.1. Let us denote as φ(Cl∗) the amount of workload
that is pending to be processed in OPTN(I) and not in SLAZY at time l
C
l∗ . From the first release
time in time interval (uCl∗−1, u
C
l∗ ] to time l
C
l∗ there are at most smax time units and so SLAZY process
during at most smax time units minus the time that it was idle. This implies that at time l
C
l∗ there
are at most smax − 2
(
|N l∗1 | − 1
)
workload units pending to be processed in OPTN(I) and already
processed in SLAZY. In other words φ(Cl∗) ≤ smax − 2
(
|N l∗1 | − 1
)
.




j ], ∀Bj ∈ N l
∗
2 but the first




j ], for all Bj ∈ N l
∗
2 but the
first one, is bounded above by φ(Cl∗). From Claim 1 it follows that l
B
j − uBj−1 ≥ 2 for all Bj ∈ N l
∗
2
but the first one, this fact together with the assumption that in OPTN(I) workload is in process
during all these time intervals and so there are at most φ(Cl∗)/2 + 1 idle periods in N
l∗
2 . putting
this information together it follows that we can upper bound the sum of the number of idle periods
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≤ |N l∗1 |+
smax − 2 ·
(



















which is the desired result.
4.4 Energy minimization
In this section we present our energy minimization algorithm and its competitive analysis. In
Section 4.4.1 we present our energy minimization algorithm DEFER. Next in Section 4.4.2 we
present its competitive analysis as well as a lower bound for an arbitrary online algorithm that
guarantee that all jobs meet their deadlines. We provide asymptotic lower and upper bounds as
a function of the maximum span parameter smax. The bounds that we provide are the result of a
worst case analysis and thus they are independent of the processor’s energy parameters, H,L and U .
4.4.1 Algorithm DEFER
4.4.1.1 Preliminaries
An online algorithm for problem energy(ρmax,smax) takes two type of decisions: 1) when and what
to process? 2) When not processing, at which power level the processor should be operating? In
Section 4.2 we presented our online scheduling algorithm LAZY, which we use as a subroutine of
algorithm DEFER to decide when and what to process. Algorithm DEFER basically schedules jobs
using the scheduling algorithm LAZY and manages the energy during the idle periods using an
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optimal 2 competitive deterministic online algorithm, see [9] for a detailed description of an optimal
2 competitive deterministic online algorithm. Recall that the we are assessing the performance of
an algorithm from a worst case perspective.
We first introduce some new definitions that will be useful to describe the results in this section.
For an arbitrary schedule S and a time t. We define Y (t, S) as the machine’s energy consumption
rate at time t for a given schedule S. We also define Nenergy(S) as the total energy consumed by a
machine with energy parameters H,L and U that processes schedule S and manages idle periods
using an optimal 2 competitive deterministic online algorithm. For an arbitrary instance I we define
OPTe(I) as a schedule that minimize the total energy consumed to process instance I. Finally for
an arbitrary schedule S we define a short idle period as an idle period of S with length l such that
H · l ≤ L · l+U . A long idle period is an idle period of S with length l such that H · l > L · l+ U .
4.4.1.2 The algorithm
In this section we present our online energy minimization algorithm DEFER. As defined in Sec-
tion 4.1, the processor is a single machine with two power states. H and L are the energy consumed
per unit of time processing in high and low power state respectively. We also defined U as the en-
ergy consumed during a transition from low power state to high power state and we assume that
transitions occur in a negligible fixed about of time. The processor processes on high power state:
it consumes H energy units per unit of workload that it processes; and when it is not processing it
consumes energy at high or at low power state. Next we described the online algorithm DEFER.
For an arbitrary instance I,
• Schedule jobs following the scheduling decision taken by algorithm LAZY.
• Let SLAZY be the schedule produces by LAZY . For an arbitrary time t, if SLAZY is processing
a job let power(t) = H. Otherwise, if δ is the elapsed time since the start of current idle period,
Bi is the processing block of SLAZY that preceeds current idle period and H · δ ≥ L · δ + U
let power(uBi + δ) = L, otherwise power(u
B
i + δ) = H.
Notice that DEFER takes scheduling decisions independently of the processor’s energy parame-
ters. We argue next that once a machine is idle, the decision of when to start processing can be done
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independently of the energy parameters of the processor (H,L,U). Notice that the value of the
processor’s energy parameters does not affect the load capacity of the adversary, more specifically
the jobs that could be released by the adversary are independent of the energy parameters of the
processor. It implies that the ability of an algorithm to forecast at current time a lower bound on
the length of the very next idle period (or the length of current idle period) is independent of the
processor’s parameters. Recall that we are looking at this problem from a worst case perspective
and that we would like to provide an lower(upper) bound on the ratio between the total energy
consumed by an arbitrary online algorithm (our online algorithm) independent of the processor’s
energy parameters and function of the maximum job span parameter smax.
Consider the case in which the scheduler is not processing and there is pending workload. Using
the same optimization problem used in by algorithm LAZY , Problem 1, someone could find an
upper bound on the maximum length of the current idle period (time that has elapsed in current
idle period plus maximum time left to start processing to guarantee that all deadlines will be met).
For some processor’s energy parameters this upper bound corresponds to a short idle period and
for some others it corresponds to a long idle period. Consider the case in which an algorithm starts
processing before it is mandatory in order to guarantee that all deadlines will be met, equivalently,
this algorithm makes current idle period shorter than the upper bound on the length of such idle
period. If according to the processor’s energy parameters the maximum length of this idle period
corresponds to the length of a long idle period, then starting to process earlier will produce in
the worst case a short idle period and a short/long one with total length at least the length of an
long idle period, which is locally less energy efficient than a long idle period. If according to the
processor’s energy parameters the maximum length of this idle period corresponds to the length
of a short idle period, then starting to process earlier will produce in the worst case a short idle
period and another short/long idle period with total length at least the upper bound on the length
of current idle period. In both cases, someone is locally better off by starting to process as late as
possible.
Intuitively, pending workload may allow a scheduler to process a set of jobs that will be released
in the future uninterruptedly that otherwise will be forced to process with an idle period in between.
More idle periods are associated with more waste of energy. Thus we could see the ability to hold
workload to process it in the future as a resource that erodes the power of the adversary to force
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an online algorithm to create more idle periods in order to meet all deadlines.
4.4.2 Competitive Analysis
In this Section we present the competitive analysis of algorithm DEFER. In Theorem 4.4.1 we
present an asymptotic lower bound in the competitive analysis of an arbitrary online algorithm
when smax goes large, and in Proposition 4.4.2 we present an asymptotic upper bound in the
competitive analysis of our online algorithm DEFER when smax goes large.
Theorem 4.4.1. Let ALG be an arbitrary online algorithm that manages power consumption
during idle periods using an optimal competitive algorithm. If I is an arbitrary realization of





= Ω (ln smax)
when ρmax = 1.
Proof. We may assume without loss of generality that preemption is not allowed because allowing
preemption could only increase the power of the adversary, thus allowing the lower bound on the
competitive ratio of an arbitrary online algorithm to increase. Notice that we will show an asymp-
totic lower bound on smax then we may assume that smax is a large number.
Let us consider the following instance of problem energy(1,smax). Given that we are performing
an asymptotic analysis, when smax goes large, we may assume that smax = 2 · 3M for some integer
M , (smax ≥ 5.
j1 = (2, 2, 2 + smax)
ji =
(
2, smax + 2 · (i− 1)− smax2·3i−2 + 2, smax + 2 · i
)




ln 3 + 2
⌋
.




ln 3 + 2
⌋
. To prove this lower bound we will first proceed
to gain information about the schedule produces by an arbitrary online algorithm. Let mi =
smax + 2 · i − smax2·3i−1 We will first argue that any online algorithm should process at least one
workload unit of job i in time interval [ri,mi + 1], to guarantee that all deadlines will be met.
Assume not. At time mi + 1 a job with workload
smax
2·3i−1 − 1, and deadline smax + 2 · i could be
released, and given that for i ≥ 2:
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mi + 1 +
smax
2 · 3i−1






− 1 + 2
> smax + 2 · i (4.4.1)
Then the algorithm will not be able to meet all deadlines. Similarly for i = 1 inequality (4.4.1)
follows.
Let us denote as ui the number of idle units of time in interval [ri − 1,mi + 1] for an arbitrary
job index i in the instance. Notice that mi + 1 = ri+1− 1. Let us denote as H, 0 and U the energy
consumption rate at high power state, at low power state and the total energy consumed during
a transition from low power state to high power state respectively. Let us define t = UH . From
definition of mechanism DEFER, if the idle period has length at least t units, then the processor
consumes energy at the rate of H during the first t time units of the idle period and then it powers
down. It is because t is the solution to the equation H · t = 0 · t+U in which the energy consumed
at high power rate is equal to the energy necessary to power up. Notice that under this particular
set of processor’s energy parameters, no energy is consumed while the processor is in low power
state. We may assume for this analysis that H = 1 and thus t = U . The reason why is that we
are interest in the ratio UH and not on their individual values. As a consequence of the fact that at
least one workload unit is processed during time interval [ri,mi + 1] and preemption is not allowed
it follows that:
ui =
 smax2 If i = 1smax
3i−1
If i ≥ 2.
Let us define S as the schedule such that:
• If ui > t, i is odd and ui+1 ≥ t: Start to process job i at time ri.
• If ui > t, i is odd and ui+1 < t: If 2ui ≥ t Start to process job i at time ri, otherwise at time
ri + 2ui+1.
• If ui > t and i is even: Start to process job i at time mi.
• If ui ≤ t: Start to process job i at time mi.
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We claim that no online algorithm that manages power consumption during an idle period using
an optimal competitive algorithm can consume less energy than S. Assume not. Let S′ be the
schedule obtained with an online algorithm and assume that S′ consumes less energy than S. Given
that both algorithms spend the same energy processing workload then S′ spend less energy than
S during idle periods. Define interval Ti as Ti = [ri − 1,mi + 1] for each job index in the instance
under consideration. We will argue that the energy spent by S is at most energy spend by S′. Let
us consider the energy consumption of any schedule S’ respect to schedule S at each interval Ti
and its impact in the overall energy consumption.
• If ui > t, i is odd and ui+1 ≥ t: Given that ui ≥ t, any algorithm consume at least t units of
energy during idle periods in time interval [ri,mi + 1]. From definition of S at time ri + 2 an
idle period of length at least t starts and it doesn’t terminate in time interval Ti.
• If ui > t, i is odd and ui+1 < t: If 2 ·ui+1 < t, given that ui+ui+12 = 2 ·ui+1 < t it follows that
ui+ui+1 < 2 t, the total energy consumed in Ti∪Ti+1 when job i is processed at time ri+2ui+1
is equal to ui + ui+1 < 2 t which is the smaller amount of energy that any online algorithm
could have consumed in Ti ∪ Ti+1. In case, 2ui+1 > 2 t, it follows that ui + ui+1 > t, thus
processing job i at time ri guarantee that the energy consumed in Ti ∪ Ti+1 is 2 t which is a
lower bound on the energy consumed by any online algorithm that use an optimal competitive
algorithm to manage the idle periods in a total idle length which is strictly greater than 2 t.
• i is even and ui ≥ t: Given that ui ≥ t, any algorithm consume at least t units of energy
during idle periods in time interval [ri,mi + 1]. From definition of S and definition of ui it
follows that at time mi an idle period of length at least 2 · t terminates. Given that ui−1 ≥ t
and job ji−1 is started to be processed at time ri it follows that during idle period in time
interval [ri,mi + 1] the energy consumed by S is the energy consume to transit from low
power state to high power state, which is t.
• If ui < t: Then it follows that any algorithm consumes at least ui units of energy during idle
periods in time interval [ri,mi + 1]. Given that ui is the minimum energy that any online
algorithm could consume during time interval [ri,mi + 1] and S consumes ui energy units
during such time interval. Then it follows that S′ cannot do better.
119
CHAPTER 4. ONLINE SCHEDULING FOR ENERGY MINIMIZATION WITH A
CONSTRAINED ADVERSARY
Notice that given that at each Ti at least one job is processed, it follows that optimality in all
pair of intervals Ti ∪ Ti+1 implies global optimality o energy consumed by schedule S.
Now we are ready to establish a lower bound of the energy consumed in schedule S as a function
of t and having smax as a parameters. From definition of ui, it is a decreasing function in i. Let us









ln 3 + 1
⌋
. From its definition l is the number of job indexes such that




ln 3 + 2
⌋
. From its definition n is the total number of jobs in
instance under consideration. Using definition of l and n, we establish a lower bound on the energy
consumed by S, Nenergy(S):
Nenergy(S) ≥ (t · l + 1) +
n∑
j=l+1
uj + 2 · n





+ (2 · n+ 1)





























































)l ≥ t6 , because from definition
of l, ul =
smax
3l−1





)n ≥ −23 because from definition of n, dn+1 − rn+1 = smax2·3n−1 < 2, which through sim-
ple manipulations give us the desired result. On the other hand, from definition of the instance
Nenergy(OPTe(S)) = t+ 2 · n+ 1.
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In order to find a lower bound on the competitive ratio of an arbitrary online algorithm, we would



























≥ a · ln
b+1 smax − a · b · lnb smax · ln ln smax
a · lnb smax + 2ln 3 · ln smax −
2·ln 4
ln 3 + 3
−
(
a · ln a− a6
)







a · lnb smax + 2ln 3 · ln smax −
2·ln 4
ln 3 + 3
,
for some 0 < a < 2ln 3 and 0 < b < 2.
Proof. Let us define f(t) as:
f(t) =
t

















We will first argue that f(t) has a global maximum. Let us consider f ′ (t):
































· ln smaxt −
t
ln 3(




From definition of f ′(t), it follows clearly that f ′(t) is a decreasing function for 0 < t < smax. In
Figure 4.4.1 we present f(t) and f ′(t) for smax = 10
3. Now we will argue that for t1 = ε in which






















(a) smax = 10
3






















(b) smax = 10
6
Figure 4.4.1: f(t) and f ′(t) for a) smax = 10
3 b) smax = 10
6
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ε > 0 is a very small number, f ′(t1) > 0. And that for t2 = smax, f
′(t2) < 0. This fact implies that
f(t) has a global maximum in domain 0 < t < smax. Given that denominator of f
′(t) is positive in
all the domain of f(t) we just need to argue that the numerator of f(t) is positive for t = t1 and is
negative for t = t2. Let us denote the numerator of f
′(t) as nf ′(t), which can be written as:


































Given that ln smaxε goes to infinity as ε goes to 0. It follows that nf ′ (ε) > 0. On the other hand, at
t = smax it follows that:




















Then we can conclude that f(t) has a unique maximizer in 0 < t < smax. Let us denote as
t∗ (smax) the value of t that maximizes f(t) for a given smax. Let us define l (smax) = a · lnb (smax)
for some constants 0 < a < 2ln 3 , 0 < b ≤ 2. We will argue that t
∗ = Ω (l (smax)). To argue this, is
enough to show that when smax is very large, nf ′(t) for t = a · logb (smax), is nonnegative. Although
we don’t know how to compute a closed form solution of t∗(smax) we can compute numerically its
value for a given value of smax. In Figure 4.4.2 we present t
∗(smax) as a function of smax. Also
the fitted curve resulted from fitting t∗ (smax) by a ln smax
b for b = 1.9 and b = 2.1. After some























Figure 4.4.2: t∗(smax) computed numerically
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manipulation it follows that:
nf ′
(























− 3 · ln a
ln 3
+
2 · ln 4 · ln a
ln 3
]






























+ ln2 smax ·
2
ln2 3






Given that b < 2 it follows that nf ′
(
a · logb smax
)
is nonnegative as smax goes large.
Now let us define u (smax) = c · lnd (smax), c > 0, d > 2. In the same order of ideas used to argue
that t∗ = Ω (l (smax)) it follows that for d > 2, t
∗ = O (u (smax)).
f (t∗) ≥ a · ln
b+1 smax − a · b · lnb smax · ln ln smax
a · lnb smax + 2ln 3 · ln smax −
2·ln 4
ln 3 + 3
−
(
a · ln a− a6
)







a · lnb smax + 2ln 3 · ln smax −
2·ln 4
ln 3 + 3
From Claim 4.4.2 it follows that when smax goes large
Nenergy(S)
OPTe(S)
= Ω (ln smax), which is the
desired result.
Next we present in Theorem 4.4.2 an asymptotic upper bound for the schedule produces by
algorithm DEFER. As reminder, algorithm DEFER schedules jobs using algorithm LAZY and
manages the energy during idle periods using a 2 deterministic optimal online algorithm. In Propo-
sition 4.4.1 we prove that for an arbitrary instance I we could always find an instance Î in which
the optimal schedule has at most 3 idle periods such that the competitive ratio for instance I is at
most 3 times the competitive ratio of instance Î. We use the results in Proposition 4.4.1 and in its
Claim 2 in the proof of Theorem 4.4.2.
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Proposition 4.4.1. For every arbitrary instance I of the constrained adversary with parameters
smax and ρmax = 1 which is processed by a processor with energy parameters (H,U), such that










Additionally, if OPTe(Î) has 3 idle periods, then there is no processing block of the schedule
ˆSLAZY that has time overlap neither with the first, neither with the last idle period of schedule
OPTe(Î). If OPTe(I) has 2 idle periods, then there is no processing block of the schedule ˆSLAZY
that has time overlap with the first idle period of schedule OPTe(Î).




with the smallest total workload. Let
OPTe(I
∗) be an optimal schedule of instance I such that workload is processed as early as pos-
sible. In other words, in which no workload unit could have been processed later without loosing
optimality.
Claim 2. The schedule OPTe(I
∗) has no short idle period.
Proof. Assume not. From assumption there exist at least one “short” idle period in OPTe(I
∗). Let
us denote as Is the first ”short” idle period in OPTe(I
∗) and let us denote as Cs the very next
processing block. We argue first that the workload processed in Cs have release time at least l
C
s .
Assume not. Let us consider an arbitrary workload unit processed in processing block Cs with
release time strictly prior to lCs . Let us define S as the schedule that result from schedule OPTe(I
∗)
but processing such workload unit at time lCs −1. The energy consumed by schedule S is at most the
energy consumed by schedule OPTe(I
∗), Nenergy(OPTe(I
∗)), then we can conclude that schedule S
is also an optimal schedule of instance I∗ and one workload unit is processed before it is processed
in OPTe(I
∗), which contradicts assumption about OPTe(I
∗). Thus, we conclude that the total
workload processed in Cs have release time at least l
C
s .
Now we will argue that workload pending to be processed in schedule OPTe(I
∗) by time uCs has
release time at least lCs . Assume not. Let us consider an arbitrary workload unit that haven’t been
processed in OPTe(I
∗) by time uCs . By assumption there is at least one workload unit with release
time strictly smaller than lCs . Let us consider a schedule equal to OPTe(I
∗) but such workload unit
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is processed at time lCs − 1, the energy consumed by the resulting schedule is a lower bound on
Nenergy(OPTe(I
∗)) and given that Nenergy(S
∗
LAZY) is not affected, it follows a contradiction with
assumption that no workload unit could be processed earlier than in OPTe(I
∗) without loosing
optimality. Thus, we conclude that the total workload with release time strictly earlier than lCs is
processed in OPTe(I
∗) by time uCs−1.
Let us denote as Bs the processing block of S
∗
LAZY in which workload that is processed in the
optimal schedule OPTe(I
∗) in Cs is processed. Bs is well defined because by definition of LAZY
all jobs processed by in schedule OPTe(I
∗) in the processing block Cs are processed by DEFER
in only one processing block.
Let us define schedule OPTe(I
∗)c as follows. Let δ denote the set of workload units processed in
OPTe(I
∗) in Bs with release time strictly prior to l
C
s . Then let OPTe(I
∗)c be equal to OPTe(I
∗) but
if δ 6= ∅, then process workload units in δ starting at time min{lBs , lCs }. Rearrange the processing
block Cs−1 in case some idle periods were created by the interchange of workload units in set δ.
So, energy consumed by schedule OPTe(I
∗)c, Nenergy(OPTe(I
∗)c), is equal to Nenergy(OPTe(I
∗)).
From definition of schedule S∗LAZY and OPTe(I











Let us denote as E1LAZY the total energy consumed in SLAZY from time 0 to time u
B
s−1. Let
us denote as E2LAZY the total energy consumed in S
∗
LAZY from time u
B
s−1 until completion time.
Let us denote as E1OPT and E
2
OPT the total energy consumed in OPTe(I
∗)c from time 0 to time
uCs−1 and the total energy consumed in OPTe(I
∗)c from time u
C
s−1 to completion time respectively.













Now, let us define as instance I1 the instance formed by the jobs in instance I
∗ with release
time at most uBs−1 and I2 the instance formed by the jobs in instance I
∗ with release time at least
uBs−1. In I2 release times and deadlines are the release times and deadlines in I
∗ minus uBs−1. From
definitions it follows that Nenergy(SLAZYi) ≥ EiLAZY for i = 1, 2. And Nenergy(OPTe(Ii)) ≤ EiOPT
for i = 1, 2. Then it follows that:
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We should assume WLOG that the latter inequality holds with equality otherwise it follows a





has strictly less workload than I∗ then it follows a contradiction with the assumption that among
instances in arg maxI
Nenergy(SLAZY)
Nenergy(OPTe(I))
such that no job could be processed earlier I∗ has the smallest
total workload. Thus we can conclude that OPTe(I
∗) has no ”short” idle period.
Now we proceed to expose an instance, Î, with at most 3 idle periods, for which competitive




. Let us define for an arbitrary processing block of schedule OPTe(I
∗), Ci, the






, in which S∗LAZY is idle and such that Si has
minimum cardinality. Let us denote as Iij the j
th element of set Si. In other words, Si is the set of






ordered in increasing order of their infimum.






if 0 < i < |OPTe(I∗)|, as the total workload processed by S∗LAZY in time interval [0, uC0 ] if i = 0
and as the total workload processed by DEFER in time interval [uCi−1,∞) if i = |S∗LAZY|. Using
these definitions, the energy consumed by OPTe(I
∗) and S∗LAZY can be written as:
Nenergy(OPTe(I










[H · Ω (Ci) +Nenergy(OPTe(Ii))]
and
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Let us define for OPTe(I
∗):
Ci∗ = arg max
Ci





H · Ω (Ci) +Nenergy(OPTe(Ii))
.
From definition of Ci∗ and Nenergy(S
∗










H · Ω (Ci∗) +Nenergy(OPTe(Ii∗))
.




i∗) andDCi∗ = H·Ω (Ci∗)+Nenergy(OPTe(Ii∗)).
Next we will expose an instance Î such that the ratio between NCi∗DCi∗
and the competitive ratio of























which is the desire result.






Let us consider the following cases:
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Figure 4.4.3: Case 1. There is a processing block that starts before and finish strictly after uCi∗−1,
and there is a processing block that starts strictly before and finish strictly after uCi∗
1. There is a processing block that starts before and finish strictly after uCi∗−1, and there is a
processing block that starts strictly before and finish strictly after uCi∗.
Let us denote as Bp and Bf the processing block in S
∗
LAZY that starts strictly before and
finish strictly after uCi∗−1 and that starts strictly before and finish strictly after u
C
i∗ respectively.
Let us also denote as δ1 the total workload processed in Bp after time u
C
i∗−1 and as δ2 the
total workload processed in Bf before time u
C
i∗ , see Figure 4.4.3. Let Ji∗ = {j ∈ I∗ : uBp <
rj < u
B
f−1} Let Î be the following realization:
• Release at times 0, . . . , δ1, unitary jobs with deadlines 1, . . . , δ1 + 1 respectively.
• For each job j in Ji∗ release at time rj − uCi∗−1 a job with workload ωj and deadline
dj − uCi∗−1.
• Release at time uCi∗ − δ2 − uCi∗−1, δ2 unitary jobs with span smax and announce that no
other job is going to be released in this realization.
From definition of Î it follows thatNenergy( ˆSLAZY) ≥ NCi∗ andNenergy(OPTe(Î)) ≤ DCi∗+U .
This latter follows from the fact that OPTe(Î) has at most 2 idle periods, the energy consumed
by one of them is accounted in DCi∗ and U is an upper bound in the energy consumed during













≤ 2 · U + 2 ·H
U + 2 ·H
≤ 2.
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The third inequality follows from the fact that the idle period preceding Ci∗ is a long idle
period and from assumption that δ1 > 0 and δ2 > 0 it follows that Ω(Ci∗) ≥ 2. Then
DCi∗ ≥ U + 2 ·H.
2. There is a processing block that starts before and finish strictly after uCi∗−1, and there is No
processing block that starts strictly before and finish strictly after uCi∗.
Let us denote as Bp the processing block in S
∗




Figure 4.4.4: Case 2. here is a processing block that starts before and finish strictly after uCi∗−1,
and there is No processing block that starts strictly before and finish strictly after uCi∗
strictly after uCi∗−1 and let us denote as Bf the processing block in SALG(I
∗) that finish the
latest before uCi∗ . Let us also denote as δ1 the total workload processed in Bp after time u
C
i∗−1,
see Figure 4.4.4. Let Ji∗ = {j ∈ I∗ : uBp < rj ≤ uBf } Let Î be the following realization:
• Release at times 0, . . . , δ1, unitary jobs with deadlines 1, . . . , δ1 + 1 respectively.
• For each job j in Ji∗ at time rj − uCi∗−1 with workload ωj and deadline dj − uCi∗−1.
• If Ji∗ is not empty, release at time max
j∈Ji∗
dj−uCi∗−1 a unitary job with span smax. Otherwise
release at time uCi∗ − 1 − uCi∗−1 a unitary job with span smax and announce that is the
last job of the realization.
From definition of Î, it follows that Nenergy( ˆSLAZY) ≥ NCi∗ + H and Nenergy(OPTe(Î)) ≤
DCi∗ +H + U . Thus,
Nenergy( ˆSLAZY)
Nenergy(OPTe(Î))











∗ +H + U
DCi∗
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The third inequality follows because the idle period preceding block Ci∗ is a long idle period.
Additionally given that δ1 > 0 it holds that DCi∗ ≥ U +H.
3. There is no processing block that starts before and finish strictly after uCi∗−1, and there is No
processing block that starts strictly before and finish strictly after uCi∗.
Let Bp be the processing block in S
∗





Figure 4.4.5: Case 3. There is No processing block that starts before and finish strictly after uCi∗−1,
and there is No processing block that starts strictly before and finish strictly after uCi∗
Bf be the processing block in S
∗
LAZY that finish the latest before u
C
i∗ , see Figure 4.4.5. Let
Ji∗ = {j ∈ I∗ : uBp < rj ≤ uBf }. Let Î be the following realization:
• For each job j in Ji∗ release a job at time rj− min
k∈Ji∗








rk + 1 a unitary job with span smax.
Otherwise release at time lCi∗ − min
k∈Ji∗
rk + 1 a unitary job with span 1. In both cases
announce that such job is the las job in the realization.
From definition of Î, Nenergy( ˆSLAZY) ≥ NCi∗ +H and Nenergy(OPTe(Î)) ≤ DCi∗ + 2 ·U +H.
This latter inequality follows because OPTe(Î) has at most 3 idle periods. The energy of one
of them is already accounted in DCi∗ and the energy of the other 2 is upper bounded by 2 ·U .











∗ + 2 · U +H
DCi∗ +H
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The third inequality follows from the fact that idle period preceding Ci∗ is long and then
DCi∗ ≥ U .
4. There is no processing block that starts before and finish strictly after uCi∗−1, and there is a




Figure 4.4.6: Case 4. There is No processing block that starts before and finish strictly after uCi∗−1,
and there is a processing block that starts strictly before and finish strictly after uCi∗
processing block in ˆSLAZY with finishes the latest before time u
C
i∗−1. Let us denote as Bf the
processing block in S∗LAZY that starts strictly before and finish strictly after u
C
i∗ respectively.
Let us denote as δ2 the total workload processed in Bf before time u
C
i∗ , see Figure 4.4.6. Let
Ji∗ = {j ∈ I∗ : uBp < rj ≤ uBf−1} Let Î be the following realization:
• For each job j in Ji∗ release a job at time rj− min
k∈Ji∗




• Release at time uCi∗ − δ2 − 1 − min
k∈Ji∗
rk + 1, δ2 unitary jobs with span smax. Announce
that no other job is going to be released in such realization.
From definition of Î, Nenergy( ˆSLAZY) = NCi∗ and Nenergy(OPTe(Î)) ≤ DCi∗ + 2 · U . This
latter inequality follows because OPTe(Î) has at most 3 idle periods. The energy of one of
them is already accounted in DCi∗ and the energy of the other 2 is upper bounded by 2 · U .











∗ + 2 · U
DCi∗
≤ U +H + 2 · U
U +H
=
3 · U +H
U +H
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The third inequality follows from the fact that DCi∗ ≥ U +H.
Theorem 4.4.2. If SI is the set of instances of a constrained adversary with parameters smax and















. Let n1 be the number of process-
ing blocks in SLAZY whose intersection with the unique idle period of the optimal schedule is non
empty. From Claim 2 in Proposition 4.4.1 it follows that there exist an optimal schedule OPTe(I)
with only long idle periods.
Now we proceed to determine the minimum workload processed in each processing block
B1, . . . , Bn1 to guarantee that the idle period has length at most U + 1.
Let Bi be an arbitrary processing block such that i = 1, . . . , n1. Let us define Q(t, i) =∑
j∈A(t) ωj for an arbitrary i ∈ A(t) and let ρe(t) =
∑
j∈A(t) ρj . From definition of LAZY it
follows that:
lBi ≥ dij −
⌊







For all ti ∈ (uBi−1, lBi ] and some ji ∈ A(ti) with deadline dij . We may assume from now onwards
that ti = l
B
i . From assumption that the optimal schedule has only one idle period together with
definition of Bi, it follows that jobs processed by LAZY in Bi are processed in OPTe(I) in C1, and
thus:
dij ≥ uBi−1 +
n1∑
k=i
[U + 1 +Q(tk, jk)] . (4.4.3)
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Additionally from the maximum span constraint, it follows that the time elapsed between the first
release time of the instance and lC1 is at most smax. We can assume WLOG that the first job is







































The Inequality (4.4.4) follows because ρe(tn) ≥ Q(tn,jn)dnj −uBn−1 . Now we proceed to find a lower bound
in the amount of workload processed at each processing block Bi, i = 1, . . . , n1 using the Inequali-

























k=i (U + 1 +Q(tk, jk))
Q(ti, ji)
− 1
Then it follows that:
Q(ti, ji) ≥
∑n1
k=i+1 [U + 1 +Q(tk, jk)]
Ii
, i < n1 (4.4.5)




Additionally, we can assume WLOG that Ii ≤ U + 1 because LAZY manages power during idle
periods in such a way that an interval larger than U +1 cannot improve the relative performance of
OPT respect to LAZY . After some manipulations of Inequality (4.4.5) and (4.4.6) together with
the assumption Ii ≤ U + 1 for i = 1, . . . , n1 we obtain:




, i = 1, . . . n1 − 1
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Q(tn1 , jn1) ≥ 1.
From the maximum span constraint, the span of any job is at most smax, it follows that from the




[U + 1 +Q(tn−i, jn−i)]









≥ n1 · (U + 1) + 1 +





· n1 · (n1 + 1) · (n1 + 2)
6
Then we can conclude that for a given smax a feasible U and n1 most satisfy the following relation:
n1 · (U + 1)2 +
(
1 +




· (U + 1) + n1 · (n1 + 1) · (n1 + 2)
6
≤ 0
Which is equivalent to:
U + 1 ≤
(




smax − (n1+1)·n12 − 1
)2
− 4 · n1 · n1·(n1+1)·(n1+2)6
2 · n1
. (4.4.7)
Let us denote the RHS of the last inequality as l(n, smax)
l(n, smax) =
(




smax − (n1+1)·n12 − 1
)2
− 4 · n1 · n1·(n1+1)·(n1+2)6
2 · n1
,
and let f(n1, U) be:
f(n1, U) =
2 · n1 · U +
[










From the assumption that the optimal schedule has only one idle period which has length at least












2 · n1 · U +
[











12U2 n+ 3U n2 + 15U n+ 6U + n3 + 6n2 + 5n+ 6
6U2 + 3U n2 + 3U n+ 12U + n3 + 6n2 + 5n+ 6
+ 4.
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= f(n1, U) + 4.
We proceed to find an upper bound on the competitive ratio for a given smax by maximizing
f(n1, U) subject to feasibility constraint impose by the constraint U + 1 ≤ l(n1, smax). The feasi-
bility constraint comes from the Inequality 4.4.7. Let consider the following optimization problem,






l(n1, smax) ≥ U + 1.
U ≥ 0, n1 ≥ 1
To solve this optimization problem we first argue that δf(n1,U)δU is non negative for any value of




6 · (2n− 1) ·
(
3U2 n2 + 3U2 n+ 6U2 + 2U n3 + 12U n2 + 10U n+ 12U + n3 + 6n2 + 5n+ 6
)
((6U2 + 3U n2 + 3U n+ 12U + n3 + 6n2 + 5n+ 6)2
≥ 0,
for any U > 0, n ≥ 1. It follows that there exist an optimal solution of optimization problem 7
such that the feasibility constraint holds with equality. This holds because for any feasible n,
setting U to l(n, smax)− 1 which is non-negative by definition, implies a non-negative improvement





f(n, l(n, smax)− 1)
From definition of f(n,U), f(n, l(n, smax)− 1) could be written as:
f(n, l(n, smax)− 1) =
2 · n · U(n) +Q(n)
U(n) +Q(n)
=
(2 · n− 1) · U(n) + U(n) +Q(n)
U(n) +Q(n)
=
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=
2 · n− 1
1 + Q(n)U(n)
+ 1
≤ 2 · n
1 + Q(n)U(n)
+ 1,
in which Q(n) and U(n) are defined as follow:
Q(n) = 1 +
n · (n+ 1)
2
+
n · (n+ 1) · (n+ 2)
6 (U + 1)
U(n) =
(




smax − (n+1)·n2 − 1
)2
− 4 · n · n·(n+1)·(n+2)6
2 · n
− 1.




and g(n) = 1 + Q(n)U(n) . In Proposition D.0.1 in Appendix D we argued






∈ arg minn h(n) which implies the desired result.
Corollary 4.4.3. If I is an arbitrary realization of a constrained adversary with parameters smax









Proof. From Theorem 4.4.1 it follows that there exist an instance Î such that the competitive ratio
of instance I is at most 3 times the competitive ratio of instance Î. Additionally Î has at most 3
idle periods such that ˆSLAZY processes workload in at most one of them. Thus there is at most
one idle period such that the ratio between the energy consumed by SLAZY during its idle periods
that intersect with the idle period of OPTe(Î) under consideration could be larger than 2, denote
such idle period as I2. The ratio between the energy consumed during I2 in ˆSLAZY and the energy
consumed in OPTe(Î) during the same time interval is upper bounded by the upper bound on the
competitive ratio found among instances in which there exist an optimal schedule with only one
idle period. This follows because in the latter case the adversary is less constraint, thus it is more












This together with the result in Theorem 4.4.2 imply the desired result.
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4.5 Discussion
We presented an online algorithm for the minimum energy scheduling problem when the processor
has two power states and consumes a fixed amount of energy when it transits between power states.
We considered two versions of this problem. We perform a competitive analysis subject to a con-
straint oblivious adversary. In all the cases that we consider we provide bounds as a function of the
upper bound on the span of the jobs that can be released by the adversary, smax. First we study
the problem in which energy minimization is equivalent to minimizing the total number of idle






for smax ≥ 5, 2 for smax ∈ {3, 4} and LAZY is trivially optimal for smax ∈ {1, 2}. We provide an
algorithm with competitive ratio upper bounded by smax2 + 2. Lastly we consider the problem in
which the total energy consumption is a function of the length of each idle period in the resultant
schedule. In this case we provide asymptotic bounds. We show that the competitive ratio of an
arbitrary online algorithm is lower bounded by Θ (ln smax). We also provide an upper bound on








Many questions remain to be answered. Even though we provide an efficient algorithm when
the workload is not necessary integral, our algorithm when the workload is integral does not run in
polynomial time and the bounds that we provide hold when the workload is integral. Is there an
efficient online algorithm with a provable better competitive ratio than our algorithm? We provide
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Figure A.0.1: compatibility graph G. Notice that graph G is a disconnected graph with 4 compo-
nents.
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Figure A.0.2: Output of mechanism BALANCE when applied on G at the end of each step of the
algorithm. (a) step 1 (b) step 2 (c) step 3 (d) step 4.
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Proposition B.0.6. Let f(G) be the output of the algorithm BALANCE-ALL on the graph G. Then
either f(G) is a maximum-cardinality matching, or it maximizes the number of matched nodes for
at least one of the agents. In other words, f(G) maximizes the total score, or the gray score or the
black score.
Proof. Let M be the matching at the end of step 3 of the mechanism BALANCE-ALL (i.e., just before
step 4 is executed). We already know that every M -augmenting path is of one color, and without
loss of generality, we take this to be black. The algorithm terminates after executing step 4 as many
times as needed, updating M in each of those steps. Note that for the algorithm to terminate, either
UR = ∅; or VB = ∅; or the matching M has no black augmenting paths. We show that in the last
case, the algorithm finds a max-cardinality matching, whereas in the other two cases the algorithm
maximizes the number of gray nodes that are matched. If UR = ∅, every gray node is matched, so
the gray score is maximized in M := f(G) trivially. Similarly, if there is no black augmenting path
with respect to M , then there is no augmenting path with respect to M (as no augmenting path
involving a free gray node is created in the last step), and so M is a max-cardinality matching.
The only remaining case to consider is when VB = ∅, but UR 6= ∅. We wish to argue that M
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maximizes the gray score. Let M ′ be a matching that maximizes the gray score (and if there are
many such matchings, pick one with maximum cardinality, breaking ties arbitrarily). We argue that
the gray score in M is exactly the same as that in M ′. Consider the components of the symmetric
difference of M and M ′. It is well known that each component in the symmetric difference is either
an even-length cycle, or a path (of odd or even length).
• In an even-length cycle both M and M ′ match all the nodes, and hence the same number of
gray nodes.
• In an even-length path, we claim that both leaf nodes must belong to the same agent. If not,
there is a gray leaf node and a black one; if the gray leaf node is not matched by M , there is
an even-length alternating path from a gray node to a black node, contradicting VB = ∅; if the
gray leaf node is matched by M , then flipping the edges of M and M ′ only in this component,
we can find a matching M ′′ that matches more gray nodes than M ′ does, contradicting the
definition of M ′. And when both leaf nodes belong to the same agent, both M and M ′ match
the same number of gray nodes.
• In an odd-length path, if the first and last edges are matched in M , both M and M ′ match
the same number of gray nodes (as the leaf nodes of the path have to be black, otherwise it
contradicts definition of matching M ′). If the first and last edges are matched in M ′, then
the two leaf nodes of the path have to be black as well: otherwise there is an M -augmenting
path from a gray node, which we assume does not exist. Again, M and M ′ match the same
number of gray nodes.
Thus we find that M matches the same number of gray nodes as M ′. As M ′ maximizes the
gray score, so does M .
Proposition B.0.7. Mechanism BALANCE-ALL is strategyproof.
Proof. Let G be an arbitrary graph and let f(G) be the output of mechanism BALANCE-ALL for
graph G. Let Re be the maximum gray score in the graph (over all matchings); similarly, let Be be
the maximum black score. For any matching M , we let µR(M) and µB(M) be, respectively, the
number of gray and black nodes matched in M . For an arbitrary graph F , we denote as µ(F ) the
number of nodes matched in a maximum cardinality matching of graph F . Recall that Ri (resp. Bi)
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denotes the maximum number of nodes matched by the gray (resp. black) agent in the subgraph
induced by the gray (resp. black) nodes alone. Proposition B.0.6 implies that the outcome of
BALANCE-ALL is a maximum-cardinality matching, or one that maximizes the gray score, or one
that maximizes the black score. We prove that BALANCE-ALL is strategyproof in each case.
Suppose BALANCE-ALL finds a maximum cardinality matching f(G) on the graph G. Then
µR(f(G)) = Ri + ∆ and µB(f(G)) = Bi + ∆, for some ∆ ≤ min{Re − Ri, Be − Bi, µ(G)−Ri−Bi2 }.
Suppose the black agent “hides” a subset of his nodes so that H is the subgraph induced by the
hidden nodes (known only to the black agent), and let G′ = {Gk} the set of graphs seen by the
mechanism. For the black agent to do strictly better with this strategy, the gray agent must
do strictly worse as BALANCE-ALL found a max-cardinality matching on G. Thus, we must have




∆′ = Ri + ∆
′. This implies that ∆′ < ∆. Now, the number of black nodes matched when black
hides is simply µ(H) + µB(f(G
′)), and we have:
µ(H) + µB(f(G





≤ Bi + ∆′ < Bi + ∆ = µB(f(G)).
Thus, it is not possible for the black agent to do better by hiding any portion of his subgraph in
this case. A similar argument applies for the gray agent.
Suppose BALANCE-ALL maximizes the score of one of the agents. Without loss of generality, we
assume that it maximizes the score of the gray agent, and so µR(f(G)) = Re. Clearly, the gray
agent has no incentive to manipulate in this case. Again, suppose the black agent hides a subset of
his nodes so that H is the induced subgraph, and let {Gk} the set of graphs seen by the mechanism.




Bki + (Re −Ri).
To see why, note that the additional utility over the utility that each agent can achieve on their
own on the manipulated graph G′, ∆′, is equal to min
{













which is upper bounded by Re−Ri, because R′e ≤ Re. The latter implies that ∆′ < Re−Ri. This




i ≤ Bi imply that the black agent does not benefit from
hiding any of its nodes.
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Proposition B.0.8. The Mechanism BALANCE-ALL-AND-AUGMENT can be implemented in polyno-
mial time, has an approximation ratio of 4/3, and is truthful in expectation.
Proof. That BALANCE-ALL-AND-AUGMENT can be implemented in polynomial time is straightforward.
The expected number of nodes matched by BALANCE-ALL-AND-AUGMENT is at least 1/2 opt with
probability 1/2, and the output of BALANCE, which is a maximal matching, with probability 1/2.
Simplifying, we find that this mechanism matches at least 3/4 opt, proving the approximation
ratio. Note that this mechanism returns a maximal matching, and by a result of Caragiannis et
al. [15], this is best possible among mechanisms that always return a maximal matching. The only
property we need to prove is that the mechanism is truthful in expectation.
It follows clearly that an agent that has an expected utility equal to the maximum utility that
it could achieves in G has no interest in be untruthful, thus we may assume that if an agent has
incentive to be untruthful, it has an expected utility strictly less than the best that its maximum
possible utility in graph G. Assume WLOG that agent black has incentive to hide some of its
nodes.
We shall show that when the black agent hides a subset of nodes, the expected gain from this
manuever in step 2 is offset by an equal or larger loss in step 1. As the matchings computed in
these steps are equally likely to be chosen, the result follows. As before, suppose black hides a set
of nodes such that H is the subgraph induced by these hidden black nodes (known only to the black
agent) and G′ = {Gk} is the graph induced by all remaining nodes in G. Let M be the output
of BALANCE-ALL on G and let M ′ the output of BALANCE-ALL on G′ together with a maximum
cardinality matching of H; let opt be the max-cardinality matchings obtained augmenting all
the augmenting paths respect to M and let opt’ be the matching obtained from augmenting
all augmenting paths respect to the output of BALANCE-ALL on G′ together with the maximum
cardinality matching of H.
Define ∆BR := min{Re−Ri, Be−Bi, µ(opt)− Bi+Ri2 }. The definition of BALANCE-ALL implies
that µB(M) = Bi + ∆BR: the last term in the definition of ∆BR accounts for the case when
BALANCE-ALL finds a max-cardinality matching; in that case, exactly as many additional gray
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nodes are matched as the number of additional black nodes, and the total score should be µ(opt),
so the gain of µ(opt)− (Bi + Ri) is shared equally by both agents. Similarly, we can define ∆′BR
as the number of gray nodes matched by BALANCE in G′ beyond Ri(B
′
i).
Consider the gray score in the graph G′. This is given by Ri + ∆
′
BR. But we also know that
or the gray score in M is the maximum possible or M is a maximum cardinality matching of G.
In both cases, it follows that ∆BR ≥ ∆′BR. Thus, ∆BR = ∆′BR + δ for some δ ≥ 0. We shall show
that:
µB(opt’) ≤ µB(opt) + δ, (B.0.1)
and that
δ + µB(M
′) ≤ µB(M). (B.0.2)
Adding these inequalities, we find µB(opt’) + µB(M
′) ≤ µB(opt) + µB(M), which implies the
result. Inequality (B.0.2) follows trivially from definition of M and M ′:




≥ Bi + ∆′BR + δ −Bi −∆′BR
= δ




BR = Ri+∆BR−δ; using µR(M) = Ri+∆BR, we see that µR(M)−µR(M ′) =
δ. But we already know that µR(opt) = µR(M), and µR(opt’) ≥ µR(M ′). Putting all this
together, we have
µR(opt)− µR(opt’) ≤ µR(M)− µR(M ′) = δ. (B.0.3)
Note that µR(opt)+µB(opt) is the size of the max-cardinality matching in the original graph,
and µR(opt’) + µB(opt’) is the size of a matching of G obtained when black matches some of his
nodes internally, and the rest of the graph is matched optimally. Trivially, we have:
µR(opt’) + µB(opt’) ≤ µR(opt) + µB(opt),
which when rearranged gives
µB(opt’)− µB(opt) ≤ µR(opt)− µR(opt’) ≤ δ,
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where the last inequality follows from inequality (B.0.3).
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The data source is publicly available in the the Organ procurement and transplantation network
(OPTN) website1. “OPTN is the unified transplant network established by the United States
Congress under the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA) of 1984.”
C.1 Forecasting the UNO’s waiting list arrival in the next 10 years
For each blood type we use the time series of the yearly number of patients that arrive by first time
to the UNO’s waiting list to forecast the number of patients that will arrive in the next 10 years
(our time study horizon) to the UNO’s waiting list. This will allow us to forecast the proportion
of each ABO blood type in the stream of arrivals in our time study horizon.
Let {xpt (b)} denote the time series of yearly patient’s additions to the UNO’s waiting list for blood
type b ∈ {O,A,B,AB}. Figure C.1.1 shows the time plot of the number of patients of each ABO
blood type that joined the UNO’s waiting list by first time from 1995 to 2012. From the time plots
in figure C.1.1 we observe that the time series corresponding to each blood type waiting list’s new
additions have a trend and so they are not stationary.
In Figure C.2.2 we plot the time series corresponding to xpt (b)−x
p
t−1(b) and their autocorrelation
(ACF) and partial autocorrelation function (PACF). The resulting ACF and PACF reveal uncorre-
1http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/optn/
150
APPENDIX C. PARAMETERS ESTIMATION: TECHNICAL REPORT
lated time series, allowing us to conclude that the time series xpt (b)−x
p
t−1(b) for b ∈ {O,A,B,AB}
can be modeled as a constant plus an unrelated error term. In a more general sense, it suggests




+ εt in which ε ∼ N (m,σ2), is a good candidate
































































Figure C.1.1: Time plots of time series xpt (b) for b ∈ {O,A,B,AB}
b ∈ {O,A,B,AB} and analyze the residuals. The analysis of the residuals include test of normality
(Shapiro-Wilk test) and independence (Box-Ljung test). For all ABO blood types the null hypoth-
esis of normality can not be rejected with a level of significance of 1%. A similar result hold for the
independence test, for all ABO blood type the null hypothesis of independence can not be rejected
with a level of significants of 1%. See Table C.1 for the details.
Then we conclude that the time series of the new yearly additions to the UNO’s waiting list
for each ABO blood type can be modeled as an AR(1) time series. We finally use these models to
forecast the number of patients of each ABO blood type that will arrives to the UNO’s waiting list
in the next 10 years (study time horizon), see Table C.2. We use as forecasting method Kalman
filter through the built-in predict procedure in R.
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Parameters estimation Shapiro-Wilk test Box-Ljung test
α̂(O) = 0.99 µ̂(O) = 11050




df = 1, p-value = 0.8331
α̂(A) = 0.98 µ̂(A) = 7452




df = 1, p-value = 0.6047
α̂(B) = 0.98 µ̂(B) = 3331




df = 1, p-value = 0.1308
α̂(AB) = 0.98 µ̂(AB) = 863




df = 1, p-value = 0.1934
Table C.1: AR(1) estimated parameters of times series xpt (p) for p ∈ {O,A,B,AB} and the corre-
sponding analysis of residuals (normality and independence).






the time series of the yearly number of living donors of blood type b ∈
{O,A,B,AB} that have donated to the UNO’s waiting list form 1989 to 2012. Figure C.2.1 shows




for b ∈ {O,A,B,AB}. Time plots in Figure C.2.1 suggest
that for all the ABO blood types the time series of living donors that donated to the UNO’s waiting
list is not stationary and present a trend. In Figure C.2.3 we plot the time series corresponding
to ydt (b) − ydt−1(b) and their ACF and PACF. The resulting ACF and PACF reveal uncorrelated
time series, suggesting that the time series ydt (b) − ydt−1(b) for b ∈ {O,A,B,AB} can be modeled
as a constant plus an unrelated error term. In a more general sense, it suggests that AR(1),




+ εt in which ε ∼ N (m,σ2), is a good candidate to model ydt (b)
for every b ∈ {O,A,B,AB}. Next we estimate the parameters β(b) and υ(b) for b ∈ {O,A,B,AB}
and analyze the residuals. The analysis of the residuals include test of normality (Shapiro-Wilk
test) and independence (Ljung-Box test). For all ABO blood types the null hypothesis of normality
can not be rejected with a level of significance of 5%. A similar result holds for the independence
test, for all ABO blood type the null hypothesis of independence can not be rejected with a level
of significants of 5%. See Table C.3 for the details. Then we conclude that the time series of the
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ABO 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
x̂pt (O) 14933 14878 14824 14770 14718 14666 14614 14564 14514 14465
σ (x̂pt (O)) 627 881 1071 1228 1364 1484 1591 1690 1780 1863
x̂pt (A) 9873 9833 9795 9756 9719 9682 9646 9610 9575 9540
σ (x̂pt (A)) 419 588 715 819 908 987 1057 1121 1180 1234
x̂pt (B) 4461 4444 4428 4411 4395 4380 4364 4349 4334 4319
σ (x̂pt (B)) 187 262 319 365 405 441 473 502 528 553
x̂pt (AB) 1164 1158 1152 1146 1140 1135 1129 1124 1119 1113
σ (x̂pt (AB)) 57 80 97 111 123 133 143 151 159 166
Table C.2: Predicted number of arrivals of each ABO blood type in 10 years time horizon











































































Figure C.2.1: Time plots of time series ydt (b) for b ∈ {O,A,B,AB}
number of living donors that donated to the UNO’s waiting list for each ABO blood type can be
modeled as an AR(1) time series. We finally use these models to forecast the number of donors of
each ABO blood type that will arrives to the UNO’s waiting list in the next 10 years (study time
horizon), see Table C.4. We use as forecasting method Kalman filter through the built-in predict
procedure in R.
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Parameters estimation Shapiro-Wilk test Ljung-Box test
α̂(O) = 0.99 µ̂(O) = 2717




df = 1, p-value = 0.1126
α̂(A) = 0.98 µ̂(A) = 1112




df = 1, p-value = 0.2579
α̂(B) = 0.98 µ̂(B) = 331




df = 1, p-value = 0.3158
α̂(AB) = 0.7 µ̂(AB) = 38




df = 1, p-value = 0.107
Table C.3: AR(1) estimated parameters of times series ydt (p) for p ∈ {O,A,B,AB} and the corre-
sponding analysis of residuals (normality and independence).
ABO 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
x̂pt (O) 4192 4171 4150 4130 4110 4091 4071 4052 4033 4015
σ (x̂pt (O)) 242 339 412 473 525 571 613 651 685 718
x̂pt (A) 1681 1673 1664 1656 1648 1640 1632 1624 1616 1609
σ (x̂pt (A)) 96 134 163 187 208 226 242 257 271 283
x̂pt (B) 478 474 471 468 464 461 458 455 452 450
σ (x̂pt (B)) 31 43 53 60 66 72 77 81 85 89
x̂pt (AB) 48 46 44 42 41 41 40 40 39 39
σ (x̂pt (AB)) 9 11 12 13 13 14 14 14 14 14
Table C.4: Predicted yearly number of living donors by ABO blood type that will be transplanted
in 2013-2022 time horizon
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ACF ABO−O patient arrivals





















PACF ABO−O patient arrivals 












































ACF ABO−A patients arrivals





















PACF ABO−A patients arrivals 












































ACF ABO−B patients arrivals





















PACF ABO−B patients arrivals 













































ACF ABO−AB patients arrivals





















PACF ABO−AB patients arrivals 
Figure C.2.2: Time plot, ACF and PACF of xpt (b)− x
p
t−1(b) for b ∈ {O,A,B,AB}
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ACF ABO−O living donors arrivals





















PACF ABO−O living donors arrivals 















































ACF ABO−A living donors arrivals





















PACF ABO−A living donors arrivals 















































ACF ABO−B living donors arrivals





















PACF ABO−B living donors arrivals 



















































ACF ABO−AB living donors arrivals





















PACF ABO−AB living donors arrivals 
Figure C.2.3: Time plot, ACF and PACF of ydt (b)− ydt−1(b) for b ∈ {O,A,B,AB}
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Appendix D
Proposition used in Proof of
Theorem 4.4.2










Q(n) = 1 +
n · (n+ 1)
2
+
n · (n+ 1) · (n+ 2)
6 (U + 1)
U(n) =
(




smax − (n+1)·n2 − 1
)2
− 4 · n · n·(n+1)·(n+2)6
2 · n
− 1.
Proof. We start arguing that h′(1) is non negative, then we will argue that the numerator of h′(n)
is non-increasing and we will finish exposing that h′(n) is negative for at least one value in the
domain of h(n). These will allow us to conclude that h(n) has exactly one stationary point in all
its domain. Then it will follow that h(n) has a global maximizer.
From definition h′(n) = 2·g(n)−2·n·g
′(n)
g(n)2
. Let us define the following functions:




− smax + 1
)2
− 8n2 (n+ 1) (n+ 2)
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+ n2 + 2




+ n2 + 2
V (n, smax) =
n
6







From manipulations it follows that:








W (n, smax)Z(n, smax)
−
16n5































32n3 (n + 1) (n + 2)
W (n, smax)Z(n, smax)
+

























































9 smax + 9
√
smax (smax − 4) + 16
)
√








smax (smax − 4)− 4
)
+1
Which is positive for smax = 10 (≈ 0.2720) and which, as we will argue is non decreasing respect
to smax, then it follows that g(1)− g′(1) is positive for all smax ≥ 10. To argue that g(1)− g′(1) is
increasing respect to smax we expose its derivative, respect to smax, [g(1)− g′(1)]′, and argue that





= 91392 smax + 28672
√
smax (smax − 4) + 13904 (smax (smax − 4))
3
2
+3792 (smax (smax − 4))
5
2 − 139264 smax2 + 101168 smax3 − 29664 smax4
+2352 smax
5 + 144 smax
6 − 2176 smax
√
smax (smax − 4)
+3936 smax (smax (smax − 4))
3










2 − 1200 (smax (smax − 4))
5
2 − 240 (smax (smax − 4))
7
2
−768 (smax (smax − 4))
3
2 − 59136 smax3 + 57792 smax4 − 27600 smax5
+7008 smax
6 − 912 smax7 + 48 smax8 + 192 smax (smax (smax − 4))
3
2
+288 smax (smax (smax − 4))
5
2 + 48 smax (smax (smax − 4))
7
2
respectively, are increasing and given that both have values for smax = 10 positive, 3.4140e+ 008,
8.9787e+ 008 respectively. Then it follows that [g(1)− g′(1)]′ is positive for all smax ≥ 10, then we
can conclude that g(1)− g′(1) is increasing in smax. Then h′(1) is positive for all smax ≥ 10.
To show that g(n)−n g′(n) is decreasing. First we argue that 2n3−4nW (n,smax) is decreasing. We will show
that W (1, smax) is negative and
1
W (n,smax)
is decreasing, which imply that 1W (n,smax) is a decreasing
function in n and multiplying by an increasing function, positive for all n ≥ 2 results in a decreasing
function.
W (1, smax) = 8−
√
36 (smax − 2)2 − 144
3
− 2 smax
< 0 ∀smax ≥ 4
and the derivative of 1W (n,smax) respect to n is negative for all n ≥ 2, smax ≥ 4:
−
9




















2 − smax + 1
)2
− 8n2 (n+ 1) (n+ 2) + 6
)2 ,
Which imply that 1W (n,smax) is negative for n ≥ 1 and decreasing, then multiplying by 2n
3 − 4n
just made this function decrease faster, for n ≥ 2.
Now we will argue that 32n
3−16n5−32n3 (n+1) (n+2)
W (n,smax)Z(n,smax)
is also decreasing. To show this we will show
that 1Z(n,smax)W (n,smax) is increasing and start positive. Which implies that this latter function
multiply by the decreasing function 32n3 − 16n5 − 32n3 (n+ 1) (n+ 2) that is negative for n = 1
result in a decreasing function. Let us define the following functions:




− smax + 1
)2





6n+ 36 smax + 72n smax + 162n
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Then first derivative of 1Z(n,smax)W (n,smax) respect to n can be written as:
27 (B(n, smax) + 2n+ 1)(




A(n, smax) + 3n2 + 6
)2 (




A(n, smax)− 3n2 − 6
)
+
27 (B(n, smax) + 2n+ 5)(




A(n, smax)− 3n2 − 6
) (




A(n, smax) + 3n2 + 6
)2










































− smax + 1
)2
− 8n2 (n+ 1) (n+ 2) + 6
)2 ≥ 0, ∀n ≥ 1.











is decreasing. For that we will argue
that 1
Z2(n,smax)








and positive. Given that we previously argued that 1W (n,smax) is decreasing and negative, then it
























2 − smax + 1
)2
+ 8n2 (n+ 1) (n+ 2)− 6
)3







, let us define the functionD(n, smax)
and F (n, smax) as:





2 − smax + 1
)2
− 8n2 (n+ 1) (n+ 2)(
n
6














2 − smax + 1
)2
− 8n2 (n+ 1) (n+ 2)
Then derivative can be written as:
n4 (n+ 1) D(n, smax) + n
4 (n+ 2) D(n, smax) + 4n
3 (n+ 1) (n+ 2) D(n, smax)
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2n+ 12 smax + 24n smax + 54n









































is decreasing in n. From the fact that 1/W (n, smax) is negative for n ≥ 1 and decreasing, it fol-






1 is increasing and is positive in all its domain. To express its derivative, let us define the following
function:





2 − smax + 1
)2
− 24n2 (n+ 1) (n+ 2)
3
− n2 − 2








8n (n+ 1) (n+ 2)
G(n, smax)
+
4n2 (n+ 1) (n+ 2)




























































− smax + 1
)2
− 8n2 (n+ 1) (n+ 2) .




























respect to n can be
written as:




2 + 9K(n, smax)n
2
161





































































and the denominator can be written as:
12K(n, smax).







































4 ≥ 0. We can conclude that g(n)− n g
′(n) is decreasing in all the domain of h(n). Now we would
like to expose a value of n for which g(n) − n g′(n) is negative. Let us define n̂ as the solution of
the following equation:(
smax −





2 · n̂2 · (n̂+ 1) · (n̂+ 2)
3
From definition of g(n) it follows that g(n)− n g′(n) can be written as:










U2(n) +Q(n)U(n)− nQ′(n)U(n) + nQ(n)U ′(n)
U2(n)
We claim that h′(n̂− ε), ε is an arbitrary small positive value, is negative. To prove is enough to
argue that:
U2(n̂− ε) +Q(n̂− ε)U(n̂− ε)− (n̂− ε)Q′(n̂− ε)U(n̂− ε) + (n̂− ε)Q(n̂− ε)U ′(n̂− ε) < 0.
We will argue that U ′(n̂ε) is an arbitrary large negative number. Let us define P (n, smax) as:




− smax + 1
)2
− 2n
2 (n+ 1) (n+ 2)
3
From definition of U(n) it follows that U ′(n) is:
U ′(n) = −
smax − n (n+1)2 +
√
P (n, smax)− 1
2n2
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By continuity to the left of P (n, smax) and definition of n̂ it follows that P (n̂−ε, smax) is arbitrarily
close to 0. Then it follows that U ′(n̂− ε) is an arbitrarily large negative number. From definition
of Q(n), Q(n) is an increasing function, then Q’(n)¿0, additionally U(n) and Q(n) are positive, in
all the domain of h(n). Then we can conclude that h′(n̂ − ε) < 0. Now we proceed to maximize
function h(n) when smax is large. Let n = s
1
3







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































′ = −s−εmax · log smax +
4 s−2 εmax log smax(

















≈ −s−εmax · log smax +
4 s−2 εmax log smax(






Then we need to solve the following equation:
−s−εmax +
4 s−2 εmax(





















max ≈ 2 s−2 εmax
Thus ε = 0. Then it follows that for smax large, n
∗ = s
1
3
max maximizes h(n).
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